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ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is mathematical proof 
involving the use of computers. The proof in 19?6 
of the Four-Colour Theorem, in which an essential lemma 
is proved using a computer program which took over 
1200 hours of computer time to complete, raises 
philosophical questions concerning the epistemological 
status of the proof and the extent to which its acceptance 
as a proof effects an alteration in the traditional concept 
of mathematical proof.
Section I provides an exposition of this proof and 
a discussion of the Kantian conception of a priori 
knowledge to provide a background for the following 
analysis of the philosophical controversy which immediately 
developed after the publication of the proof. The 
unsurveyable length of the proof gave rise to the view 
that its structure was fundamentally empirical and closer 
to a scientific experiment than a traditional a priori 
proof. Objectors to this view claimed that the proof 
differed from most others only in that its empirical 
content was greater. No essential qualitative difference 
was involved.
These views are examined, and an analysis of those 
of Frege and J,S, Mill are used to support the opinion 
that a detailed reassessment of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction is necessary to clarify the issues raised by 
this type of proof.
Section II provides an account of recent developments 
in epistemology with particular reference to the a priori/ 
a posteriori distinction and favours an analysis of this 
distinction based on differences in types of psychological 
process required to generate knowledge. It is maintained 
that this type of "psychologistic" analysis provides a 
clarification rather than a rejection of the Kantian 
conception of the distinction and shows clearly that 
the Four-Colour Theorem does significantly differ from 
previous purely formal proofs._ The conclusion is that 
acceptance of unsurveyably long computer proofs by 
the mathematical community involves relinquishing a 
characteristic of proof formerly held to be essential.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 1977 letters emanating from the Department 
of Mathematics at the University of Illinois bore a meter 
stamp proclaiming in large letters that "Four Colors 
Suffice", The purpose of this rather puzzling declara­
tion was to honour the publication by two members of that 
department of a solution to a mathematical problem that 
had remained intractable for more than a hundred years.
The conjecture was attractive in its simplicity. It 
was just that every map drawn on a sheet of paper could be 
coloured using only four colours, in such a way that no two 
areas with a common border were the same colour. The proof 
of this conjecture was formidable.
In October 1977, the Scientific American published a 
report by Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken, the two mathe­
maticians from Illinois, entitled "The Solution of the Four- 
Color Map Problem". What emerged from a reading of this 
report was that this proof had some very uncharacteristic 
features, the most significant of which was its length. The 
method of proof involved a lemma which was itself proved 
using a fantastic twelve hundred hours of computer time, A 
print-out of the work done on the computer was so long that 
the time required to check it would easily exceed a human 
lifetime. The proof was unsurveyable. Questions were 
quickly raised in philosophical circles concerning this proof, 
and it is a discussion of those questions which is the sub­
stance of this thesis. The course of the discussion leads
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quickly into areas of general epistemology. The Four- 
Colour Theorem, if accepted as a genuine proof, and 
clearly it has been so accepted by the mathematical world, 
exhibits a counter-example to the traditional belief that 
mathematical knowledge is a priori knowledge. What is 
required is a re-examination of the distinction between 
a priori and a posteriori knowledge. In doing this I hope 
to show how some recent work in epistemology can clarify 
this distinction, and provide a way of answering some of 
the questions surrounding this unusual and exciting proof.
3 .
SECTION I 
CHAPTER I
Naming and Necessity and the Four-Colour Theorem
(a) Kripke. Kant and A priori Truth
Before embarking on an exposition of the proof of the 
Four-Colour Theorem (l shall sometimes abbreviate this title 
from here on to 4ct), a discussion of some of the ideas and 
suggestions put forward by Kripke in "Naming and Necessity" 
(1972) will be useful as an exposition of some concepts and 
distinctions fundamental to the philosophical issues with 
which it is involved.
The first distinction is that between statements being 
necessary and statements being a priori. These terms, 
"necessary" and "a priori", Kripke believes to be used inter­
changeably by the majority of philosophers and there is 
certainly evidence for this view.
"Ifhat is it that makes necessary truths necessary? It 
is that they are knowable a priori; indeed, the terms 
"necessary truth" and "truth knowable a priori" are inter­
changeable expressions", (Hospers, 1973, p.l8o). Nevertheless 
I think Kripke could be overstating the case in claiming that 
the majority fail to draw any distinction.
In any case, it does seem odd that anyone should even 
have thought the two expressions to be synonymous - if only 
from consideration of the results of replacing one with another 
in commonplace sentences. For example, it appears perfectly 
in order to say, "I know *x* a priori", where *x* here is 
perhaps, "The square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled
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triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two 
sides". To substitute in this sentence, ^necessarilygives 
"I know  ^necessarily", which is not only grammatically 
uncomfortable, but also asserts a completely different 
proposition and a false one at that. No matter what route 
we take in the acquisition of any knowledge we have, we do 
not know anything at all ^necessarily * for very obvious 
reasons. Even given that we exist, a purely contingent 
matter, we might be in a coma, or severely brain-damaged, or 
defective in some way, and thereby cannot easily be said to 
know anything at all. The only case where the substitution 
of one term for another can plausibly be made, is that where 
the terms are used as descriptive of propositions, as for 
example in "^2 + 2 = 4" is a priori true % and *"2 + 2 = 4 "  
is necessarily true *, But the fact that some substitutions 
yield grammatical sentences seems little reason for claiming 
synonymy for the terms substituted.
Kripke's account of the traditional view of the meaning 
of *a priori % which, as he claims, derives from Kant, is that 
a priori truths are those which can be known "independently of 
any experience".
Certainly Kant describes a priori knowledge in this way, 
but it is also clear from what he says, although Kripke does 
not mention this, that far from treating the terms "necessary" 
and "a priori" as synonymous, Kant took the view that "necessity" 
is a criterion for a priori knowledge, distinct but inseparable 
from what he calls "strict universality",
He argues as follows - a priori knowledge is knowledge 
independent of experience. "Experience teaches us that 
a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise".
(Kant, trans. Kemp Smith, 1933, p.43). Those propositions 
of which we know both that they are true and that they cannot 
be false, i.e. necessary propositions, therefore cannot be 
learned from experience and must consequently be known a priori. 
The important point is not that the truth of some of these 
propositions cannot be discovered experimentally. It is 
believed that Pythagoras ' theorem was known to the Babylonians 
and used for architectural purposes. Kant is asserting that 
the necessity of certain propositions cannot be known from 
experience.
It does appear then that Kant was well aware that he was 
using "necessarily" as a metaphysical concept and ’a priori * 
as an epistemological one. The only reason for the subsequent 
conflation of the two terms is his implied assertion that no 
necessary proposition can be known a posteriori. The two classes 
of propositions would on this view be co-extensive and in 
certain circumstances the names for these classes could be 
confused without serious difficulties arising for either writer 
or reader.
It is this co-extensiveness of the classes of statement 
that Kripke does not accept. He is in fact challenging Kant *s 
first assumption, that is, the claim that we cannot discover 
experimentally that any statements are necessarily true.
Before going any further into the arguments by which 
Kripke attacks Kant *s premise, it is worthwhile to raise some
o ,
questions concerning the terms Kant uses.
It can be asked, exactly what is implied by the 
expression "knowing something independently of experience" 
since this is supposed to be what "knowing something a priori" 
means.
Certainly, one characterization of this process is 
to know of a particular statement that it is true or false 
merely by reflecting on the meaning of words; that no 
empirical evidence can be relevant to the determination of 
its truth value. It is often suggested that, "Given the concept 
'square ' and given the concept 'round ', we can know a priori 
that, for example, 'x ' is a round square is not only false but 
necessarily false." As far as they go, remarks like this seem 
to be perfectly in order. Nevertheless, there is the assumption 
made, in the use of expression "given the concept square" that 
the acquisition of an understanding of the concept 'square ' is 
somehow irrelevant to, or plays no part in the way that we 
know statements using it to be true, and also an assumption 
that everyone 's individual understanding of the concept is 
identical once it has been acquired. None of this is entirely 
obvious. There is at the very least the trivial point to be 
made that our understanding of most of the concepts we have 
grasped is acquired by experience and observation. It is 
perhaps possible, though unlikely, that an understanding of 
'square ' could have been gained in the first instance by 
following the deductions made from Euclid 's postulates, but 
for most people the word is learnt, I expect, by learning the 
role it plays in language ; how it is used to distinguish one
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shape in contrast to another.
It does not really matter if there are any concepts 
which are learnt independently of experience (the concept of 
a complex number, for example) since there are plenty of 
concepts, such as colour predicates, which I do not think are 
learnt other than purely experientially. This is not to 
suggest that the possibility of innate knowledge can be ruled 
out a priori, but the claim that some concepts are innate lacks 
any explanatory power. It amounts to little more than the 
assertion that we do not know how these concepts are acquired. 
There is, it would appear, always some degree of experience 
required for our understanding of such statements as "every­
thing blue is extended", and it cannot consequently be said 
that our a priori knowledge of the truth of this statement has 
been gained independently of all experience. Perhaps what is 
intended by the expression "independent of experience" is just 
that the truth value of propositions like "everything blue 
is extended", and unlike "this flower is blue", can be 
determined without any appeal to particular observations, but 
it still remains the case that concepts are acquired by 
learning a language and the justification of a proposition as 
a priori, though not appealing to sensory experiences, is 
nevertheless dependent on an empirical phenomenon; that of the 
language of some members of a species of living being. The 
expression 'independent of experience * must be interpreted as 
allowing for an experience rich enough for a competent grasp of 
a language to be acquired, since the alternative would commit 
us to the view that all a priori knowledge is innate.
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Kripke's point is that, given an adequate account of what
it is for a proposition to be known a priori, it is not always
the case that propositions which can be known a priori, are
known a priori. Ho asserts that it is possible for particular
individuals to know some statements, of the sort usually
regarded as true a priori, by empirical means. He gives us
the example of a computer providing us with the information
that a particular number is prime. This number is presumably
one which has never been proved to be prime before. If we
can be said on the basis of this evidence to know that the
number is prime, it does seem to be the case that we know it
to be so, a posteriori. In order, however, to claim that
therefore we know something a posteriori which could have been
knoim a priori, we do, I think, need rather more evidence than
Kripke provides that this example could in fact be kno^m to be
true a priori. He does not adopt a very strong position, but
merely maintains that it is a statement of the kind which
belongs "in the realm of such statements that can be known
*a priori*," (l972, p,26l) In other words, since we know
that we can calculate or prove a priori that certain numbers
are prime, he assumes that this is a possibility open to us in-
every case. The assumption is one of realism; for any number,
however large, either it is prime or not, independently of
whether we can discover which is the case: the further
assumption Kripke is making is that an application of the
procedure by which some numbers are shoifn to be prime, will
provide an a priori proof of the primacy of any number whatever.
I have no wish to argue in favour of an anti-realist theory of
/
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truth, here, simply to note that the realist view is one that 
can be challenged. As far as the second assumption is 
concerned, I believe Kripke to be mistaken in thinking that 
what can be shown to be the case with respect to one number 
by a priori means necessarily can be shown for a larger one, 
for although there is a method available for discovering 
whether a particular number is prime or not, that is, by 
dividing it successively by all the primes prior to its square
root, it is an extremely long and tedious business. Prime
numbers rapidly become very large and increasingly far apart 
in the series of natural numbers and it would take only a 
relatively short time for the required calculation to exceed 
the capacity of most modern computers, let alone that of any 
individual mathematician. Such a proof may well turn out to 
be unsurveyably long.
Kripke *s example appears in some ways, therefore, to 
resemble the case of the famous Four-Colour Theorem, in that 
it appears to be an instance of the type of knowledge supposed 
to be a priori which in fact can only be known a posteriori, and 
not as he suggests just knowable by either route.
The proof published in 1977 of the Four-Colour Theorem by
the research team at the University of Illinois raises some
very interesting questions not only to do with the nature of 
proof in mathematics, but also with regard to the a priori/ 
a posteriori distinction; questions which are relevant here,
(b) The Proof of the Four-Colour Theorem
It was in I852 that Francis Guthrie of University College, 
London, in a letter to his brother, Frederick, (recorded by
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Appel & Haken, 197^) asked if it was possible to prove that 
every geographical map could be coloured, using only four 
colours, so that countries sharing a common border wore all 
coloured differently. The approach to the successful proof of 
this conjecture was first used by Alfred Bray Kempe in 1878.
Ho attempted to show via a classical reductio ad absurdum 
argument that the assumption of a map requiring five colours 
led to a contradiction, and that therefore four colours suffice.
Kempe*s proof was unfortunately inadequate in some parts 
and in the years that followed mathematicians struggled to 
eradicate the difficulties. Finally the research team at 
Illinois published their findings:- the conjecture was true.
The result was achieved using three basic notions; firstly, 
they needed a definition of a 'normal* map, Kempe had shown 
that if the theorem could be proved for 'normal ' maps it would 
hold for all maps. Secondly, the notion of an 'unavoidable 
configuration' was developed, and thirdly, that of a "reducible 
configuration", Appel & Haken explain these ideas as follows: 
"in every normal map there is at least one country with two, 
three, four or five neighbours. This may be expressed by the 
statement that the set of "configurations" consisting of a 
country with two neighbours, a country with four neighbours, 
and a country with five neighbours is 'unavoidable',.,.,,
A configuration is intuitively reducible if there is a way of 
showing, solely by examining the configuration and the way in 
which chains of countries are aligned, that the configuration 
cannot possibly appear in a minimal five-chromatic map,"
The objective was to find an unavoidable set of reducible
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configurations, Kenipe attempted to prove that there was a 
sot of four simple ones, but the final proof, by Appel &
Haken & Koch, required a set of 18OO very complex figures.
It is here that the matter becomes philosophically interesting, 
for the proof procedure was so long, involving essentially 
hundreds of hours of computer time, that it becomes practically, 
and probably, even in principle, impossible to check the proof 
by liand (or head) computation. That is, assuming that the
checking of the proof would, in order to count as checked, have
to be carried out by a single human being, the length of time 
required to do so would exceed any reasonable lifetime.
Details of the method by which the proof was achieved 
can be found in Appendix A.
It appears that this proof offers an example not just, 
as Kripke suggests, of an a priori "kind" of statement that 
can be known a posteriori, but of one that, being the proof 
of a mathematical theorem, would seem to be a paradigm case of 
the kind of statement to be kno^vn *a priori * and yet which
can only be known *a posteriori *.
Presumably, if the Four-Colour conjecture is true it is 
necessarily true, since it is usual to grant all mathematical 
theorems the status of necessary truths. If this is the case, 
then we have here a case of a necessary a posteriori truth 
which, if assimilated into the body of mathematical knowledge 
as a proof, must at least raise some questions regarding the 
concept of proof itself.
Philosophical reaction to Appel and Haken *s proof was not 
slow in making an appearance. A paper entitled "The 4 CT and
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its Philosophical Significance" by Thomas Tymoczko was 
published in early 1979, in which he questions the 
justifiability of using an "appeal to computer" as part 
of a mathematical proof. In this paper he makes several 
strong claims concerning the Four-Colour Theorem, in 
particular that knowledge of the truth of the conjecture 
is knowledge obtained a posteriori, thus echoing Kripke *s 
example of the use of computers to determine the primacy 
or lack of it of a certain number.
In the first place, there remains more to be said 
about Kripke*s example. He has no need to make use of 
the idea of a computer-run to describe a situation where 
an item of knowledge is in fact known a posteriori, but 
which could be known also a priori. Simple illustrations 
abound. Suppose one wished to discover if the diagonals 
bisecting a rectangle are equal in length; there are two 
courses of action open. Either one can demonstrate, via 
the definitions of geometrical terms, the congruence of the 
two triangles formed by the diagonals and thus the equality 
of the diagonals themselves, or by drawing the figure and 
taking up a ruler, one can simply measure.
In the first case, the knowledge can be said to be 
derived a priori and in the second a posteriori. Thus 
it is easy to see that the truth of a particular proposition 
of mathematics can be known, in many cases by either route.
A. Plantinga in "The Nature of Necessity" (Plantinga, 
1974, p.?) la answer to the question - "is every necessary 
truth that is known, known a priori?" replies - "the answer
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  is clear. Having taken the trouble to understand
the proof you may know a priori that the Schroeder- 
Bernstein theorem is a consequence of some standard 
formulation of set theory. If I know you are properly 
reliable in these matters and take your word for it, then 
I may know that truth a posteriori - as I may if I*ve 
forgotten the proof, but remember having verified that 
indeed there is one. To learn the value of sine 54°
I consult a handy table of trigonometric functions: 
ray knowledge of this item is then a posteriori,"
It might be argued that it is peculiar to speak of 
"taking something on authority" as "knowing" it at all. 
Would it not be better to describe the situation as one of 
"belief for good reason" or "justified belief"? Certainly, 
someone would rarely have occasion to assert "I know 
theorem x is true", but in other examples of "belief on 
good authority" it would be natural not only to talk of 
knowing, but also to ascribe knowledge to a third party 
whose reasons for belief were grounded on reliable 
authority. As an example, it would be quite normal to 
assert "the height of Mount Everest is approximately 
29,000 ft, I know, I read it in an encyclopaedia." The 
case of the theorem is only different in that discussion 
of theorems is a much less familiar area of discourse.
However, putting aside misgivings surrounding the 
applicability of the expression "know" here, these 
considerations make the point quite clearly. On the 
traditional view of epistemological distinctions, many
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propositions can be known either a priori or a posteriori.
A further question might be, however - is the knowledge 
thus acquired identical in these cases? The answer is 
not at all obvious. Does it even make sense to talk of 
the same item of knowledge? Perhaps in some circumstances 
it does. Two students apprised of a particular fact by a 
lecturer, of which they were both previously unaware, 
might be held to now know the same thing - except that 
their background experience could differ radically, for in 
the one case the new item slips neatly into the student *s 
belief-network, makes conncections with previous knowledge 
and illuminates areas of puzzlement, whereas in the other 
case, the new belief is disruptive, causing radical revision 
of beliefs.
It is at least arguable that the identity criteria for 
items of knowledge should not be located solely in the 
prepositional content, but take some account of the level 
of "fit" into the knower's background belief structure.
This however is not the important issue here, which is 
a rather different kind of consideration. The deducer and 
the measurer would both know the truth of the statement 
the diagonals of a rectangle are equal in length. The 
deducer*s knowledge, however, would involve the awareness 
that not only is this the case but also that it must be so; 
that this particular item of knowledge was a necessary 
truth. The measurer, although he might rapidly come to 
the conclusion that it was highly probable (allowing for 
the approximate nature of measurements) that all rectangles
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had equal diagonals would nevertheless not be in an 
identical epistemological position to that of the deducer.
Colin McGinn (l97c, p.204) says; "we must beware of 
any ambiguity in attributing a posteriori necessity to 
statements. The ambiguity invites confusion between two 
quite distinct theses: one true, the other false. To
claim we have a posteriori knowledge of essence might be 
to claim either that there are neceèsary truths whose 
truth we know a posteriori (there being no other way), or 
that there are necessary truths whose necessity we know 
a posteriori. The latter thesis, but not the former, 
collides with a famous dictum of Kant 's: 'Experience
teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it 
cannot be otherwise, * The ambiguity can be removed by 
attending to matters of scope: the true statement 'we
can know a posteriori of a necessary truth that is true ' 
is different from and does not imply the (l think) false 
statement 'we can know a posteriori of a necessary truth'," 
Knowledge of modality according to McGinn is always a priori, 
and is acquired via a kind of thought-experiment involving 
a survey of possible worlds.
Thus if we are going to allow that computer proofs 
are proofs, the knowledge of which are genuinely acquired 
a posteriori, then some answer is required as to the 
question of the modalities involved in that knowledge and 
how it relates to the knowledge which might have been 
acquired had an a priori route been available.
Is the knowledge of the truth of the conjecture the
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same knowledge as would have been gained had a short 
formal proof been available? Presumably not. Is not 
the mathematical world in this case in the position of the 
man with the ruler, not that of the man who performed the 
deduction? If so, it seems to be the case that mathema­
ticians are prepared to forgo one distinctive characteristic 
of traditional proofs. It has long been held to be a 
predominant feature of a priori knowledge that it provides 
absolute certainty. Deductive reasoning generates knowledge 
of necessary truths, which are therefore incorrigible. 
Inductive reasoning merely renders its conclusions more or 
less probable. Now there is a great deal of confusion 
surrounding the notions of certainty and necessity, I feel 
no less certain that the sun will rise tomorrow than that 
2 x 6 =  12, "Necessity and certainty are, indeed, quite 
different. It can be certain that, but not necessary that, 
something was or will be so ; and necessary that, but not
certain that, something (should) be so". (White, A,R., 1973» 
p.95).
Ifhether or not we can know that the 4 CT is necessarily 
true, this may not affect our feelings of certainty regarding 
its truth. However, since our knowledge of its truth is 
derived at least in part inductively, by generalizing from 
the observation that the computer program has operated 
flawlessly in selected cases, to the conclusion that it has 
done so in every case, does this not mean that our certainty 
that the 4 CT is proved is based on the very high probability 
that it is proved, rather than on understanding that its 
conclusion must be the case?
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The acceptance of the 4 CT as a proof would certainly 
seem to imply a modification to the concept of proof, and 
a clarification of these issues should help to determine 
the nature of that modification.
The difficulty inherent in the proof of the 4 CT is 
however not just a matter of the use of inductive reasoning 
in one part of it. It is a rather more subtle one.
Tymoczko expressed it like this;
’Müiat reason is there for saying that the 4 CT is not 
really a theorem or that mathematicians have not really 
produced a proof of the 4 CT? Just this: no mathematician
has seen a proof of the 4 CT, or has seen a proof that it 
has a proof. Moreover, it is very unlikely that any 
mathematician will ever see a proof of the 4 CT. What 
reason is there, then, to accept the 4 CT as proved? 
Mathematicians know that it has a proof according to the 
most rigorous standards of formal proof - a computer told 
them,' Modern high speed computers were used to verify 
some crucial steps in an otherwise mathematically acceptable 
argument for the 4 CT and other computers were used to 
verify the work of the first." (Tymoczko, 1979, p.38).
Thus we can see that it is not just that some of the 
steps in a formal proof, because of the number required, 
were made by a computer, but that a computer experiment 
was needed to show that such a formal proof is possible. 
Since a distinction between "proof" and "formal proof" has 
crept into the discussion we are inevitably led to the 
consideration of the nature of proof.
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(c) The Nature of Proof
Tymoczko (l979, p.6o) suggests three major character­
istics of traditional proofs; that they are (l) convincing,
(2) surveyable, (3) formaligable (i.e. expressible in some
formal language or other),
The first requirement, that a proof is convincing, 
relates to the concept of self-evidence. The traditional 
account of a deduction is that it leads from logically true 
premisses to a conclusion by means of a series of logically 
valid steps. This description explains the justification 
for the conclusion. The conclusion is true, if the premisses 
are true, because it is derived from the premisses using only 
valid rules of inference. If we are talking of "conviction" 
and "self-evidence" however, the use of such psychological 
terminology requires a different kind of explanation of 
proof, one which describes the way in which human beings 
prove propositions. Such an explanation could be like this:- 
an individual is convinced of the truth of a proposition or 
set of propositions, a priori, if they are tautologies, and 
he infers a series of valid consequences of these propositions, 
^\j of each of which he is equally convinced, and reaches ,a\thereby 
conclusion, again of which he is convinced. Both of these 
versions, however, seem to leave out an element crucial to 
the concept of proof. Not only do we pass from one 
convincing truth to another convincing truth which is a 
direct consequence of it by a series of self-evident steps, 
we need also for it to be self-evident to us that each step 
in the chain is not only true but also that it is self-
19.
evidently a consequence of the previous one.
Self-evidence itself is not an entirely unprobleinmatic 
notion, Quine defines the concept of self-evidence for 
a statement as "to understand it is to believe it", "Self- 
evident beliefs look for support neither to other beliefs 
nor observation," (Quine & Ullian, 1970i p.2l)
"Everything that is blue is coloured" could be said 
to be self-evident in this sense since to understand the 
words *blue * and ^coloured * suffices to convince us of
the truth of this statement, without recourse to any evidence
from observation. The sky could possibly provide a counter­
example, but that is another matter. Similarly, if we 
understand the meaning of the symbols for the positive 
integers and the operation of addition, not only is
2 + 2 = 4  self-evident, so is "if 2 + 2 = 4  then 2 + 2 + 1 =
4 + 1".
Like "self-evident", "being convinced" is an essentially 
anthropocentric concept. It is always open to ask "self- 
evident to whom?" or "convincing to whom?" People vary 
greatly in their intellectual abilities. What is self- 
evident and convincing to one person may well fail to be so 
to another and who is to arbitrate on their relative, 
subjective "understanding" of the concepts involved. For 
any particular judge in these matters it is still open to 
question his understanding, - why we should support one 
party in a dispute rather than another? No piece of 
mathematics is granted the status of proof simply because 
it convinces one solitary mathematician who claims a greater
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understanding than that of his fellows. Proofs are 
called proofs when they convince enough of the accredited 
experts in the field. How many experts are enough?
Clearly there is no obvious answer to this - at some stage 
the theorem is accepted into the body of theory belonging 
to its branch of mathematics.
Possibly then, it would be more accurate to say, 
instead of characteristic (l) proofs are convincing, 
perhaps characteristic (l*)proofs are convincing to enough 
of those whose opinions are respected within the discipline. 
This is undeniably vague and it is on this account that 
Tymoczko suggests that philosophers feel the need for "some 
deeper characterization of mathematical proofs which explains, 
at least to some extent, why they are convincing". This 
second characteristic is that of "surveyability". To say 
that a proof is surveyable means that it can be organised 
into a form which allows it to be checked by other mathe­
maticians, allows them to become convinced of the truth 
of the theorem, and makes the proof available for acceptance 
by the appropriate consensus of informed opinion.
It is of course the received opinion that the knowledge 
mathematicians acquire in this way is knowledge gained 
a priori, and the reason for this opinion depends largely 
on a third characteristic - that of formalisability. A 
formal proof being a finite sequence of formulae leading 
from the axioms, via the rules of inference of a particular 
formal system to the theorem in question is imbued with an 
inevitability sufficient to remove all doubt of its truth.
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In order to be quite clear about this distinction 
between surveyable and formalisable proof, it should be 
noted that in the first place a surveyable proof may be 
either formal or informal (informal ones often, but not 
necessarily, can be formalised to provide the required 
rigour). Secondly, although it is not obvious that all 
surveyable informal proofs are capable of formalisation - 
in some system or other; the possibility of formal proofs 
which are in practice (though not principle) unsurveyable, 
cannot be denied. The length of the proof might well be 
such that the time required in checking it exceeds a 
feasible human lifetime. To rely on the testimony of 
others as to the truth of a proposition concerning the 
validity of the first part of a deduction is to acquire 
a belief, which may or may not amount to knowledge, but 
which in either case can only be said to have been acquired 
a posteriori.
A team of mathematicians each handing on their belief 
in a part of a proof which they have surveyed, to another 
mathematician, might effect a human survey of the entire 
proof. Nevertheless this type of surveyability differs 
radically from that where an entire formal proof is followed 
by one individual whose knowledge of the concluding theorem 
is said thereby to be a priori. Where the formal proof is 
too long to be surveyed, it is commonly guaranteed by a 
surveyable informal proof that it does exist - a practice 
acceptable to most mathematicians.
Thus there are two ways in which mathematicians come to
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know that a statement has a formal proof.
"On the one hand, the mathematician might actually 
survey or look over the formal proof and check it for 
correctness. On the other hand, the mathematician can 
derive the existence of the required formal proof, in 
effect by presenting a surveyable proof that the formal 
proof exists..,. Either the formal proofs are simple 
enough to be surveyed themselves and verified to be proofs, 
or their existence is established by means of informal 
surveyable arguments," (Tymoczko, 1979» p.62).
The contention is, however, that the case of the 4 CT 
is a different one. There is a gap in the surveyability of 
the formal proof of the 4 CT, a gap in which an important 
lemma is justified by the results of running certain computer 
programs. That is, the 4 CT has a formal proof, one which is 
unsurveyable, but unlike the traditional case where the 
unsurveyable proof is guaranteed by a surveyable informal 
proof, our reasons for believing that it has a formal proof 
are grounded in the unsurveyable part of the proof; in the 
results of the computer work.
(d) Computer Proof and Surveyability
Tymoczko *s objection to the use of the computers is 
composed of at least three strands which are not clearly 
distinguished, one of which I think carries more weight 
than the others. The objection is this:- the use of 
computers introduces an empirical element into an essentially 
non-empirical activity.
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These are the reasons that are given
1. The running of a computer program is a scientific
experiment.
2. The acceptance of the result of a computer experiment
is similar to relying on the testimony of another 
person.
3. The proof depends on the reliability of the machine
and the program, the assessment of which is an
empirical matter.
Although these claims are all mutually dependent, I 
have separated them, in order, I hope, to elucidate the 
basis for the principle objection to the proof of the 4 CT, 
and also because it helps to clarify the difference between 
this case and Kripke 's example of the use of computer to 
determine whether a particular number is prime or not.
Taking each one in turn, I want to ask first why is the 
computer part of the proof to be regarded as an experiment? 
Is the use of any aid to mathematical thinking resorting to 
experiment - and if not, what is so different in this case?
Suppose, for example, I form the hypothesis (guess) 
that the product of 422 and 244 is 27868, and by picking up 
a calculator or slide rule either confirm or refute that 
hypothesis - can I really be said to have carried out an 
experiment? Most people would, I think, be inclined to say 
"No", except perhaps in the superficial sense of having 
conducted a psychological experiment on the accuracy of my 
guessing ability. I would not be said to have used experi­
mental methods to ascertain the truth of the proposition,
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and thereby to have introduced an empirical element into 
mathematics, robbing it of its status as an a priori 
discipline. Why not? It cannot be just because the 
result is known in advance, for every scientist spends all 
his formative years merely repeating the work of others; 
conducting experiments the results of which are written up 
in the text-books. No. The reason that this is not an 
experiment (or would not count as one) is that although 
we are most unlikely to have the answer to the specific 
question in any text-book, - few people "know in advance" 
the result of more than the very simplest multiplications,- 
we do know in advance that this belongs to the class of 
statements that can be deduced a priori and that (leaving 
aside the serious question of the reliability of the machine 
for a moment) the calculator merely fills in the steps in 
the computation, invisibly and at great speed. We know that 
we could arrive at the answer ourselves in time. We know 
that surveyable proofs of these mathematical propositions 
are available, and that we are accelerating the process of 
calculation for pragmatic reasons.
This is the case with Kripke *s example. A particular 
mathematical proposition is known to be true in a particular 
instance a posteriori; nevertheless it is one which is 
kno\m to be knowable a priori. Is the 4 CT, on the other 
hand, a very different matter? The computers were not used 
in the proof of the all important lemma to perform lengthy 
calculations, but to examine and analyse configurations of 
parts of maps, the set of configurations shown to be
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^unavoidable  ^in tlie required sense, in order to decide 
if* each one was reducible to a proven four-colourable 
configuration. The affirmative decision reached by the 
computer in every case, as a result of its analysis, 
constitutes the proof of the lemma. The hypothesis that 
if every member of a certain class possesses a certain 
property then the combination of machine and program will 
produce the answer that in each case it does so, was tested 
and confirmed. The suggestion that this operation has the 
character of a scientific experiment is, at least on the 
surface, a convincing one. Tymoczko further claims that 
the result of the experiment is "at best, an empirical truth", 
but here the argument becomes confused. It is without doubt 
a contingent fact that on a particular occasion a particular 
machine and program achieved a particular output. After all, 
the machine could have gone wrong or the electricity supply 
failed or any number of circumstances might have prevented 
the production of that result or any result at all. It is 
equally a contingent fact that on any particular occasion
the addition of 2 + 2  on a calculator produces the answer 4,
What is not contingent, presumably, is that it is the case 
that "four colours suffice". As regards our epistemological 
position, however, the difference is this, in the case of 
2 + 2 = 4  we can not only see for ourselves the truth of the
proposition, we have also what is perhaps more important,
since not all examples are of sufficient simplicity for us 
to do this “ we have available the justification of our 
knowledge in the form of "consensus of received opinion among
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experts". As far as the 4 CT is concerned, however, neither 
the appeal to our own rational capabilities or to those of 
a body of authorities in those matters is of any avail - the 
only justification those experts have for their belief is 
the belief that (l) the program was adequate (2) the machine 
operated correctly and (3) that the combination of adequate 
program and efficient mechanical operation are sufficient 
to decide the issue. Whatever way of looking at these beliefs 
one might take, it seems clear to me that in no way can they 
be held to be gained a priori, whereas the conviction of the 
truth of the former proposition amongst that body of experts 
relies precisely on the fact that individually they can 
achieve the result by a priori deduction. There seems no 
question that these cases are essentially different. Whether 
the difference between them actually warrants the claim that 
the Four-Colour Theorem proof rests on an empirical experiment 
is still to me not all together clear: the withholding of
a decision on this particular point is not crucial - Tymoczko *s 
other objections make out a stronger case for the view that 
the proof differs in major and interesting ways from that of 
a traditional one.
Consider the objection based on the notion of testimony.
It is a commonly held view that if the justification for a 
claim to knowledge takes the form of an appeal to authority - 
i.e. "I read it in the text-book", or "Professor So-and-So 
says so and he *s in a position to be sure", - then the 
reasons provided are of an empirical nature. The appeal to 
authority, however, operates only as support for an individual
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claim and as such must be clearly distinguished from the 
justification for the truth of the item in question. In 
general a mathematical truth is justified by appeal to an 
a priori deduction from within a formal system which is 
accepted by a sufficient number of accredited mathematicians.
It is not impossible that they should all have overlooked 
some mistake,(though with well-established theorems it is 
more than unlikely), or that the formalisation is in some 
way defective and therefore may be wrong. The kind of 
mistake I have in mind is not that of an unnoticed slip in 
calculation, but that of an invalid inference, or an 
unsuspected paradox within the conceptual structure of the 
work. The effect of Russell*s set theoretic paradox 
devastated Frege's work on logicism. The point is, though, 
that the procedures used are of the sort that they are - 
deductive - and their knowledge is acquired via these 
procedures. As far as the 4 CT is concerned, the belief 
in its truth by the body of mathematicians is a belief 
founded on the "testimony" of a computer, plus the further 
belief that the computer operates satisfactorily; it just 
is not open to them to follow the procedures through themselves.
It might be objected that the above embodies a confusion: 
that although I have argued that the reasons which support 
an individual claim to knowledge must be distinguished from 
the justification of the truth of the proposition which is 
the subject of that claim, I have formulated the justification 
of mathematical truths in terms of the procedures mathema­
ticians use in coming to know these propositions. Some
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clarification is necessary. The traditional Kantian view 
of the a priori/a posteriori distinction entails regarding 
propositions (or statements) as the bearers of a priority or 
a posteriority. These predicates refer to the type of 
justification available for its truth, A proposition is 
a priori if its truth can be determined by reflecting on 
the meanings of the words involved or by validly deducing 
a consequence of a logically true proposition or set of 
propositions. A proposition is a posteriori if its truth 
is only determinable via an appeal to particular observations. 
Thus someone who accepts a proposition on the basis of 
reliable authority, accepts either an a priori or an 
a posteriori proposition. The difficulty with this account 
is that it fails to distinguish the Kripkean example where 
knowledge of an a priori proposition is gained in a particular 
instance not "independently of experience" at all, but as a 
result of the particular experience of reading'it in a book 
or being told it is so by someone in a position to be sure.
The problem is caused by two things, an ambiguity in the use 
of the word justification, and the failure to recognise the 
implications of expressions like "determine the truth value" 
or "justify the truth of".
In the first place, there is the type of justification an 
individual might produce for a belief; his irreproachably 
good reasons for believing even a false proposition. Someone 
can be perfectly justified in believing something even though 
it is not the case, if the evidence to the contrary is totally 
unavailable to him. Secondly, there is justification in the
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sense of "the way in which a proposition is determined as 
true or false". The first use is a subjective one concerned 
with reasons for belief. The second an objective one to do 
with the status, i.e. truth or falsity, of the proposition 
itself,
Now, taking care to keep these senses of justification 
distinct, it is still possible to ask of the second 
objective sense, what is meant by "determining the truth 
value of a proposition? Propositions are classified as 
a priori or a posteriori according to difference in type 
of their justifications. Ifhat are the differences in type? 
Ways in which truth values are determined. To determine a 
truth value, is to decide on the truth or falsity of a 
proposition, or to come to know the truth or falsity of a 
proposition. To describe a proposition as a priori or a 
posteriori is therefore to describe the way in which it can 
be known to be true by human beings. Its justification is 
provided by a description of the way in which it can be 
known. The question then arises, known by whom? Some 
human beings? All human beings? If the truth value of a 
proposition is not determined in every case by a particular 
means, it seems that the ascription of the predicates 
a priori and a posteriori to propositions means that those 
propositions have been, are, or could be, known by some human 
beings in a particular way. The claim to objectivity appears 
to fail. If a proposition might or might not be known a 
priori, it seems queer to describe it as "a priori". In my 
view, the terms should be regarded primarily as predicates
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applicable to "types of procedure" or - "ways of knowing" 
and only derivatively of propositions. Thus a proposition 
could be said to be a priori if that way of knowing it to 
be true is available to at least some people.
What is being claimed here, is, therefore, that there 
is no purely a priori procedure by which the k CT can be 
kno’im. A process which involves the observation of the 
results of the computer program is at least in that part 
an a posteriori one.
In a recently published paper, Israel Krakowski (1980) 
argues against all the objections raised by Tymoczko, that 
there is nothing very different about the 4 CT, and that no 
issues of philosophical significance are thereby raised.
I think he is wrong, and greatly oversimplifies the matter 
as, equally, Martin Gardner's brief remarks do, in an article, 
"The Colouring of Unusual Maps leads into Uncharted Territory"
(1979).
Krakowski, on the point of testimony, has this to say:
"....  even if any mathematician could survey any given
proof this is not so of all humans: the vast majority could
not follow the most complex proofs, they must appeal to 
authority" - so far no one would dream of denying this. Then 
he goes on - "therefore the proof of 4 CT merely extends the 
class of humans who must so appeal" (my underlining) (p.92).
This is precisely the force of the objection. Far from 
merely extending a given class, the proof of 4 CT extends it 
so far as to include all human beings actual or possible, and 
it is for this reason, its unsurveyability, its reliance on
31.
non-human authority that makes the 4 CT so different from 
a traditional proof.
There are difficulties in describing the activity (or 
operation) of computers, - linguistic pitfalls which are 
hard to avoid, Krakowski falls straight into the biggest 
trap - that of attributing human faculties or capabilities 
to non-human things.
Even the idea of an "appeal" to a computer is suspect. 
Appeals are made by those who do not have knowledge, to those 
who do. Computers cannot be said to know anything at all, 
so it is difficult to see the sense in making an appeal to 
one. Krakowski, however, seems to regard computers as a form 
of intelligent life. One of the main premisses of his 
argument is that the proof has, despite Tymoczko 's claim 
to the contrary, been surveyed;
"For the computer has, in a step by step fashion, surveyed 
and proved this lemma. To suggest otherwise is chauvinism."
(p.92).
I would much prefer to accept the ad hominem charge of 
chauvinism, than to inhabit a world in which I believed that 
machines surveyed or proved anything at all. Such anthropo­
centric terras as 'surveying ' and 'proving * can surely only be 
used metaphorically when applied to constructions of steel, 
wire and plastic, despite recent developments in artificial 
intelligence which seem to suggest that such terms could 
become applicable in the near future. In fact, Appel and 
Haken admit to being taken by surprise by their program and 
their language is certainly as objectionable on this ground 
as Krakowski's.
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"It was working out compound strategies based on all 
the tricks it had been taught, and the new approaches were 
often much cleverer than those we would have tried". (1977» 
p.177). !
However, that their remarks are intended metaphorically !
is evident from the preceding sentence in the paragraph; !
"....but now the computer was acting like a chess j
playing machine." For expressions attributing cognitive {
!capacities to machines to have any genuine application, it |
would involve altering the meanings of those expressions !
Ispecifically to rule out consciousness as an essential part ■
of those meanings, Ifhere we are not prepared to attribute 
consciousness, no sense can be made of an attribution of a 
capacity to 'prove 'survey ', acquire knowledge ', etc.
Should, in the future, a real possibility of machine­
consciousness arise, then some re-thinking about the 
applicability of these terms to such machines may be in 
order. For the moment, it suffices to say that no machine 
thinks, knows, or proves anything.
As has already been said, proving has to do with becoming 
convinced of the truth of a proposition, but I doubt if even 
Krakowski would want to claim that computers were convinced 
of the truth of their results.
Surveying a proof, also, I maintain, involves not only 
passing from one step to the next, but essentially, the self- 
conscious awareness that you have done so because you under­
stand how the second follows from the first. The assertion 
"I understand, but I do not know that I understand", if not
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actually self-contradictory, is certainly extremely peculiar. 
Computers cannot be said to understand anything either.
Krakowski pays lip service to this fact when he says :-
"It is true that the computer does not know that it 
has surveyed anything any more tlian a computer knows that, 
say, it has just added a million numbers. But inferring 
from this that the computer has not surveyed the proof is 
equivalent to inferring, what is obviously false, that the 
computer has not added a million numbers." ,(p.93, loy under­
lining) .
Wiat is going on here? There is, I suggest, a slurring 
over distinct senses of the word 'add '. If what we mean by 
'add ' is 'cax’ry out an operation of a certain kind defined by 
a set of rules ' then clearly this can be done mechanically 
or non-raechanically, but when we say of a person, "he has 
added a column of figures" we mean much more something like, 
"he has learnt the rules governing this operation and has 
consciously applied them in this case, and is aware that the 
end product is a direct result of the application of these 
rules."
It may be that this description is excessively specific 
for some instances, but it should be clear that there are 
circumstances where it would be natural to withhold the term 
"is adding". An example of this would be where a child 
repeats, as a result of rote learning " 2 + 2 = 4 ,  4 + 4 = 8 "
- etc., yet on further questioning shows no comprehension of 
the operation involved. Certainly, producing the answer 4 
when asked to add 2 + 2  would count as evidence that the
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operation of addition had been performed, but would not 
of itself be sufficient. The ability to provide the correct |I
answer in a variety of examples would increase the evidential j 
support, but unless the child demonstrated a grasp of the use
Iof mathematical expressions and an ability to extrapolate on 
that usage in hitherto unexperienced cases, we would not 
easily agree that the child knew how to add or had grasped the 
meaning of, e.g. 2 + 2 = 4,
Far from being "obviously false", there is a genuine and 
relevant sense in which a computer cannot add two, let alone 
a million numbers. It is Krakowski*s naive way of talking 
about computers, which leads him to espouse the views he 
does. After all, he cannot have it both ways. On one hand 
he wants to say that computer-assisted proof is fundamentally 
no different from abacus-assisted proof, yet would he, on 
the other, want to insist that it was obviously true that 
an abacus had added a million numbers? I rather think not, 
Hospers (1967, p,207) attributes the pervasive animism 
in natural language to primitive times where a literal sense 
was intended; "We want to say, 'the first billiard ball
compels the second one to move, ' and 'when the first hits the
second, the second can't help moving'," We speak of the trap
catching the rabbit, Newton's apple striking him on the head, 
or of food poisoning us. In primitive times it was believed 
that all things housed spirits of some kind which initiated 
actions by those things. Nowadays we still use the active 
form of the verb, although the beliefs in inhabiting spirits 
have long been relinquished, but we should be clear that the
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passive use is what is intended; "the rabbit is caught in 
the trap", "Newton is struck by the apple", etc. In none 
of these examples are we attributing actions in inanimate 
objects. The computer case is different. The suggestion 
that computers add, prove and survey can only provide 
Krakowski a basis for the claim that the 4 CT has been 
surveyed if he intends the words in the sense of actions 
comparable to those performed by human beings.
The other prong of Ilrakowski 's attack is equally naive, 
but less obviously so. It rests on the familiar distinction 
between 'in principle * and 'in practice '.
Those are his words - "There is no principled reason 
why, when longevity reaches astronomical proportions a bright 
young mathematician could not spend a few millenia going 
through the entire proof." (l979i p.92), The point he is 
trying to make is this. It is only a matter of empirical 
impossibility (he even suggests a temporary one) that the 
4 CT is unsurveyable, rather than one of logical impossibility. 
There is, he is suggesting, nothing self-contradictory in the 
conception of a man living for millenia. But just what 
exactly is he imagining? Suppose we ask a few searching 
questions as to the details of this supposed conception.
Would this bright young man stay a bright young man for 
hundreds of years? Would, he age progressively like ordinary 
human beings? In which case, if his physical and mental 
capacities deteriorated over millennia would he not tend 
to become so senile that following the proof at all became 
an impossibility? Perhaps he goes on ageing until he is
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about fifty and then stops for a couple of thousand years. 
Perhaps the degenerative process becomes slower and slower.
In any case, the demand for a complete specification of this 
kind of picture leads one into difficulties. Exactly how 
could a living structure like a human being, consisting of 
the type of cells that it has, and subject to the kinds of 
processes that it is, be imagined as behaving in a way which 
would require different cell structure and different 
processes (i.e. of cell regeneration). Could such a creature 
be considered a human being if its micro-structure is other 
than human ?
f^hat I am suggesting is.that if the notion of logical 
possibility is divided from that of minimal conceivability 
(outline imagining) and located in simple contradictoriness, 
there is still a case for saying that a millennia-surviving 
human being is a logical and not just an empirical impossi­
bility. Certainly the contradiction involved here is not an 
obvious one such as the ascription of both predicates 'fat ' 
and 'thin' to one individual; nevertheless I maintain that 
the ascription of both 'human ' and 'millennia-surviving ' to 
an individual is inconsistent,
Smithurst (198O/81)provides an argument for the 
contradictoriness and hence logical impossibility of the 
existence of centaurs. The argument requires a grasp on the 
way in which general terms get their meaning, and on the 
Lockian distinction between 'nominal' and 'real' essences. 
Nowadays, unlike nearly three hundred years ago when Locke *s 
essay was first published, we do have genuine knowledge of
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real essences, something Locke believed impossible. Scientific 
investigation into the micro-structure of substances, the 
information thereby derived as to their composition and 
properties at that level, and the resulting definitions, 
i.e. water is H2O , are what fix the extension of substance 
terms. Gold is distinguished from iron pyrites not by 
differences in observable properties (nominal essences) but 
because gold is atomic number 79 and iron pyrites is not.
Thus it is a necessary truth that water is HgO and gold, 
atomic number 79. Nothing is going to count as water or gold 
with a different micro-structure. In a similar way I would 
argue, the extension of the term 'human being* is determined 
by facts about genetic codings, cell structure, chemical 
processes, etc., making is also necessarily true that a human 
being has a particular micro-structure. It is surely not an 
implausible suggestion that survival for even say four 
hundred years would require some fundamental changes in 
the minute structure of an individual,
Krakowski *s suggestions about mathematicians with 
enormously extended lifespans add up to no more than window 
dressing for the bald claim that the 4 CT is surveyable.
The assertion that the theorem can be surveyed "in principle" 
takes us no further either, if all "in principle" is supposed 
to mean is "if someone lives long enough". Perhaps all that 
is intended here is that the theorem is "surveyable by a 
rational being", In which case should not the concept of God 
be invoked instead of people with the capacity for incredible 
longevity.
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Bernard Williams provides some interesting and amusing 
thoughts on the subject of "living for ever" in Chapter 6 
of "Problems of the Self" (1976); the discussion surrounds 
the Makropulos case: the title of Williams * lecture,
"The Makropulos Case: reflections on the tedium of 
immortality", is a translation of the title of a play by 
Karel Capek which was made into an opera by Janacek. The 
play concerns a woman, who having received an elixir of 
life from her father, survives to be 3^2 years old, choosing 
to die at this point because of the joyless tedium of her 
existence.
Williams raises questions concerning both the coherence 
of the idea of eternal life, and the consistency of retaining 
a desire to stay alive, E.M., the woman's initials, constant 
through a variety of aliases, is forty-two, and has been so 
for three hundred years. She is supposed also to have 
retained a constancy of character during all this time, and 
she is literally bored to death since:-
"everything that could happen and make sense to one 
particular human being of 42 had already happened to her"
(p,90). The idea of a constant character is a difficult one 
if examined closely,
"How is tliis accumulation of memories related to this 
character which she eternally has, and to the character of 
her existence? Are they much the same kind of events repeated? 
Then it is strange that she allows them to be repeated,,," (p.90 
If on the other hand the hypothesis is that her 
experiences are varied ones, it is hard to see how this is
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consistent with the idea of a fixed character, presuming 
that one *s character determines to some extent the kind of 
experiences one has. Should the opposite be supposed and 
the subject of eternal life take on a different character 
during successive periods of its existence, there is little 
reason to claim continuing identity for the subject during 
that period, unless at least memories were carried over.
Again a problem arises, for if the character is not constant,
how can memories remain so,
Williams ' conclusion is that the type of character which 
produces the desire to stay alive, one which finds interest
and delight in the prospect of further experience, necessarily
cannot sustain that desire if life is protracted to a length 
where there are no new experiences available to that character, 
because of its very constitution. The idea of eternal life is 
incoherent,
Even if these arguments fail, ray claim is a stronger one.
It is my contention that it is logically impossible for a 
human being to live for millennia and, consequently impossible 
even in principle for the 4 CT to be surveyed in entirety.
The belief that the conjecture has been proved must include, 
in part, some beliefs as to the accuracy of the results of 
the computation, the flawlessness of the program and the 
efficiency of the machine in executing the program. None of 
these subordinate beliefs can be said to have been derived 
*a priori * in any sense of the term. It would seem fair to 
conclude that knowledge of the truth of the 4 CT is knowledge 
which is gained at least in part a posteriori, and which can only
4o.
be so acquired. I would further maintain despite criticisms 
made by M,R. Levin in "On Tymoczko *s Argument for Mathematical 
Empiricism" (1980) that this case is significantly different 
from those where computational aids (log tables, calculators,
V "abaci, etc.) are utilised in proving theorems.
She claims "the use of a computer as a mathematical 
shortcut to by-pass human computation does not differ 
significantly - that is, from an epistemological point of 
view - from the use of tables of logorithms, square roots, 
trigonometric values or random numbers". In her next 
sentence, however, she puts her finger on exactly the 
difference between the 4 CT with its appeal to computers 
and a general use of logarithmic tables, "In theory, one 
could work out all the values for log^ for oneself." (1980, 
p,84). Levin's conclusion is that if the use of a computer 
introduces an empirical element into mathematics then so does 
the use of any computational aid, as does accepting well- 
established theorems on the basis of the testimony either of 
text-books or other mathematicians. She is simply missing 
the point. Except for proofs like the 4 CT, and there is at
■X'least another which antedates it , it is possible for human 
mathematicians in sufficient numbers to work out, check and
■X- *  -X- * * * * * * *  *
* Detlefson and Luker (The 4 CT and Mathematical Proof, J.Phil,
1980) mention that 350 hours of computer time were used to prove 
21701that 2  ^ - 1 was prime using the Lucas - Lehnier algorithm.
It is not clear, however, that this proof is sufficiently long 
to render it unsurveyable during the lifetime of a normal human 
mathematician.
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recheck the inferences made, understand them and be aware that 
they understand them. Pieces of reasoning are absorbed into 
the body of mathematical knowledge only when, as I have said 
before, a consensus of specialists give them the seal of 
approval, and it is exactly because of the manner in which 
they are checked by individual human minds that they are 
traditionally characterised as a priori. This is not to say 
that the label 'a priori ' is immune from criticism in that the 
possibility of error is eliminated - only that the Pour-Colour 
Proof cannot be so described, and cannot because of its 
essential unsurveyability.
It is no more plausible to claim the characterization 
'a priori ' for a proof whose length requires the continuous 
work of successive generations of mathematicians for a duration 
of several centuries; a chain of human beings each taking 
on trust that the previous one had worked correctly. As 
Levin rightly remarks, a case like this is much more like 
computer-assisted proof than Tymoczko 's analogy of proof by 
'Simon says ' in 'Martian' mathematics, and whether or not she 
doubts that "we would be inclined to deny that what they had 
done was a proof", I think one would certainly be inclined to 
resist describing the activity as purely 'a priori
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CHAPTER II
Mathematical Truth as a Paradigm of A Priori Knowledge
It should be fairly clear by now that at least one, 
if not several, well accepted mathematical proofs contain 
elements knowable essentially a posteriori. I persist in 
using the ungainly locutions 'knowable a priori ' and 
'knowable a posteriori ' in order to emphasise the epistemo­
logical character of these terms, and I hope by refraining 
from using expressions such as 'a priori truth', 'a posteriori 
proposition ', not only to avoid slipping back into old 
confusions with the pairs of terras 'analytic; synthetic '; 
'necessary; contingent '; but also to preserve my declared 
intention of making "ways of knowing" the primary bearers 
of a priority and a posteriority.
I now want to consider the question of whether these 
so-called empirical elements are a much more widespread 
phenomenon in mathematical proofs than previously supposed.
It would be an oversimplification just to accept, as Levin 
does, that mathematics is fundamentally empirical because:-
(1) Mathematicians can make mistakes.
(2) Mathematicians use calculators and log. tables.
(3) No mathematician can check for himself the whole 
of mathematics.
If knowledge can significantly be classified according 
to the procedures by which an item is knowable, then a mistake 
as to the truth of a proposition should not require the 
immediate reclassification of that item as of a different
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kind. If for example it is claimed that 129 + 129 = 257, 
the fact that an error has been made in calculation does 
not mean that the proposition ceases to be knowable a priori, 
but is instead a posteriori. Being false, it is not knowable 
at all, but it is nevertheless the result of a piece of 
(albeit inaccurate) a priori reasoning.
It seems reasonable to suggest that the assumption that 
a computer has operated flawlessly during a run of surveyable 
length is an empirical one. It is equally an empirical belief 
that a human being has correctly calculated a result. The 
difference between the two cases is that, in the former the 
assumption is an integral part of the process which leads to 
the determination of the truth value of the conclusion; in 
the latter, the inferential structure, the calculation itself, 
determines the truth value and in addition supports the belief 
that no mistakes have been made.
The idea that the possibility of error introduces 
"empirical elements" into all of mathematics arises from 
a confusion between being "necessarily false" and being 
contingent. A true mathematical proposition is both necessary 
and known a priori, a false one can still be arrived at 
a priori but is neither known nor necessary. It is necessarily 
false. If, however, the expression "not necessary" is used 
instead of "necessarily false", it is easy to move from this 
to the view that the proposition is contingent, and therefore 
knowable a posteriori. This type of confusion is made more 
likely to occur if "a priori" and "necessary" are held to be 
synonymous terms. If a proposition is thought of as "not
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necessary" rather than necessarily false, then by substi­
tution of the supposed synonyms, it is then thought to be 
"not a priori", i.e. a posteriori.
Frege in the Foundations of Arithmetic, (p.3©) held 
that "An a priori error is thus as complete a nonsense as, 
say, a blue concept," Frege accepts the Kantian conception 
of the a priori/a posteriori distinction, where the terms 
are predicated of propositions. A proposition in his view 
is either a priori or a posteriori according to the type of 
justification available for its truth. The possibility that 
an error has occurred in the reasoning leading to a proposi­
tion can only be relevant to the adequacy of that justification. 
It cannot determine the type of the justification.
The feeling that a priori and necessary mean the same, 
does appear to lurk somewhere in the background of Levin *s 
apparent conviction that a fair analogy can be drawn between 
a human error in deductive reasoning and a flaw in the program 
or a mechanical fault in the hardware of a computer. Now it 
seems to me that this analogy is a poor one. Levin makes the 
point that ;-
"Human beings and their workings are also physical
objects, just as subject to physical laws as computers....
Our wiring is subject to physical laws, - indeed we humans 
are prey to all sorts of mishaps, - inattention, boredom, 
forgetfulness, slips of pen or tongue, subconscious urges 
to fail, - that computers escape".
What comparison is she making? Taking a simple example, 
imagine a computer programmed to perform the operation of
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addition on a long series of positive integers. Suddenly 
it prints out the sum of the series in the form of a 
recurring decimal. What would be a likely response?
Saying: ^Something has gone wrong with the machine % or
’Someone has mistyped the program are both likely, if 
simplified, accounts of the ’human’ reaction to such a 
situation. A search would follow to detect the source of 
the error, and all the relevant considerations would, I think, 
be fairly described as empirical ones; i.e. engineers would 
examine the workings of the machine for faults in the 
circuitry, etc., typescripts would be checked for misprints, 
and for wrong instructions, and experiments could be carried 
out using different machines, or different programs. How 
similar is this situation to the case of a human mathematician? 
Suppose Mr. X was asked to add a series of numbers, all 
positive integers, and announced as the result of his effort 
something like, for example, 1.73211111. What sort of 
response are his colleagues going to make? I cannot imagine 
that calling in a brain surgeon or even a neurologist would 
be appropriate, "Something has gone wrong with his wiring", 
or statements like, ’Perhaps his c-fibres are not firing 
properly’, do not seem to be even plausible suggestions.
Would we not simply conclude that he has simply misunderstood 
the operation of addition? There may well be discoverable 
psychological reasons for this state of affairs, and relevant 
empirical tests which would be carried out; tests of his 
sanity, linguistic competence, education, etc., but, and this 
is an important difference from the computer case, we can
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know a priori that misunderstanding, for whatever reason, 
is the cause, since to understand the operation involved 
precludes the type of response given.
It may be thought that this argument is tenuous, and 
that the analogy can be tightened up; for example, we can 
say that for the same reason we can know a priori that there 
is a malfunction in the system, computers neither understand 
nor misunderstand, nevertheless something is wrong. Certainly 
this is the case, and yet it amounts to no more than the 
claim that there is an error, because there is an error; 
self-evidently true, but hardly worth saying.
Of course, mathematicians can make mistakes, but to 
regard this as supporting a direct analogy between human and 
mechanical computation is to ignore the enormous gulf between 
natural and artificial intelligence, something well recognized 
by those working in the field of artificial intelligence.
Wilkes, in Physicalism. (l9?8, p.75) describes a hypothetical
automaton, a robot for the future, and suggests that its 
responses to stimuli could be such that we would have difficult} 
in resisting the impulse to credit it with consciousness.
Should such an unlikely circumstance ever arise, we would,
I think, adopt a Wittgensteinian approach. In the ’Blue 
Book’, on the question of personal identity, he says:-
".... the ordinary use of the word ’person’ is what one 
might call a ’composite use under normal circumstances .
(1972, p.62), Faced with Wilkes ’ clever robot, the verdict 
might be that these were not normal circumstances and that 
some ad hoc decisions on the use of the word ’consciousness ’
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had better be made.
The disparity between the mathematical achievements 
of man and machine, however, does not close the case against 
mathematical empiricism. Detlefsen & Luker (1980, p.807) 
quote Davis ( ’Fidelity in Mathematical Discourse ’: ’is one
and one really two? ’ - "American Mathematical Monthly LXXIX 
(1972))as saying
"As we get away from trivial sums, arithmetic operations 
are enveloped in a smog of uncertainty. The sum of 12,345 + 
54,321 is not 66,666, It is not a number. It is a probability 
distribution of possible answers in which 66,666 is the odds 
on favourite." This is an ususual point of view and a 
particularly implausible one at that. In the first place, 
this example can hardly be described as a non-trivial instance 
of the operation of addition. It is difficult to see how any 
uncertainty about its correctness could arise. Secondly, it 
is a view derived from a confusion, - a confusion, I think, 
between epistemology and methphysics. The answer to an 
addition of whatever complexity, of two finite numbers, is 
a number and a determinate one at that. To suggest that it 
is a probability distribution is to suggest something that 
is false. What is or is not the case, however, does not 
necessarily coincide with our knowledge of it. From a human 
standpoint the probability that the answer to this particular 
sum is 66,666 approaches 1, and this is the nearest one can 
get to absolute certainty of the empirical proposition that 
no error has been made in calculating the answer, but this 
is not to suggest that it is plausible to speak of any level
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of uncertainty surrounding such simple mathematical 
propositions.
Mathematical proofs (and addition sums are simple 
mathematical proofs) are accepted in part because they are 
convincing. Simple proofs are accepted by individuals when 
they are themselves convinced that they have deduced the 
conclusion correctly from the premisses. As far as more 
complex proofs are concerned, most people have to rely on 
the opinion of experts, and here it is a consensus of opinion 
among the body of mathematical experts that the proof is 
correct which leads to its acceptance into the store of 
mathematical knowledge. The experts themselves are convinced. 
The claim to knowledge made when relying on the testimony of 
experts as to the correctness of a proof is unquestionably 
a claim a posteriori, if indeed it is a genuine claim to 
knowledge at all. I have argued that we do assert that we 
know things because we have been told that they are so. It 
is rather odd to say "I know (rather than believe) that all 
maps can be coloured with only four colours, because Appel 
and liaken say so," but whether knowledge or belief is the more 
appropriate description, there is no doubt that the claim is 
an a posteriori one.
The experts themselves are in a rather different position. 
For them the route to conviction is two-fold; not as is often 
maintained a simple path of reasoning either a priori or a 
posteriori, but a combination of both, and Davis ’ mistake 
arises from taking the a posteriori aspect of the "convincing- 
process" as overriding.
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Conviction is a psychological state. Achieving this 
state, one which is necessary for a proof to be accepted as 
a proof, can require more than simply deducing the conclusion 
from the premisses. The process leading to the state of 
conviction is often, though not necessarily a complex one.
Becoming convinced, I suggest, goes something like this.
In the first instance the mathematician carries out a piece 
of deductive reasoning, passing from each of a finite string 
of symbols to its successor, recognising that each is a 
direct consequence of the previous ones; this surely 
exemplifies an a priori process in the traditional sense.
To understand the formulae in the string involves understanding 
the relationship between them. A conclusion or result is 
derived. The mathematician may be surprised or uncertain 
depending on the length or complexity of the formulae, or 
on his physical condition; perhaps he is suffering from 
fatigue, has a headache, or pressing anxieties, in fact 
any of the limitations which render a human being far from 
infallible. The lack of conviction causes him to carry out 
an experiment. The hypothesis is that if the process (a priori) 
is repeated, the same result will be derived. The experiment 
can be conducted many times and by different individuals, 
and, assuming that the same result is at least usually 
derived, the hypothesis is confirmed. The probability that 
the reasoning is correct approaches unity. This is the 
probability distribution that Davis is referring to, 
mistakenly applying it to the result itself, Expérimentation 
is an a posteriori activity; with increasing evidence.
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conviction grows. An a priori process is being used for 
experimental purposes, and since conviction derives from 
this combination of experimentation with deduction, it 
could be argued that the knowledge acquired cannot be 
described as either purely a posteriori or purely a priori.
It is certainly possible t© know something without necessarily 
being convinced of it, so that one could say that "x" knows 
"p" a priori, and "is convinced of ’p ’ by both a priori and 
a posteriori reasoning taken together", thus maintaining the 
knowledge-generating process as distinct from the conviction- 
producing process.
It is the equation of "knowing" with "being convinced" 
that lies at the root of the claim by Tymoczko ’s critics that 
the whole of mathematics is in some way infected with empirical 
elements; that proofs like the Four-Colour Theorem do not 
differ interestingly from any other mathematical proofs. In 
all cases, even those of the most simple proofs, the possibility 
of error in calculation, and the experimental nature of 
eliminating (as far as possible) this possibility, by 
’re-running’ the deductive programme, lead them to suppose that 
mathematics cannot be satisfactorily distinguished from the 
empirical sciences.
If any computation, however trivial, constituting a step 
in deductive reasoning, since it is a proof in its own right, 
must be regarded as containing empirical elements, then the 
traditional distinction between deductive and inductive 
reasoning breaks do^m and with it the distinction between 
a priori and a posteriori knowledge. This is a very strong
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claim indeed, much stronger than it appears Detlefsen &
Luker intend in the article, for they conclude:
"For our part we accept Tymoczko ’s reasoning and as 
a result, we believe that empirical proof is a relatively 
widespread phenomenon," (p,809). They do not say, however, 
that they believe non-empirical proof to be an impossibility,
though it would seem to be a consequence of their argument.
The discussion rests on the consideration of Gauss * 
"little theorem" that the sum of the first 100 positive 
integers is 5050, This proof is used by Tymoczko to 
exemplify pure a priori proof, I will quote his description 
of Gauss’
“Write down those numbers (the first 100 positive 
integers) in two rows of 50 columns as shown:
1 2 3 4 .......  49 50
100 99 98 97 ........ 52 51
Observe that the sum of the two numbers in each column 
is 101 and that there are 50 columns. Conclude that the sum 
of the first 100 positive numbers is 5,050."
Detlefsen and Luker (198O, p,80l) continue:
"Now it seems to us that somewhere between the 
"observation" (that the sum of each column is 101 and that 
the number of the columns is 50) and the "conclusion" (that 
the sum of the first 100 positive numbers is 5050), a 
substantial episode of computation has taken place: say
one in which 50 is multiplied by 101, or alternatively, one 
in which a series of 50 entries is summed. Upon what is 
our confidence in the results of such a computation based?"
5 2 .
They then lay down four assumptions they hold to be 
implicitly required in order to have confidence in a 
computation. These assumptions amount to a description of 
the "double-aspect" convincing process outlined previously 
(i,e, having both a priori and a posteriori elements).
They are :
"(a) that the underlying algorithm to be used is 
“ mathematically sound;
(b) that the particular program to be used is 
a correct implementation of the algorithm;
(c) that the computing agent correctly executes the 
program;
(d) that the reported result was actually obtained,"
Now, on my understanding, assumptions (a) and (b) apply
to what I have chosen to call the "deductive" or "a priori 
element" in the process of becoming convinced. In this 
example (a) refers to the operations of addition and 
multiplication, and (b) to the propriety of their use in 
this case, (a) and (b) according to Detlefsen and Luker are 
at least "in principle" provable. (c) and (d) correspond to 
the checking or experimental element, it is claimed, and 
encapsulate the empirical considerations unavoidably required 
in computation.
There are two issues involved here. The first is the 
particular case, that of the suggested interpretation of 
Tymoczko ’s argument concerning the Four-Colour Theorem, The 
second is the much more general question of the epistemological 
status of all mathematical propositions.
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Turning therefore to the particular case, I shall 
endeavour to summarize this interpretation and display the 
inherent weakness of it.
The appeal to computers in the 4 CT is analysable into 
two claims :
"(l) that every configuration i^ U (a set of 1834 / ^
unavoidable configurations) is reducible if a 
machine with such an such characteristics, when 
programmed in such and such a way produced an 
affirmative result for each configuration,
(2) that a machine so programmed did produce affirma­
tive results for each configuration,"(Tymoczko,
1979, p.73)
Claim (2) can be regarded as analogous to assumption
(d) above. It also becomes clear that that a particular 
result was actually achieved is a matter for empirical 
verification. As far as claim (1) is concerned, however, 
that it is directly analogous to assumption (c) is not nearly 
so obvious, Tymoczko regards the truth of claim (l) as 
dependent on the beliefs that "(i) the machine is executing 
the program it is supposed to execute, and (ii) the belief 
that the program is doing what it is supposed to...."
It is the similarity between assumption (c) and belief 
(i) that persuades Detlefsen and Luker that Tymoczko ’s 
claims (1) and (2) exactly parallel their assumptions (c) 
and (d), Belief (ii) on the other hand is swept aside on 
the grounds that it can be equated with their assumptions
(a) and (b), which they believe to be provable in principle.
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even if no-one actually possesses the proofs. Here lies 
the crux of the matter. Tymoczko regards the justification 
for the belief in claim (l) to be of an empirical nature 
and "not subject to traditional proof." The proof of the 
critical lemma, that shows that every configuration in U 
is reducible, being unsurveyable, provides support only of 
an inductive kind for the belief that the program is flaw­
lessly implementing the algorithm. He says "the task of 
evaluating programs is a topic of computer science, but 
at present there are no general methods for accomplishing 
it at this level,,,.. the reliability of any appeal to 
computers must ultimately rest on grounds as diffuse as 
these." (1979, p.74),
Belief (ii) or assumptions (a) and (b) rather than 
being in principle provable, are subject to justification 
of a ’diffuse’ and empirical nature. This marks the 
disagreement between Tymoczko and Detlefsen & Luker, and 
it is in this respect that Tymoczko believes the Pour-Colour 
Theorem differs from traditional proof. It is his further 
contention that although we believe in the existence of 
a formal proof of the Four-Colour Theorem, "this belief in 
the formal proof cannot be used to legitimize the appeal to 
computers. Rather we believe that the formal proof exists 
only because we accept the appeal to computers in the first 
place," (p.72),
The considerations made explicit in assumptions (a) and
(b) concerning the mathematical soundness and correct imple­
mentation of the algorithm are formal considerations relating
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to the process of deduction itself, as opposed to consider­
ations which relate to the accuracy with which the process 
has been carried out. It is not just that the unsurveya- 
bility of the computer print-out fails to eliminate the 
possibility of error, a possibility which remains in all 
cases of traditional proof, but rather that the justification 
of the proof as a whole rests on the conviction that the 
program has done what it is supposed to do. The inordinate 
length of the proof of the reducibility lemma not only 
prevents checking for mistakes, but also prevents the 
discovery of defects, bugs, flaws in the program.
It is by no means a new idea that human fallibility 
renders all knowledge less than certain. Hume (Treatise 
of Human Nature, 2nd Ed., 1978, pp. 18O-I87) argues for a 
position which can hardly be described as other than that of 
mathematical empiricism.
"There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in 
his science as to place entire confidence in any truth 
immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as anything 
but a mere probability. Every time he runs over his proofs, 
his confidence encreases; but still more by the approbation 
of his friends; and it is raised to its utmost perfection 
by the universal assent and applauses of the learned world.
Now it is evident that this gradual encrease of assurance is 
nothing but the addition of new probabilities, and is derived 
from the constant union of causes and effects, according to 
past experience and observation".
It is interesting to note that not only is Hume
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characterizing mathematical knowledge as merely probable, 
he is also suggesting that proofs are accepted, or equally, 
accepted as true, when they convince a sufficient number of 
the relevant experts. Hume argues like this; although the 
rules governing deductive reasoning, those of logic and 
mathematics, if infallibly applied, are bound to produce 
a conclusion which is necessarily true, human fallibility 
is such that it only is probable that in a particular case 
of any length, the individual performing a piece of reasoning 
has actually arrived at the correct conclusion, having 
avoided falling into error in the application of the rules.
He describes the process of becoming convinced of the 
truth of a conclusion deductively arrived at, rather in the 
same way as suggested earlier, that is, as a two-fold process 
combining a deductive element and an experimental element. 
According to Hume, we first form a new belief (reach a 
conclusion) and then form a further belief which acts as a 
kind of control on the first, by taking account of our 
personal history of mistake-making, The more often in the 
past we have discovered ourselves to be in error, the more 
likely it is that our limited faculties have led us astray on 
this occasion. The resulting judgement is therefore induc­
tively justified, at least in part, and the probability that 
it is true will depend on observation of past behaviour with 
regard to reasonings of that particular level of intricacy. 
Every instance of rechecking, by ourselves, and even more 
importantly by others better qualified, will increase or 
decrease this probability. This argument of Hume *s is not
57.
a particularly good one. The fact that we have made mistakes 
in the past often leads us to take greater care. A history 
of poor mathematical competence does not provide a good 
inductive basis for the belief that an improvement will not 
occur.
Hume tries to explain the commonly held belief that 
truths of reason are more secure than truths of fact.
The certainty we feel with regard to mathematical 
propositions can be accounted for in that the longest .and 
most complicated piece of mathematical reasoning can be 
broken down into a series of simple steps for which the 
probability approximates to 1. However, says Hume, since 
it is impossible to fix a boundary between certainty and 
probability, and since the assumption that if every step in 
a piece of reasoning is certain, the whole must be certain, 
is itself only probable, we must conclude that "all knowledge 
degenerates into probability". (p.l8l).
By interpreting "knowledge" so strongly that nothing can 
count as knowledge unless nothing whatever could conceivably 
falsify it, Hume effectively denies that a priori reasoning 
can provide us with knowledge.
It would seem that his position is very much that of 
Detlefsen and Luker, where they claim that even Gauss ’ little 
theorem contains empirical elements". The description of this 
proof as a "theorem" is in some ways misleading, Detlefsen 
and Luker are not alone in using the terms ’proof ’ and 
’theorem’ interchangeably. For all theorems there must be 
a proof, yet it is not the case that all proofs are proofs
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of theorems. Certainly not in the mathematical sense.
To be a theorem, mathematically speaking, the proposition 
proved needs to contain some general content, some deducible, 
consequences, and not merely be the demonstration of a 
particular proposition. A more accurate expression might 
be ; "even Gauss’ little proof of the proposition that the 
sum of the first 100 positive inte^gers is 505O". Leaving 
that aside, however, what is to be made of the claim that 
mathematical and logical truths are arrived at inductively, 
that these paradigm examples of a priori knowledge are only 
very probably true?
Initially a summary and recapitulation of some tradi­
tionally held beliefs about knowledge will help to clarify 
the situation:
1. It is believed the terms a priori and a posteriori are 
epistemological in character. They describe ’ways of 
knowing ’.
2. It is also the case that the truth of a proposition ’p ’
is a necessary condition for "knowing that ’p ’".
3 . In the case of a priori knowledge the truth of ’p ’ is
not only true but necessarily so. It is true in all
possible worlds.
It would seem therefore that in the case of an ’a priori 
way of knowing ’ the knowledge depends on the necessary truth 
of ’p ’ but that according to Hume ’s argument (among others) 
our access to that necessary truth involves inductive proce­
dures concerned with the assessment of human fallibility.
This is clearly a contingent matter. Theie is no contradiction
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in the supposition that a human being has infallible 
reasoning powers within a given logical structure; this 
is a different kind of supposition from that of a human being 
living for millennia, which as I have already indicated - 
might be considered as a contradictory conception. It should 
also be fairly obvious that the use of inductive reasoning 
would normally be described as reasoning a posteriori. The 
very least these considerations suggest is that there is 
often, if not always, an *a posteriori* element involved in 
knowing a priori; that the distinction a priori/a posteriori 
does not provide a clear-cut dichotomy dividing epistemological 
states neatly into two. It might be further claimed, if Hume 
is to be taken literally, that pure a priori knowledge is not 
even a possibility. This conclusion, however, is not directly 
drawn by Hume, but argued for indirectly. It would appear, 
he continues, that at least as far as mathematics is concerned 
the most intricate piece of reasoning can be broken down into 
a series of simple steps about each of which we can be certain. 
Thus, although we may have a priori knowledge of some self- 
evident propositions, drawing the boundary between this 
knowledge and that which amounts to no more than probability 
is an impossible task, not only on practical but also on 
logical grounds.
"Knowledge and probability are of such contrary and 
disagreeing natures, that they cannot well run insensible into 
each other and that because they will not divide, must be 
either entirely present or entirely all absent."
It is for this reason, the logical incompatibility of
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certain and probable knowledge, coupled with the contention 
that in cases exceeding the most simple in complexity, it 
is clear that our knowledge is only probable, that Hume 
claims that all reasoning is fundamentally a posteriori. He 
provides a further argument in support of this conclusion 
when he asserts that despite the apparent self-evidence of 
the assumption that certainty of each step in a deduction 
ensures certainty of the whole, this assumption itself is 
subject to the very same belief-forming process as the 
original piece of reasoning, and can consequently be known 
only experientially.
Now, it might well be denied that Hume is right about 
all this. Perhaps, far from being logically impossible, it 
is in fact quite easy to divide cases of pure a priori know­
ledge from those requiring additional experimental checking 
procedures as part of the process. Hume confines his 
attention to examples concerning the addition of numbers.
That he takes mathematics to provide a paradigm source of 
deductive reasoning is in no way surprising. However, 
consideration or propositions such as "If it is red, it is 
red" or "if it is blue, it is coloured" suggest that, although 
much smaller than traditionally assumed, there is nevertheless 
a class of non-inferential a priori propositions of which 
knowledge (in Hume *s sense) is possible. Relying as it does 
though, on the over-worked primitive notion of "self-evidence" 
this argument is of little value. Precise demarcation of 
this class is clearly no trivial matter. Individuals * 
intellectual capacities vary sufficiently to require an
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inferential process in some cases and none at all in others. 
Quine *s example (197O, p.22) "If you help none who help 
themselves you do not help yourself" illustrates this 
difficulty well. This particular logically true statement 
may easily be self-evident to one person and stand in need 
of demonstration to another.
The respective merits of Hume *s position and this type 
of objection to it, might well be held to be unworthy of 
discussion, since both the original argument, and the 
objection, fall foul of a much more serious criticism; 
one which equally applies to claims of the kind put forward 
by Detlefsen and Luker, The charge of that of "psychologism" 
To use a now familiar expression, all these writers could be 
said to have made the mistake of confusing "the context of 
discovery with "the context of justification". It is to an 
analysis of Frege*s objections to the intrusion of psychology 
into mathematics that I now turn, with the intention of 
demonstrating that these objections are not fatal to the 
interpretation of the a priori/a posteriori distinction that 
I have adopted, one which applies the terms to "ways of 
knowing" as opposed to propositions.
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CHAPTER III
Frege. Proof and Psychologism
It is a common claim that it was one of Frege *s most 
firmly held beliefs that psychological processes have 
nothing whatever to do with mathematics. This claim is 
somewhat of an oversimplification. It is certainly true 
that Frege believed that the tendency in philosophical 
discourse to utilise psychological methods of argument was 
largely responsible for the lack of cooperation between the 
disciplines of philosophy and mathematics. He also believed 
interaction between them is essential for the analysis of 
the concept of numbers and the foundations of mathematics, 
"With this tendency", jthat of using psychological method^ 
"mathematics is completely out of sympathy, and this easily 
accounts for the aversion to philosophical arguments felt 
by many mathematicians," (l884, trans, J.L, Austin, 1959 Ve)
In the course of an attack on the notion that the 
concept of number has any connection with sensations or 
mental pictures, he remarks (1959, Austin VI®); "It may 
of course serve some purpose to investigate the ideas and 
changes of ideas which occur curing the course of mathe­
matical thinking, but psychology should not imagine that 
it can contribute anything whatever to the foundations of 
arithmetic."
The logicist programme, the reduction of mathematical 
definitions to purely logical ones, was the result of 
Frege *s awareness of and concern for the lack of rigour 
in nineteenth century mathematics. It is only, he claims
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through, the logical justification of mathematical 
definitions that rigour can be achieved and genuine 
certainty obtained. Proof in this strong sense he 
believed was possible, but only if mathematics was 
firmly embedded within logic.
The quest for rigour and the demand for purely 
logical justifications therefore lead Frege to characterize 
three principles which he believes to be fundamental. The 
first (1959» Xe) is of interest here, "always to separate 
sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective 
from the objective,"
It is considerations of this kind that lead Frege 
to make his now famous observations (30®) on the distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, a distinction 
which rests, he claims, on the kind of justification we have 
for asserting a particular proposition. Questions regarding 
this justification, which in the case of a mathematical 
proposition must be a rigorous proof, must be clearly 
separated from descriptions of the way in which a particular 
person has come to believe it to be true.
Whether a proposition is to be considered to be true 
a priori or true a posteriori depends on the type of 
justification provided for its assertion and not at all 
on the process by which an individual becomes convinced of it. 
In view of the preceding characterization of the 
a priori and a posteriori distinction, as an entirely 
epistemological one, to do with ways of knowing, it is 
clear that some further consideration of Frege*s general
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epistemological position is required. Frege appears to 
be asserting this; that contrary to Hume*s belief (among 
others) that the possibility of error in deductive 
reasoning removes all knowledge thus achieved from the 
realm of the a priori and casts it firmly in that of the 
a posteriori, the assertion of an error in a priori 
reasoning is just meaningless. If the ultimate ground 
for believing the truth of a proposition is removed then 
so is the ground for drawing the distinction. A proposition ! 
lacking an appropriate justification would therefore be !
neither knowable a priori nor a posteriori. This is in j
accordance with the traditional conception of the distinction iI
as one dividing propositions. On the interpretation of the 
distinction I have adopted, as classifying "ways of knowing", 
the process itself can be a priori, even if defective and 
leading only to a false belief.
The divorce between logical and psychological grounds 
fails to solve one problem; that is the previously mentioned 
one of the clear possibility of acquiring knowledge of a 
particular proposition by either a deductive or an empirical 
route. Both the deducer and the measurer, and also the man 
who is prepared to accept their testimony, knows that "the 
sum of the interior angles of any triangle is l80°" is 
a true proposition. The status of the proposition itself 
as a priori is unaffected by this. Its status is presumably 
guaranteed by Euclid *s proof. There is a certain assynietry 
however, for it is only the deducer who knows the ’ultimate 
ground * for this truth, and this might be said to provide
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a partial answer to the question raised earlier (i.e. is 
the knowledge acquired the same in all cases?). The reply 
must clearly be ’no the man who gains his knowledge 
deductively is in a different epistemological condition 
from those acquiring it inductively, or by testimony.
That access to a truth is possible via the fundamental 
logical justification however suggests two things. In 
the first place it would seem that knowledge acquired by 
this route is somehow better grounded than that acquired 
in any less fundamental way, and secondly and consequently, 
that the route to that knowledge is not, as Frege believes, 
entirely undescriptive of a psychological process. What 
constitutes the justification for a proposition is 
inextricably bound up with the belief-forming process.
In other words, what forms a justification, in the sense of 
determining the truth value of a proposition, is one of the 
ways in which it can be known. The type of process by which 
it can be known is what determines the ascription of the 
terms a priori and a posteriori irrespective of how it is 
known in a particular instance.
There is in any case a difficulty inherent in Frege *s 
sharp separation of logical and psychological processes.
The question raised by it is this; if as logicism demands, 
mathematical truths are reducible to logical ones and 
derive from this the status of being absolutely certain, 
how do we come to know the truth of basic logical laws? 
Nowhere does Frege provide an answer to this question and 
yet an answer would seem to be of very considerable
bîD,
importance for the entire undertaking, Philip Kitcher 
in "Frege ’s Epistemology" (l979) attempts to supply an 
account of Frege 's theory of knowledge which explains his 
attitude to this problem, and also provides an analysis 
of his rejection of "psychologism" which will be of use 
here.
Kitcher’s aims in this paper are twofold. He begins 
by analysing Frege ’s rooted objection to the confusion of 
psychology and logic, in order to demonstrate that this 
demand for separation in no way interferes with the conception 
of ’knowing’ as being a "psychological process", and secondly 
he demonstrates that the reason for Frege *s lack of interest 
in the fundamental question of how we know the laws of logic
to be true is that his basic epistemological structure is
Kantian, with refinements regarding our knowledge of truths 
of arithmetic. Kant ’s structure being accepted, the 
question is already settled.
Frege ’s motivation in the Grundlagen, is as I have 
said, derived from his awareness both of the lack of
understanding most mathematicians had of the foundations
of their own discipline and from the casual approach they 
had towards proofs. Mathematical proofs in Frege ’s day 
were slap-happy affairs, full of gaps, great leaps of 
intuition and ill-defined terras, much more like Lakatos’s 
characterization of a thought-experiment ( ’Proofs and 
Refutations', 1976) than modern formal proofs. The 
justification for them was often a pragmatic one - they 
achieved the result desired and no contradictions appeared.
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All this Frege rejected. (l959 Xe )
"Yet it must still be borne in mind that the rigour 
of the proof remains an illusion, even though no link be 
missing in the chain of our deductions, so long as the 
definitions are justified only as an afterthought, by our 
failing to come across any contradictions . "
Now Kitcher contends that Frege ’s position as a 
mathematical reformer, coupled with his acceptance of a 
Kantian epistemology, allowed him to rule out any discussion 
of mental processes as irrelevant to the foundation of 
mathematical knowledge without furnishing an alternative 
account of the origin of this knowledge* " I shall continue 
to take seriously Frege *s demands for the reform of 
mathematical knowledge. My task will be to account for his 
epistemological reticence. In brief niy answer is this:
Frege believed that the basic epistemological issues had 
been settled." (1979? p.24l).
Kitcher begins his defence of this claim by spelling 
out the conception of proof he believes to be common to 
both Frege and Kant - a traditional conception from which 
Frege developed the notion of a formal proof. According 
to this conception proofs "are distinguished by the kinds 
of knowledge they produce". Proving is a special kind of 
human activity which gives rise to a distinctive type of 
knowledge and the written proof, the sequence of symbols, 
serves as a record of this activity,
"The proof (the pattern of the proof) shows us the 
result of a procedure (the construction); and we are
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convinced that a procedure, regulated in this way always 
leads to this configuration. (The proof exhibits a fact 
of synthesis to us.)" (Wittgenstein, 1978, p.159)
Note also the connection here with T}'‘inoczko ’s criterion 
of surveyability. Proofs describe processes. This 
account, says Kitcher, presupposes a psychologistic 
interpretation of knowledge, and although it might be 
felt that this would have been abhorrent to Frege, it is 
not so. According to a psychologistic theory of knowledge, 
the distinction between knowledge and true belief can be 
drawn by considering the way in which the belief was generated 
- the reasons for the belief. This is not to imply that for 
any item of knowledge, the way that the belief in it was 
initially acquired is relevant; it may start out as a 
lucky guess, but that for a belief to count as knowledge, 
the justification for the belief must be given in terms of 
how it has come to be believed.
Kitcher *s exposition of the traditional conception of 
proof requires that those mathematical propositions taken 
as axioms can be knomi either by entering a particular 
type of mental state or by undergoing a particular type of 
mental process. Since the identification of knowledge as 
a mental state has its intrinsic difficulties, perhaps it 
is simpler to retain only the idea of knowledge as the 
result of a type of mental process. The kind of process 
required in the case of knowledge of axioms is that which 
is essentially non-inferential.
Kitcher here remarks that one of the most important
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tasks necessary for a theory of mathematical knowledge 
constructed in this way is to give a precise characterisa­
tion of these processes. This is a matter to which I shall 
return later.
According to the argument under discussion, 
mathematical knowledge is generated from knowledge of 
axioms by a process of inference. Absolute incorrigibility 
which is a feature of this type of knowledge arises from 
the particular nature of the mental processes which 
provide knowledge of axioms. This incorrigibility is 
then transmitted via the processes of inference to further 
mathematical propositions.
"The activity of reasoning from axioms to theorems is 
the process of proving. Mathematical proofs are records 
of that process," (Kitcher, 1979, p.238)
The point is this: in order to count as a proof,
a sequence of symbols must function as a codification of 
a piece of reasoning that enables the reconstruction of 
that reasoning in such a way as to permit knowledge of 
the special type outlined above, to be attained. It was 
to provide a perfect realization of this conception of 
proof, to rid mathematics of confusion and slipshod 
practice, that Frege devised the formal systems of the 
Begriffschrift and Grundgesetze, Dummett explains that
(1973) "Frege*s purpose in constructing such a formal 
system was not the modern one whereby, when formal 
systems themselves are made the objects of mathematical 
investigation, light is thrown on the nature of mathematical 
proofs and definitions, but simply to attain the ideal of
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that rigour to which the whole of* nineteenth-century 
mathematics had been striving". The fact that formal 
systems were not used in this way, often being too 
cumbersome to handle effectively, in no way detracts 
from Frege*5 achievement. It was, Dummett comments (19ÔI) 
"not the actual execution of a totally rigorous formulation 
of mathematical proofs, but the precise delineation of what 
such a formulation would consist in" that was important 
and was Frege*s significant innovation.
The problem for the argument of this paper is to 
demonstrate how Frege's known opposition to psychologism 
does not force us to conclude that he rejected tliis account 
of proof, relying as it does on a psychologistic theory of 
knowledge. The important thing to recognize here is that 
Frege believed an inference to be a psychological process. 
He had no quarrel at all with the idea that making an 
inference was a mental process; that is, the passing from 
one judgement to further judgements strictly in accordance 
with uninterpreted rules would be analogous to a move in 
chess, and could in no way count as an inference,
"Now it is quite true that we could have introduced 
our rules of inference and the other laws of the "Begriff- 
schrift" as arbitrary stipulations, without speaking 
of the meaning and the sense of the signs. Ne would then 
have been treating signs as figures, kliat we took to be 
the external representation of an inference would then be 
comparable to a move in chess, merely the transition
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from one configuration to another  .....  where there
could he no question of thoughts expressed by the various 
positions, and no move could be interpreted as an inference." 
(Frege, Ed. Geach, P. and Black, M., 3rd Ed* I9ÔO, pp.l63-l66) 
ifliat views exactly was Frege attacking in the 
Grundlagen? There seem to be several. Primarily, Frege 
was objecting to the confusion between the descriptive and 
the normative sciences of human mental processes of 
inference. It is the task of logic to prescribe the nature 
of our inferential processes; of psychology to describe the 
ones we actually make. It was, in fact, precisely because 
Frege believed that the "nature of the process which 
produces the belief is crucial to the epistemic status 
of the belief" (Kitcher, 1979, p.246) that he regarded it 
essential that we only make inferences which conform 
strictly to the laws of logic. A further reason for the 
attack on psychologism was Frege *s essentially Platonistic 
view of mathematical objects; his opposition to the 
identification of mathematical objects with ideas (in the 
sense of mental objects) and of the identification of ideas, 
again in this sense, with the meanings of words. What is 
important here is that not one of these doctrines is 
entailed by the epistemological position required by the 
traditional concept of proof.
"One can believe that the difference between knowledge 
and true belief is to be found in the nature of the factors 
which produced the belief in the knower, one can regard 
inferences as a mental process to which the laws of logic 
prescribe, and one can view proofs as codifications of
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ideal inferential processes, processes which produce 
certain knowledge, without committing oneself on any of 
the complex of doctrines which Frege correctly spurned." 
(1979, p.248).
Thus Kitcher completes convincingly, I think, the 
first stage of his argument. It remains to provide a 
brief exposition of the second, the thesis that Frege 
fundamentally accepted Kant s^ epistemological framework 
whilst disagreeing only in the case of arithmetical 
propositions, A description of the position involves 
the recognition of three kinds of distinction. Propositions, 
Kant divided into analytic and synthetic, items of knowledge 
into a priori and a posteriori, and sources of knowledge 
into (to use Kitcher*s terminology) conceptual analysis, 
experience, and pure intuition.
The first two distinctions are familiar ones, I have 
discussed Kant *s treatment of the terms a priori and 
a posteriori earlier in this paper and therefore will 
merely outline Kitcher *s interpretation of the notion of 
independence of experience. He suggests that it goes like 
this: "Ne have a priori knowledge of a proposition when,
for any experience which would be adequate for the 
acquisition of the concepts involved in that proposition, 
we could have exactly that experience and still know the 
proposition in the way we actually know it."
The last requirement, that we know the proposition 
in the same way is essential to allow for cases of a type 
already mentioned where a proposition which could be known
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a priori is in fact known a posteriori, A posteriori 
knowledge is distinguished, consequently as knowledge 
which given experiences adequate for the acquisition of 
the concepts involved, could nevertheless, not he known 
in the way it actually is. Thus a priori knowledge requires 
that no experiences beyond those necessary for the 
acquisition of the relevant concepts are needed to know 
the truth of a proposition. If further experiences are 
required the knowledge is a posteriori. Unless, as I have 
said, we allow that a certain level of experience is 
necessary to provide a grasp of the concepts involved in 
many propositions held to be a priori, we are committed to 
the view that such concepts are innate. Even if the case 
cannot be closed against the possibility of innate knowledge, 
an account of a priori knowledge should at least leave the 
question an open one.
Derived directly from this distinction is a further one 
among true propositions. A proposition can be held to be 
a priori or a posteriori accordingly as it is knowable 
a priori or only a posteriori.
The other distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions has had a very chequered philosophical history, 
but leaving questions of its merit aside, it has been 
explained as that between those propositions where the 
concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of 
the subject, and those where the concept of the predicate 
is external to that of the subject.
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"Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, 
as something which is (covertly) contained in this 
concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although 
indeed it does stand in connection with it. In the 
one case I entitle the judgement analytic and in the other 
synthetic." (Kant, 1933» p.48). The intelligibility of 
this explanation is dubious. The idea of one concept 
containing or being contained in another can only be 
a metaphorical one. Kitcher*s exposition of this 
distinction is a little more illuminating. He suggests 
that a proposition is analytic "in virtue of the structure 
of our concepts", while synthetic propositions are true 
in virtue of some aspect of the world (Kitcher, 1979, 
p.249).
Given these pairs, a fourfold division is possible, 
though one class, the analytic a posteriori, need not be 
considered for the reason that all analytic propositions 
are a priori.
"Since, in framing the judgement, I must not go 
outside my concept there is no need to appeal to the 
testimony of experience in its support," (Kant, 193 3, p.49).
The three classes of propositions which are of > 
interest are therefore the analytic a priori, the synthetic 
a posteriori, and the synthetic a priori, and related to 
each of those epistemological categories tliere is a 
distinctive source of knowledge. Clearly sense experience 
provides synthetic a posteriori knowledge, this is not 
a problem. What is not nearly so obvious is the process
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of* analysis of* concepts by which Kant believed we gain 
knowledge of analytic a priori propositions. The description 
of this process amounts to just this: "I have merely to
analyse the concept, that is, to become conscious to 
myself of the manifold which I always think is that 
concept," (p.49) He offers no explanation of exactly 
how this occurs. In order to account for synthetic 
a priori knowledge a third source is required. No 
reasoning from analytic premisses can provide a priori 
knowledge of a synthetic nature, and so Kant postulates
a process he calls "pure intuition", by which we arrive
at mathematical truths, truths concerning the forms of 
intuition, space and time.
Now it is Kitcher *s contention that although Frege 
accepted this Kantian tripartite division of knowledge and 
its sources, he believed that as far as arithmetic is
concerned Kant allocated it the wrong source and vainly
strived to find a pure arithmetical intuition. Ifhilst 
allowing the propositions of geometry to be synthetic a 
priori, those of arithmetic are analytic a priori. By 
revising the account of the sources of this kind of 
knowledge Frege was simply strengthening ICant *s epistemo­
logical structure. It is reasonable to suppose that Frege 
found the limitations of the analytic/synthetic distinction 
uncomfortable and that by supplanting conceptual analysis 
by his own "logical source of knowledge" he not only 
extended the scope of the analytic beyond propositions 
of subject/predicate form, but also imbued knowledge of
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arithmetic with the virtues he claimed for it, "clarity, 
certainty and self-evidence."
Returning to the main purpose of this discussion, 
it is the source of a particular item of knowledge that 
for Frege constitutes the ideal justification for it.
The primitive truths of each type of knowledge, from 
which all inferences are made, are themselves classified 
according to their ideal justifications, grounded either 
in perception, intuition or logic. The primitive truths 
relevant to mathematics, i.e. laws of logic and definitions, 
therefore, stem from a common distinct source, whose 
independence of experience and intuition confers on the 
propositions thereby derived a superior level of certainty. 
Frege explains this superiority by examining the consequences 
of denying the basic truths governing each class of knowledge. 
Synthetic truths are mutually independent. No contradiction 
results from the denial of any one of them, nor from the 
postulates of Euclidean geometry, but he says of arithmetic, 
"the science of number", "here, we have only to try denying 
any one of them, and complete confusion ensues. Even to 
think at all seems no longer possible. The basis of 
arithmetic lies deeper, it seems, than any of the 
empirical sciences, and even than that of geometry. The 
truths of arithmetic govern all that is numerable. This 
is the widest domain of all; for to it belongs not only 
the actual not only the intertable, but everything 
thinkable," (p,21e)
Thus, if Kitcher is correct in his interpretation of
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Frege *s epistemological position, and liis argument is 
a plausible one, we can explain our knowledge of 
fundamental logical laws as stemming from a distinct 
logical source. However, by accepting this interpretation 
of Frege, we become committed to taking seriously the 
suggestion that all of mathematics contains "empirical 
elements". These empirical elements, either as Hume 
maintains, in the form of additional judgements as to 
the likelihood of personal error, or as in Detlefson and 
Luker*s terms, the essentially fallible human nature of 
the process of computation, cannot be safely written out 
of account as an obvious case of confusing discovery with 
justification.
Psychological, some of these considerations may be, 
but not in any sense in which Frege attacked their intrusion 
into mathematics. Inference making is a psychological 
process. An uninterpreted string of symbols, i.e.
p, C p ^  Cp does not constitute an inference;
it represents the form a valid inference might take. An 
inference is constituted by the conscious transition of 
a human mind from an awareness of the premisses to an aware­
ness that the conclusion is a valid consequence of those 
premisses. This Frege would not have denied; he would only 
have denied that there was room for any considerations 
of an empirical nature, concerning the actual habits of 
human minds in making inferences. His concern was with 
how certain of these inferential processes are justified 
as valid, not with a description of the psychological
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factors governing successful performance of these processes.
Checking and double checking - assessment of 
individual reliability among other considerations 
may well be necessary to the formation of a belief.
However the ultimate ground for a belief lies not in 
the accuracy which is credited to the performance (of 
the process in question), but in the way in which the 
most basic propositions of that type of knowledge come 
to be known; that is, of the kind of process required.
f^hat is suggested by Hume, and also by Levin, and 
Detlefsen and Luker, is that the necessity of checking 
difficult computations introduces empirical elements 
into the structure of the inferences being made in 
performing computations. This is in direct opposition 
to Frege *s views. For him the justification of a 
mathematical proposition rests solely in an idealized 
inferential structure, abstracted from the actual processes 
of inference that occur in human minds. The proponents of 
this type of mathematical empiricism believe that Frege 
was mistaken;that the truth value of a mathematical 
proposition is only determined by an inferential process 
which includes assessment of reliable performance and 
rechecking of difficult steps.
If these charges of empiricism in mathematics cannot 
be ignored on the grounds that they consist of a simple 
confusion of logical and psychological grounds, precisely 
because these grounds are not fully distinct, a further 
account of those so-called empirical elements must be
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given, I believe Kitcher is correct in his inter­
pretation of Frege 's views, as accepting a fundamentally 
psychologistic epistemology, despite his claim that the 
final justification for any item of knowledge lies in the 
source of that knowledge, and the reason for my belief 
that this is so has to do with the way the concept of 
"a source of knowledge" is to be explained. To say that 
perceptual knowledge derives from and is justified by a 
perceptual source can only be made intelligible if the 
remark is interpreted as the claim that such knowledge 
is acquired via perceptual processes; similarly if 
arithmetical knowledge is held to be derived from a 
special "logical source" this must be to say that it is 
a product of strictly logical reasoning.
In order to defend the traditional claim that 
mathematics is an a priori discipline, it must be shown that 
deductive computational processes do not in themselves 
involve considerations of human fallibility. Decisions 
as to the epistemological status of mathematical proposi­
tions need to take into account the kind of way in which 
they are known. Wittgenstein considers the question of 
whether a mathematical proof could be called an experiment, 
i.e. whether the process of proving is an experimental one. 
If it is an experiment, he maintains, it must be a psycho­
logical one (1978, pp.95-98).
"Is it experimentally settled whether one proposition 
can be derived from another? It looks as if it were. For 
I write down certain sequences of signs, am guided in doing
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so by certain paradigms, - in doing which it is essential 
that no sign should got overlooked or otherwise lost - and 
of what X get in this procedure, I say - it follows".
He suggests as a counter-argument the fact that in counting 
apples, if 2 and 2 result in the presence of only tliree 
apples, we would not doubt the laws of arithmetic, but 
conclude that one apple must have become lost. When we 
check a proof, it could be described as an experiment to 
see if the transformations are in agreement with known 
paradigms, "so if this is to be called an experiment it is 
presumably a psychological one. For the appearance of 
agreement may of course be founded on self-deception.
And so it sometimes is when we make a slip in calculating"
(p.97). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein goes on to argue, the 
result of the calculation, or the proposition proved, is not 
what is the result of the process viewed as experiment. The 
result of the experiment "is that from these propositions, 
by means of these rules, I was led to this proposition."
(p.98). Wittgenstein*s question is really this: how is
the mathematical proposition related to the proposition 
stated in the experimental result? What is needed is a 
much more detailed examination of the kind of epistemological 
theory, the psychologistic theory of knowing, which Kitcher 
claims to underpin the traditional concept of proof, but 
before embarking on that extensive programme, there is 
another claim for mathematical empiricism which deserves 
some comment, that made by Jo3, Mill in "System of Logic".
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CHAPTER IV
Mill, Frege and Mathematical Empiricism
The account given by Mill in "System of Logic" of 
the nature of number and mathematical knowledge has been 
generally ignored or held up to ridicule, particularly since 
Frege *s devastating attack on it in the opening section of 
the "Grundlagen Der Arithmetik". However in recent years 
(1979» and 1980), papers have been published resurrecting 
Milles position and attempting to defend it. This section 
will give a brief exposition of Mill*s argument, followed 
by a statement of Frege *s criticisms. It will then look 
at the proposals to restate it in an acceptable form.
Finally I shall try to extract any elements relevant to 
the main discussion of this paper and to the Four-Colour 
Theorem in particular. The papers I want to discuss are 
"Arithmetic for the MiIlian" (Phi1. Studies 19800), once 
more by Philip Kitcher, and "Frege, Mill and the Foundations 
of Arithmetic" (j. Phil., February I98O ) by Glenn Kessler,
(a) Mill on the Foundations of Mathematics
The underlying presumption of Mill*s account of 
arithmetic, the science of number, is that it is fundamentally 
a matter of definitions taken in conjunction with axioms.
These axioms he cites as (l) "things which are equal to 
the same things are equal to one another", and (2) "the 
sums of equals are equals". This second axiom he re-expresses 
rather obscurely as "whatever is made up of parts is made up of 
parts of these parts." It is important to recognize that Mill
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lie Id these axioms to be higher order empirical 
generalizations.
"This truth, obvious to the senses in all cases which 
can be fairly referred to their decision and so general as 
to bo coextensive with nature itself, being true of all 
sorts of phenomena (for all admit of being numbered), 
must be considered an inductive truth or law of nature 
of the highest order. And every arithmetical operation 
is an application of this law, or of other laws capable 
of being deduced from it." (Mill - Ed. Robson, J.M., 19?4,
p.613).
Not only did Mill consider the ultimate truths of 
arithmetic to be inductive in character, he also asserts 
that the definitions of numbers are factual definitions 
rather than pure logical ones, Kantian analytic truths.
"The fact asserted in the definition of number is a 
physical fact." (p.6lo).
Mill 8^ intentions here are made a little clearer in 
the light of his theory of names. Names for Mill have a 
denotation which consists of the individuals covered by 
the extension of the term, and connotation which is the 
properties in respect of which the individuals belong to 
the extension. Proper names therefore only denote; their 
lack of connotative power renders them literally meaningless. 
Definition clearly is to do with meaning, or in Mill*s 
terminology, connotation. Thus it follows that if numbers 
are to be regarded as definitions, it is necessary to reject 
the Platonic view that they are proper names for abstract 
entities.
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Each of the number terms is held to denote a physical 
phenomenon and connote a physical property of that 
phenomenon, "IVo for instance denotes all pairs of things, 
and twelve all dozens of things, connoting what makes them 
pairs, or dozens; and that which makes them so is something 
physical,.,.," (p.olO). What exactly is this physical 
property which constitutes the connotation of a number?
Mill explains it as a way in which an aggregate is made up 
of parts, and can be separated into parts. When we use 
the numbers, two, three, four for a collection of things, we 
are not speaking in the abstract but referring to the way 
in which particular kinds of things together form that 
aggregate.
This view of numbers as properties of aggregates or 
agglomerations coupled with the preceding one that the 
axioms of arithmetic are empirical laws of a very high 
degree of generality provide the basis of Mill^s claim 
that mathematical knowledge is of an a posteriori nature.
Against this Frege makes several criticisms. In the 
first place he simply derides the idea that the definitions 
of numbers assert physical facts, which are open to 
observation. Mill^s claim for the case of number three, 
that it is a recognizable agglomerate, separabJe into two 
parts, one containing one item, the other containing two, 
is all very well for such a small number, but what, Frege 
asks, can be the observable fact asserted in the definition 
of, for example, a six-figure number. Here there is no 
recognizable aggregate; no amount of observation of a
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collection of that size could distinguish that number from 
its nearest twenty or so neighbours.
"lie informs us, in fact, that these definitions are 
not definitions in the logical sense; not only do they 
fix the meaning of a term, but they also assert along with 
it an observed matter of fact. But what in the world can 
be the observed fact, (or the physical fact, to use another 
of Mill's expressions) which is asserted in the definition 
of the number 777864? Of all the whole wealth of physical 
facts in his apocalypse, Mill names for us only a solitary 
one, the one which he holds is asserted in the definition 
of the number j . It consists, according to him, in this; 
that collections of objects exist, which while they impress 
the senses thus may be separated into two parts,
thus o o  o (1959; p.9®)
"Miat a mercy," he continues, "that not everything in 
the world is nailed down. For if it were, we should not be 
able to bring off this separation, and 2 and 1 would not be 
3." Nor is Frege *s humourous outburst exhausted yet; he 
proceeds to muse on Mill*s presumed discomfort, had he been 
required to demonstrate the observable fact underlying the 
numbers 0 aud 1 , and comments on the limitations on, or 
applicability of numbers, to such things as sensations and 
abstract ideas, given the account suggested.
Mill does to some extent forestall this particular 
objection when he insists that although it might often be 
the case that the difference between for instance one hundred 
and one and one hundred and two horses is not in fact
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perceptible, it is the possibility of them being so
arranged as to make it perceptible that is of importance.
If no difference was in principle discernible there would 
be no reason to give the aggregates different numerical 
names. Certainly the conception of numbers as having 
factual definitions as opposed to logical ones is not a 
particularly clear one, but at least Mill was not as 
unaware as Frege supposed of its inherent difficulties.
Frege 's next attack is directed against the assertion 
that fundamental arithmetical truths are laws of nature.
This, says Frege, gives to them, "a sense which they do 
not bear" (p,13®). Mill does this by confusing pure and
applied mathematics and by failing to notice that it is only
in the context of some applications that it makes sense to 
conceive of numbers as heaps or agglomerations.
Even if these criticisms were not sufficiently 
devastating to overthrow the idea that the laws of arithmetic 
are laws of nature, further questions can be raised. If 
they are general laws, how are they established? How 
could they be falsified? What basis for induction do 
they provide?
Frege asks (p,l4®);
"From what particular facts are we to take our start 
here, in order to advance to the general? Assign them to it, 
ju numbers 3^^8 of course we lose once again the advantage 
gained by giving our definitions of the individual numbers; 
we should have to cast around for some other means of 
establishing the numerical formulae,"
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In other words, if numerical formulae are held to be 
the particulars from which the supposed general laws are 
derived, then the physical facts which Mill claims serve 
as their definitions cannot be definitions in any sense 
at all, Even should it be possible for these "observable 
facts" about the properties of aggregates to support the 
general laws, "the sums of equals are equals" and "things 
which are equal to the same things are equal to one 
another", it is extremely hard to see exactly how, for 
in the case of numbers "there is none of that uniformity, 
which in other fields can give the method a high degree 
of reliability." (p.l4®)
Not only are numbers dissimilar in more than just 
magnitude, "iln even number can be divided into two equal 
parts, an odd number cannot; tliree and six are triangular 
numbers, four and nine are squares, eight is a cube, and 
so on." (p.l4®), they are also unlike individual members 
of a species, who are related by a set of common properties, 
which is what constitutes the definition of the species. 
Numbers, on the other hand, have no single common property. 
They are all individual, and yet are arranged in a fixed 
series, quite unlike members of a species.
Thus it is not only hard to see how the generalizations 
are derivable from the instances, it also appears that 
those generalizations do not provide an inductive basis 
either. Where similarity is lacking, so is a ground for 
prediction. Further, Frege argues, inductive reasoning 
to be sound must be based on a mathematical theory of
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probability, and therefore cannot without circularity 
justify mathematics itself.
Compelling these criticisms certainly are, but even 
more so is the one which Kessler (1980) dubs the "relativity 
argument". It is directed against the view of numbers as 
properties of aggregates and at the same time calls into 
question the intelligibility of the concept of an aggregate. 
The tlirust of the argument is that if a number is to be 
regarded as a property, then notice should be taken of 
difference in the way it functions when compared to other 
properties, such as being red, having a certain weight, 
or shape, or texture. The assumption is that in normal 
cases of "possession of a property" the answer to the 
question of whether an object possesses a property or not 
is a determinate one. In the case of number it is not.
Now before entering into a discussion of the argument 
concerning Mill*s conception of number as a property, I 
would like to argue against the assumption that in most 
cases a determinate answer can be given to questions of 
possession of a property,
(b) Vagueness and the Relativity Argument
First of all some alteration in the terminology in 
which this discussion is cast must be made. Speaking of 
objects "possessing properties" at all invites too many 
additional difficulties concerning the old ontological 
problem of universals,
"One may admit that there are red houses, roses and 
sunsets, but deny, except as a popular and misleading manner
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Ox speaking, that they have anything in common. The words 
'houses ', 'roses ' and 'sunsets ' denote each of sundry indivi­
dual entities which are houses, and roses and sunsets, and 
the word 'red ' or 'red objects' denotes each of sundry 
individual items which are red houses, red roses, red 
sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, 
individual or otherwise, which is named by the word 'redness' 
nor for that matter, by the word 'househood ', 'rosehood ',
'sunsethood ' (Quine, 1952, p.29).
In other words, talk of "properties" involves a 
commitment to a realm of abstract entities corresponding 
to the terms describing characteristics of objects. It* is 
the result of a particular and mistaken theory of meaning 
which holds that the meaning of a term is the thing it 
refers to. On this view the question, what do the terms 
'red ', 'hard ', 'circular ', etc., refer to? can only be 
answered by invoking abstractions 'redness ', 'hardness ', 
'circularity ', It is far better to relinguish the term 
'property ' than to be entangled in the problem of explaining 
the manner of their existence.
For this reason I intend to translate the question,
"Does the question of whether an object possesses a property 
or not admit of a determinate answer?" as "Does the question 
of whether a term is applicable to an object or not admit 
of a determinate answer?"
In reply to this reformulated question, my answer is, 
"not always", and the reason that it does not always do so 
has to do with a feature of natural language; that of
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vagueness.
Wiat, therefore, is vagueness?
"In practice, language is always more or less vague, 
so that, what we assert is never quite precise", (Russell,
1923, p.91).
There are not many people, I think, who would feel 
inclined to disagree with Russell and only slightly more 
who would wish to claim that this vagueness, or lack of 
precision, (if in fact lack of precision can he used 
interchangeably with vagueness, which is by no means 
obvious), is a defect in natural languages, rather than 
an essential feature of them.
However, in agreeing that ordinary language is 
vague we are committing ourselves to a statement which 
is itself vague in at least one of the many senses of 
the word.
It would seem appropriate, therefore, to look closely 
at this term, "vague", in order to clarify the ways in 
which it is used and to distinguish it from other notions 
closely connected with it.
Avishai Margalit (l97b) draws distinctions between 
three senses of "vague", two of which he believes to be 
those most commonly used in philosophical literature. The 
third sense of "vague", that of being obscure, or being 
a term "lacking clear cases for its application and its 
misapplication ("experience", for example), he dismisses 
without explanation. Despite this seeming a little hasty, 
the senses of vague, those of being indefinite and being
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indeterminate, which he does consider, do fall into line 
with those used by other writers and for this reason would 
make a useful starting point.
Being indefinite, according to Margalit, is to lack 
definite boundaries. He suggests as examples, the 
boundaries between day and night, or mountains and valleys. 
These boundaries fall somewhere on a continuum and it does 
not really seem sensible to pick any specific point as 
demarcating a transition from one thing to another without 
a feeling of arbitrariness arising. There are, however, 
other cases where although the boundaries are indefinite, 
they clearly do not fall on a continuum. An instance 
would be a pain, such as headache, where it would be hard 
to determine the beginning and end of the pain, yet it 
could not be said that the boundary between a headache 
and lack of headache fell on a continuum, Margalit 's 
definition of this sense of "vague" is therefore inadequate 
and the distinction he is attempting to make could be 
better expressed as the distinction between the limit of 
the individual and the limit of the class. Being
indeterminate is to be vague in the way that the distinction
between mountains and hills is vague. There are clearly 
borderline cases, where it would be impossible to decide 
if a particular land-formation belonged to the extension 
of the term "mountain, or the term "hill",
Quine in "Word and Object" draws a similar
distinction between the ways in which a term can be vague.
He writes: "Commonly, a general term true of physical
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objects will bo vague in two ways: as to the several
boundaries of its objects and as to the inclusion or 
exclusion of marginal objects." (196O, p,2o). Thus 
"mountain" can be said to be indefinite in that it is 
unsettled exactly how much land is included in its 
boundaries, and indeterminate in that there are borderline 
cases where it is undecidable whether a particular object 
is to be included in the class of mountains or not. It 
is worth raising the question whether these concepts, the 
boundaries of which fall on a continuum, can be said to be 
vague at all, and this will be dealt with later,
"Vagueness" in these senses can be successfully 
distinguished from several other correlated notions, 
such as ambiguity, generality and obscurity. An 
ambiguous terra such as "light", when applied, to use 
Quine 's example, to a dark feather could be said to be 
clearly true and clearly false of that object. The 
contradiction dissolves easily, however, on further 
consideration of the context of the utterance, or if 
it does not, communication fails and some reformulation 
is required. The so-called vagueness of the term "light", 
which inheres in the uncertainty of its application in 
marginal cases, is clearly independent of the ambiguity 
of the term, and though possibly eliminable by further 
specification of the context in which it occurs, it is 
not settled by straight-forward paraphrase.
One may be led to think that a term is "vague", 
because of its extreme generality. An example of a
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sentence containing a very general term would be: "I saw
a ship." Now Russell appears to think that the meaning of 
"a ship" is the class of objects to which it applies, and 
that by naming each member of the class we have exhaustively 
specified the meaning. It is this erroneous conception of 
the function of general words in language which gives rise 
to any confusion there may be between generality and 
vagueness, A general term is not necessarily a vague one.
It may be vague for other reasons, but not just because 
it is general. The idea is not that, in the case of "I saw 
a ship", by citing the name of the ship that I saw, I have 
turned a vague statement into a precise one. It is much 
more a question of looking at the purpose for which an 
utterance is made in a particular context. It could still 
be maintained that "ship" remains vague, in the sense that 
there are certain floating conveyances, Ra II, for example, 
to which we might feel reluctant to assign the term "ship". 
Terms which Margalit holds to be vague in the sense 
of "obscure" present a whole complex of difficulties,
I think that his terminology here is peculiar in that it 
is doubtful if "vague" is ever used interchangeably with 
"obsciu’e" and "obscure" itself suggests not "lack of 
paradigm cases" but is rather a subjective notion. What 
one person finds "obscure" or difficult to understand, or 
far removed from his conceptual scheme, another might 
consider to be perfectly clear and of central interest and 
importance. It is quite possible for a term to be both
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"vague" and "obscure"; "vague" because of an intrinsic 
uncertainty of application, and "obscure" in the subjective 
sense described above. Max Black (1937) characterizes 
vagueness as an objective notion and as such cannot be 
assimilated to obscurity.
We do regularly use terms which through social pressures 
and different group practices have altered their range of 
application so radically that a complete meaning-shift has 
taken place. Many words are noticeably used in contexts 
more and more estranged from those found in literature of 
previous centuries. There are also terras for which there 
is no "hard-core" of central cases of their use, Quine 
regards language-learning as an "implicit induction on the 
subject's part, regarding society's usage", and on this view 
the words which are most difficult to learn would be this 
group of vague terms over which, for lack of evidence, the 
induction can least successfully be performed. It is not 
necessary to accept Quine 's analysis of language learning 
in order to recognize that many abstract and emotive terms 
fall into this category, as do a large number of everyday 
expressions, "Interesting", "useful", "plausible", are all 
widely applied but certainly do not command any fixed 
extension and would perhaps be better laid on one side to be 
analysed in terms of the theory of Speech Acts in order to 
give some account of the force or the purpose of utterances 
containing them,
I intend to adopt, at least for the moment, Margalit 's 
proposed definitions of vagueness (i.e. indefiniteness or
94.
lack of fixed boundaries; and indeterminacy or admitting 
of borderline cases), since it is these aspects of natural 
languages which give rise to paradoxes and contradictions 
when some sentences are expressed in terms of classical 
two-valued logic.
Russell, as noted at the beginning, wishes to equate
vagueness with lack of precision. ¥e would usually be
inclined to say that ”5 ft. Il4 in,” is a more precise
expression than "about 6 ft.", that "ultramarine" is more
precise than "blue", or that "at 2.05 p.m." more so than
"in the afternoon" so that by giving specific figures,
measurements or times we can distinguish between utterances
in terms of precision or lack of it, or rather in terms of
relative precision. What is not so clear is that at the
lower end of a scale of degrees of precision we would have
all those expressions which could be described as vague in
the sense of having ill-defined boundaries. Certainly in
terms of the measurement of, for example, height,
"5 ft. 11^ in," is more exact than "about 6 ft.", and it
is equally clearly less exact than "5 ft. 11 in.", but450
when attempting to determine the class of individuals to
226whom the extremely precise predicate "is 5 ft, 11  __ la.450
tall" applies, the problem immediately arises as to which 
individuals to include and which to exclude. In the absence 
of sufficiently accurate measuring equipment it would not 
be possible to decide at all. Is not, then, a precise 
expression also a vague one? It would in fact be a much 
simpler matter to decide which individuals belonged to the
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class of "persons about 6 ft. tall", disagreement only 
arising over a handful of marginal cases, whereas it is 
difficult to see that the class picked out by the precise 
expression would contain any .members at all. The height 
of any human being is subject to continual small variations 
so that the suggestion that there is a precise height to 
be measured is incoherent. We can only measure to a useful 
approximation, "useful" meaning suited to the purpose in hand. 
All expressions, such as "accurate", "detailed", "complete", 
"exact", which could in different sentences be substituted 
for "precise" and contrasted with "vague", can only be 
informative, can only make sense,relative to a specified 
context, which determines the purposes, interests and 
intentions involved. To assert: "All measurement is
inaccurate" is meaningless, since such an assertion precludes 
the possibility of there being criteria of accuracy and 
inaccuracy. For a carpenter to assert, however, "this is 
accurate enough for my purposes", and for a micro-engineer 
to reply; "but not for mine" is clearly significant. In 
a similar way no meaning can be attached to Russell*s claim 
that: "All language is vague". What is interesting is to
look at the way some allegedly vague terms work, to see if 
any are intrinsically so.
I am not suggesting that there are not distinctions to 
be made between vague and precise expressions, or that all 
precise ones are vague in the same way as typically inexact 
ones, but only that precision is not the obvious contrary 
to vagueness that it appeared to be for Russell. Margalit
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considering tlie relation between determinant and 
definiteness, in his view the direct opposites to vagueness, 
makes the point that the terms "accurate" and "precise" 
suggest conformity to some objective standard, while a 
determinate term can be inaccurate or imprecise to the 
extent to which it conforms to a standard which is 
subjective or arbitrary. For instance, if we so restrict 
a term so that not only borderline cases, but also 
intuitively clear parts of its extension are ruled out, the 
criteria used could be said to be subjective, and the term 
though well-defined, can be held to be inaccurate.
Both he and Quine refer to Richard 's (1936) analogy 
of the water-colour painter and the mosaic artist. The 
idea is that the painter by thinning and mixing colours, 
gains far more precision, reproduces what he sees more 
accurately, than can the mosaic artist with his pile of 
tiny coloured stones, each with distinct and determined 
boundaries. This analogy, though extremely crude in the 
assumption it makes about artistic objectives, is a good one 
in that it shows very clearly how precision does not stand . 
in direct opposition to vagueness, but it does also raise 
again the question whether there are no expressions which 
are immune from vagueness in the sense so far accepted.
Since this is not coherent we might be using the term in such 
a restricted philosophical sense that it ceases to mark out 
any interesting distinctions.
I have so far discussed the concept of vagueness without 
making it in any way explicit to what kinds of things it is
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attributed. What candidates suggest themselves for the 
title of vagueness-bearer? On the surface there seem to 
be tliree main groups which are worth consideration, although 
those writing on this subject accept almost unanimously 
that vagueness is a property of predicates, primarily if 
not uniquely. Since the reducibility of all vagueness to 
that of vague predicates is by no means obvious, before 
opting for the easiest approach, that of keeping in line 
with the bulk of the literature, some investigation of the 
alternatives might be appropriate.
The tliree candidates would seem to be, on Margalit *s
view:
(1) physical objects or events
(2) linguistic items (words or expressions)
(3) uses of words (characterizations or descriptions)
Is it possible for things to be vague or does the
vagueness arise only in our description of them? The answer 
given by Russell, Margalit, Haack (l975) and others is that 
things are just what they are, not in shades, gradations 
or degrees. To suggest that things could be vague according 
to Russell would be to commit what he calls the fallacy of 
verbalism, i.e. that of the ascription of the properties 
of words to objects. This rejection of (l) as a possible 
"vagueness-bearer" is, I think, a rather crude over­
simplification. Looking more closely at Russell*s argument 
for a moment, he maintains that vagueness arises in the 
relations between things (or objects) and their, representa­
tions, If there is a simple one to one relation between
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some tiling and a representation of it then the thing is 
effectively determined by the representation, and it is only 
when the relation is of the one/many variety that vagueness 
arises. His ascription of vagueness to words (or 
expressions) is a result of his extraordinary view that 
a word is a "representation" of a thing. He appears to 
regard the use of words as a convenient shorthand, whereby 
we utter a word as a kind of agent or "representative" 
instead of producing the thing itself.
Leaving this view of language aside as clearly mistaken 
(imagine the ideal of communication as the amassing of a 
series of objects for which words are but poor substitutes) 
the notion of the vagueness of a representation does raise 
an interesting point. Consider an impressionist painting.
In the background we can just make out the outline of a 
figure. The painting certainly is what it is. The various 
pigments are deployed in a fixed and determined way, but 
could not this barely—perceptible outline be said to be 
vague? It is surely possible accurately to describe what 
you see as "vague". It could be argued that sometimes one 
can accurately describe things in the world as vague.
However, more usually it is only relative to our criteria 
for classifying them, that such a description would be 
made. Language by which we order our experience determines 
the construction we put on ouz^  observations so that it does 
not even make sense to ask the question: "Is vagueness
ascribable to words or objects?". To put it another way, 
since a thing is what it is, relative to the construction
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we put on it, it does not make sense to withhold the 
ascription of a term such as vague from objects.
It is when we look at descriptions as opposed to 
things that matters become a little clearer. If we say 
of a certain object "x is red", then it is to the term 
"red" that we ascribe vagueness, since there would be 
instances where the applicability of the term would be 
in doubt. Most probably this would be where the colour 
could not easily be classified as either red or orange, 
or either red or purple. The question is not whether 
the "redness", the perception, is the one we think we are 
experiencing, but whereabouts on the spectrum to classify 
it. If on the other hand, we say "x is reddish", we become
entangled in a complex of vaguenesses. The term "reddish"
could be held to be vague, in that the boundary between 
"reddish" and "orangeish" is indefinite and also vague in 
the sense that it does not pick out any particular colour
as the central core of its application. There might also be
a case for concluding that the "reddishness", is vague 
because we cannot be quite sure what colour we are 
perceiving.
I think we can conclude that vagueness is an 
anthropocentric notion primarily, but not uniquely, 
applicable to words or expressions.
If the first suggestion that vagueness applies to 
objects is to be rejected (allowing for reservations about 
some special cases), the problem of deciding between the 
other two candidates becomes the next matter of concern.
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Is it linguistic expressions, names, predicates, logical 
connections, quantifiers, etc., that are vague, or is it 
uses of them? Are there some terms which are so essentially 
vague, that uncertainty remains even where the context in 
which they are used has been thoroughly specified?
This distinction, between words and their uses, is 
often characterized as the difference between semantics 
and pragmatics. It is an important distinction for if it 
is agreed that there are some terms in natural languages 
which are in themselves vague, then there may be inferences 
made using them in the course of everyday discourse, of 
which, though apparently valid, the truth values cannot be 
fully determined. This is often described as a threat to 
the status of classical two-valued logic and used as an 
argument in favour of the adoption of a different system 
to fill the role of natural logic, i.e. the theory of valid 
inferences made in natural languages.
Whether vagueness is regarded as a semantic concept 
or a pragmatic one depends largely on the extent to which 
it is held to be eliminable. Is it possible to tighten 
up our use of words sufficiently to avoid any uncertainty 
over their application? Quine (196O) appears to think so. 
There are no difficulties in using terms with unsettled 
boundaries or "penumbral" areas to their extension, except 
on the rare occasions when the particular use of the terras 
involves one of the objects from the "penumbra". In these 
cases the matter is resolved by a decision from the relevant 
experts, whose criteria depend upon their particular 
interests,
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'•Sentences whose truth values hinge on vagueness 
usually command interest only in specialized studies 
if at all, and the rulings adopted to resolve the 
obstructive vaguenesses are adopted only locally 
for the purposes in hand." (1960)
It is hardly surprising that Quine regards the cost 
of making, at times, arbitrary decisions with regard to 
the applicability of a term, a price worth paying in order 
to avoid any revision in the laws of standard logic, which 
he holds to be the core of our conceptual scheme. Neverthe­
less, it is not obvious that it is possible in every case 
to make even an arbitrary decision to use one term in favour 
of another. A simple instance of this difficulty would be 
to decide where, to use one of his own examples, to withhold 
"muddy water" in favour of "wet mud". A law could be laid 
down which states that muddy water becomes wet mud when the 
quantity of earth particles suspended in the liquid reaches 
a precise number, but would there not still remain the 
difficulty of discovering when the required level had been 
reached? It is hard to imagine that this particular 
distinction is one which would normally be made only in 
a specialized context with a team of relevant experts on 
hand with the appropriate equipment at the ready. On the 
contrary it would seem to be a very ordinary layman *s 
distinction, the vagueness of which is unresolvable except 
by relativization, Quine suggests that the vagueness of, 
for example, colour predicates can be removed by contenting 
ourselves with speaking of one thing being, for example.
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"groQner" than another. Here again there would seem to bo 
infinitely many occasions where the applicability of the 
term "greener" would be in doubt. Is an emerald greener 
than a pine tree? They are certainly both green, clear cut 
instances of greenness, but to label one as greener than 
another would be an impossibility. Relative terms, I would 
suggest, are as vague, if not vaguer, than straightforward 
descriptive terras, and that the paraphrasing of vague 
descriptive expressions into relative ones, is an inadequate 
way of resolving the problem,
Dummett (1975) in his article "¥ang *s Paradox" outlines 
a method of dealing with vague expressions by "sharpening" 
them. Sharpening a term amounts to "any acceptable means 
of giving it a definite application". "Acceptable" he 
defines as truth-preserving; that is, a vague statement 
is sharpened if it is true in every case in which, before, 
it was previously definitely true and false in every case 
in which it was definitely false. He observes, however, 
that this method does not amount to an adequate account 
of vagueness. There are on his view some concepts which 
are "ineradicably vague" and that to sharpen them, though 
possible in principle, would destroy the essence of them.
To treat vagueness as a primarily pragmatic notion 
would seem to be dealing very lightly with the subject 
and it would be preferable, while admitting that many 
cases of vagueness arise through particular uses of 
expressions and can therefore be eliminated, to consider 
it a semantic notion, despite the problems this raises for
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classical logic. Vague, then, is a predicate which can he 
said to apply to the constituents of some statements.
Whether all the constituents of a statement can be infested 
with vagueness is unclear.. However, we can find examples 
of a variety of expressions which we can fairly safely 
characterise as vague. Certainly many descriptive terras, 
terms naming things, both general and singular, and 
relational expressions fall into this category. In 
conclusion, then, it is probably best to go back to the 
starting point and agree with Dummett and Haack, among 
others, that vagueness is something appertaining to 
predicates, usually if not always. Kit Fine (l975> P.^79) 
summarizes the position like this: "... it could be argued
that all vagueness is reducible to predicate vagueness.
For possibly one can replace, without any change in truth- 
value, each vague name by a corresponding vague predicate..."
Despite Kant *s (l933) assertion that examples are the 
crutch of the weak intellect, I intend to proceed by way of 
them to investigate further the vagueness inhering in certain 
predicates in everyday use in natural languages.
There is still room for some detailed consideration 
of particular examples of vagueness in order to discover 
if there are several different types of vague predicate 
or if they form one large homogeneous class.
Which examples to deal with first is to some extent 
an arbitrary matter. For the sake of simplicity it would 
be as well perhaps to follow Quine and turn our attention 
initially to general predicates. There are, as far as I
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can see, at least three main groups of these. They are 
those containing:
(1) simple general terms ;
(2) general terms indicating a species;
(3) complex or abstract general terms.
This method of classification may well prove to be 
quite inadequate, but accepting it for the moment, I would 
suggest as examples of type (l):- table, mountain, flower, 
apple, etc.; as examples of type (2):- mammal, insect, home, 
musical instrument, etc.; and as examples of type (3):- 
entity, sensation, power, ability, etc.
In what way could "being a table" be said to be vague? 
Alternatively, to use Susan Haack's terminology (l975> p.llO), 
in what way are the qualifications for being a table imprecise? 
Being a flat-topped piece of furniture is clearly insufficient. 
Perhaps something qualifies as a table on the strength of 
its use? Use for what? To eat at? To put things on? Play 
games, i.e. chess, on? To write at? Already a multitude of 
uses suggest themselves, none of which capture exclusively 
the notion of what it is to be a table. Any specification 
of shape, material, number of legs, etc., equally fails 
to define the now apparently elusive table. True, we 
would usually have no trouble in defining a table 
ostensively: "That is one and that is one and that is one -
and that wooden crate covered with a cloth over there, well,
I don ^ t really know." Suddenly even ostensive definition 
fails to distinguish tables from non-tables clearly.
The obvious comparison to make is with Wittgenstein *s
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"family resemblance" concepts. The application of a 
general term is governed by a "complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and crisscrossing..," It could 
be argued that although many terms function in this way, 
this does not provide a reason for calling them "vague".
The notion of a "game", it might be suggested, is not vague 
at all. We learn to use the term without difficulty despite 
the lack of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for its correct application.
To argue this way would, however, be missing the point, 
for it would involve insisting on using a very general 
sense of "vague", whereas the intention to use "vague" as 
a technical term has already been made clear. "Vague" in 
the sense of "lacking sharp boundaries" is not an 
inappropriate description of the kind of term Wittgenstein 
has in mind. Any confusion could be avoided by using a 
special word to express the idea of a complexity of criteria 
governing the application of a term. The pedantic substitu­
tion of, for example, "indeterminate" for "vague", however, 
would servo little purpose. The issues would remain the 
same,
To return to our example "table"; here there is 
certainly a multiplicity of criteria governing the 
application of the predicate and there is no difficulty 
in imagining a variety of cases in which it is hard to 
determine whether enough of them have been fulfilled.
Let us distinguish one type of vagueness, class (a), 
following Haack, as that where "the qualifications are
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complex (in tlio I'orni of an open conjunction or conjunction 
of disjunctions) and it is indeterminâte how many of the 
qualifications must be satisfied, and how the qualifications 
are to be weighted,
"Table", then suffers from vagueness of class (a).
What about "mountain"? "Mountain" is vague, as pointed 
out earlier, in that the boundary, the dividing line 
between valley and mountain, is indefinite. The 
qualifications for being included in the area of mountain,
1 suggest, shift from context to context. The area 
designated part of "Mount X" by the geographer would 
probably contain more terrain than the area designated 
by the mountain climber. Differences of interest or 
purpose require different criteria.
This kind of vagueness, though not included in Haack^s 
classification, I shall call class (b), that of being 
context-dependent. The term "mountain" also suffers from 
a certain amount of class (a) vagueness, for although the 
criterion of being a mountain is clearly defined as being 
a certain height above sea-level, there is sometimes 
uncertainty whether to describe a ridge between two peaks 
to be in the middle of one mountain, or to lie between two 
separate mountains.
"Flower" and "apple", I think, are terms which are 
subject to uncertainty of a rather different kind. The 
qualifications for "being a flower" are determined simply 
in the form of a conjunction, all of whose conjucts must 
be satisfied. The difficulty arises in that knowledge of
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the exact criteria is limited to those with some training 
in botany, so that the scope of the term is rather wider 
for a layman than for an expert. Margalit comments:
"is the upshot of all this that we should resign ourselves 
to adopting the Two Language doctrine?" - that is, one 
language for laymen and one for the experts, the former 
being vaguer than the latter. His conclusion, with which 
I would agree, is that where an expert can resolve the 
indeterminacy, the term is not genuinely vague. It is 
only where the specialist cannot decide that there is 
any inherent vagueness.
Class (c) vagueness then, could be described as that 
where the qualifications are either simple or complex, but 
it is indeterminable whether one or any of them are 
satisfied. "Flower" and "apple", however, do not seem 
to fall into any of the categories so far distinguished 
and can be laid aside as not vague in any problematic sense.
To proceed to examples of type (2), "mammal" and 
"insect" are terms which might in some applications require 
the services of an expert in order for a decision to be 
reached, but besides this, at least in the case of "mammal", 
another difficulty arises. There has been in the history 
of taxonomy a radical alteration in the criteria for 
classifying an animal as belonging to one species rather 
than another. The discovery of creatures which do not fit 
definitely into any of the existing categories creates 
pressure which eventually results in the revision of some 
of the concepts involved. Although the odd situation
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develops where a previously appropriate application of* a 
predicate, i.e. "is a mammal", is somehow invalidated, 
there is only an instance of interesting class (c) 
vagueness when, for example, a taxonomist could not 
discover if a creature had fused wrist-bones or not.
General terras like "home" and "musical instrument" 
fall clearly into class (a) and also, though perhaps not 
so obviously, into classes (b) and (c). There is also yet 
a fourth type of vagueness, picked out by Haack, that which 
arises where the qualifications are complex and in some 
cases conflicting. The example she takes, one of Quine *s, 
is that of "being a tributary", where a river may join 
another, which though longer is less in volume. She cites 
C,H. Mellor (Experimental error and deducibility (1965)) 
as defining "conceptual imprecision" in this way, "Home" 
and "musical instrument" both seem to fall into this 
category, too, (class (d)), since, certainly in the case of 
"home" and probably in that of "musical instrument", the 
criteria are so subjective that there are almost bound to 
be degrees of conflict between them. It is terms like 
"home", whose very essence would be destroyed by any 
determination of the conditions for their application.
The complexities of the predicates included in my 
third category are severe. Undeniably the qualifications 
for "being an entity" are various, conflicting and in 
particular, theory-dependent. What will count as an entity 
for a certain person will be a direct result of the 
ontological position to which he subscribes. It all
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depends on how bloated a universe he feels comfortable in. 
Will he admit linguistic or metaphysical entities? And 
how about numbers, classes, ideas, and concepts? "Entity" 
is clearly seriously vague with respect to class (d) and 
also with respect to class (c), for whatever standards are 
used, whether physical or theoretical, there are some things 
such as sub-atomic particles which are undetermined by 
theory, as to their ontological status.
"Sensation" is another difficult term. There are 
presumably emotional and physical sensations, but when 
someone claims to feel pain in an amputated limb it is 
hard to decide whether he had a sensation of pain or 
imagined he had one. Maybe an imaginary sensation counts 
as one, but if so perhaps a thought should as well.
Whereas, I think, the vagueness of "sensation" belongs to 
both classes (a) and (c) " ability" is subject to the
shifting criteria of class (b) and possibly class (c).
To use an illustration probably originating from Dummett 
(although I am not certain about this) there is a man,
John Brown, who is dead. He never learned nor spoke a word 
of any language other than English. Of him it was said 
(rather implausibly) that he had an ability to learn foreign 
languages. Whether this assertion is true, false or truth- 
valueless depends on the criteria for the applicability of 
the term "ability". Not only are these criteria complex, 
it would appear to be indeterminable in a case like this 
whether they are satisfied or not. The last general term 
in my list is "power". The qualifications for being "a 
power" appear to be so vague themselves that any attempt
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to classify this term seems doomed to failure. For the 
sake of simplicity let us label its vagueness as class (d).
Singular terms too, according to Quine, can be vague.
He says; "In so far as it is left unsettled how far from the 
summit of Mount Rainier one can be and still count as on 
Mount Rainier, Mount Rainier is vague." However, there is 
nothing inherently indeterminate in the area of this 
mountain and an appeal to the appropriate geographical 
expert would resolve the difficulty.
So far then, there seems to be a case for concluding 
that not all ways of lacking precisely defined boundaries 
constitute genuine vagueness. There are, however, several 
ways in which a predicate can be ineradically vague, and 
there are many predicates which are vague in more than one 
way.
The remaining kinds of predicate to be considered 
are; (l) relational; and (2) those containing descriptive 
terms.
It is a relatively simple matter to find examples of 
relational expressions in which there is room for 
uncertainty over their applicability in marginal cases. 
Consider predicates such as "is a friend of", "is much 
greater than". In Section 1 I mentioned Quine *s suggestion 
that the device of relativization can be used to resolve 
the vagueness of some descriptive terms. I discussed the 
relation, that of "being greener than" and concluded that 
it would not easily be seen to be less vague than the 
simple descriptive predicate "is green".
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He does, though, have a point to make with regard to 
those terms he describes as"polar opposities", i.e. "big", 
"small"; "hot, "cold"; "smooth", "rough"; "short", "tall", 
etc ,
Whereas "x is tall" is a class (b) vague statement,
"x is taller than y" is not. The relation of being taller 
than someone is quite precise. It is that of having 
measurably greater height. Allowing, of course, for such 
superficial conditions being fulfilled, as standing erect, 
on level ground, without shoes, etc., there would seem to 
be no cases where the truth value of the statement "x is 
taller than y " could not be determined. In the circumstances 
where x might be taller, but not discriminably so, the 
statement to the effect that he was would be simply false. 
Dummett points to the non-transitivity of the relation of 
"being non-discriminably different (or taller)" as a source 
of vagueness and this will be discussed later, when dealing 
with the paradoxes arising from the use of vague predicates.
The inclusion of the qualifying term "much" in the 
example "much greater than" alters the situation. "Great" 
suffers from some superficial vagueness, in that its 
meaning is dependent on the particular context. This 
dissolves on adequate specification of the circumstances. 
Given a well-defined context, it is possible to distinguish 
which things can bo said to be greater than others. The 
addition of "much" requires that there are criteria for 
determining what it is to be much greater than something.
An elephant is much greater than a mouse. A dog is much
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greater than a mouse. Both these statements appear to be 
true and it is not merely a question of context. L.A, Zadeh 
(Fuzzy Sets. Information and Control, I965) takes the 
predicate of "being much greater than" as a paradigm 
example of an expression requiring treatment in terms of 
fuzzy logic. Detail of this occurs in Appendix B. For the 
moment let it suffice to conclude that this expression is 
vague with respect to both class (a) and class (b), the 
first of which, at least, is not easily eliminable.
It is the descriptive element of these expressions, 
however, that is responsible for any vagueness attaching to 
them. There will be doubt in borderline cases over the 
appropriateness of "is a friend of" only to the extent that 
the general term "friend" is vague. That "friend" is 
subject to a multitude of uncertainties is not difficult to 
discover. The least reflection shows the qualifications for 
friendship to be complex, in part subjective and open to 
disagreement, particularly with respect to their individual 
importance. "Is a friend of", therefore, suffers from 
class (a) vagueness.
It is round the vagueness of descriptive terms that 
most of the literature is centred. Nearly all writers 
devote some time to the discussion of colour predicates.
The other examples extensively used in the treatments of 
the subject are those such as "short", "bald," etc., from 
which formulations of the ancient Sorites paradox are 
constructed. An examination of some of these terms would 
be therefore the next obvious step.
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Initially, to suggest that colour words are vague, 
seems implausible. "Tlie grass is green", "the sky is blue", 
and "that is a red book", are all readily understood as 
are most predications of colour. This is not the case, j
however, with all sentences describing things in terms of 
colour. It is easy to imagine circumstances, looking at 
a rose for example, where it would be impossible to decide 
either that "that flower is orange", or that "that flower 
is red".
It is most probable that we would say, here, that 
"that flower is a kind of "orangeish-red" and by inventing 
a suitable description, evade the difficulty of applying 
either predicate. Nevertheless, the uncertainty over the 
applicability of "red" and "orange" leaves a residual 
uncertainty over the applicability of "red" and its 
contradictory "not-red". It is this dilemma, the decision 
to apply a term or its contradictory, which threatens the 
Law of Excluded Middle.
If we assume it to be a fundamental law of logic that 
all disjunctions of the form "either p or not-p" are true 
then cases such as this where it is genuinely undecidable 
whether we have a case of "p" or a case of "not-p", appear 
to violate this basic law. If on the other hand we reject 
this law as an unnatural philosophical demand to place 
everything in one of two categories, we deprive not only 
disjunction, but also conjunction and negation of their 
usual truth-functional definition.
Two points concerning colour predicates should be
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made. The first, made by Dummett (l975) is that colour 
words of the same level of generality are normally treated 
as mutually exclusive. Thus one would be using language 
incorrectly if one asserted "that is both orange and red".
The second point is that colour predicates are purely 
observational; that is; "if one can tell at all what 
colour something is, one can tell just by looking at
it. The look of an object decides its colour "
Now, allowing that there are borderline cases where it 
cannot be effectively decided by observation whether to 
apply the term "red" or "orange" and that it is possible 
to construct an arrangement of shades of colour such that 
though gradually changing from yellow to orange to rod, 
the transition is so slow that the appearance is of a 
continuous band of colour, it becomes clear that since 
red and orange are used as mutually exclusive, the boundary 
between them must fall somewhere on this band of colour, but 
to fix it at any particular point must be arbitrary (within 
certain limits".
Thus colour predicates can be said to be not simply 
vague in the sense of being context dependent, but paradigm 
examples of terms whose range of application is intrinsically 
indeterminate. There is no way, by further elaboration- or 
specification of a particular context in which such a term 
occurs, that would eliminate the indecision over its 
applicability. It is true a physicist might be able to 
make a pronouncement as to the lengths or types of lighb 
waves, but since colour, as has already been remarked, is
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an observational term, no connections we make between the 
nature or constitution of light and the colours we see can 
justify the ascription of one terra in favour of another, in 
cases where our senses fail to make the distinction.
To make this clearer it is worth quoting Wright (1975) 
from his article "On the Coherence of Vague Predicates".
It is Wright s^ contention that predicates with "blurred 
boundaries" are "in typical cases to be regarded as 
semantically incoherent". By this he means not that there 
is some breakdown in the underlying semantic rules, but 
rather that the predicates with "fuzzy" boundaries are 
a product of those rules. He maintains, in my view correctly 
that this feature of certain predicates is essential and 
that "the utility and point of the classifications 
expressed by many vague predicates would be frustrated 
if we supplied them with sharp boundaries". Colour 
predicates sre obviously of this type. Imagine this time 
a series of coloured patches ranging from red to orange 
such that each patch is just discriminable in colour from 
those each side of it. Now Wright argues: "it is notable
that the sense of colour predicates is such that their 
application always survives a very small change in shade... 
There is a notion of a degree of change in respect of 
colour too small to amount to a change of colour." It is 
only whore the change in shade is great that we are likely 
to ascribe different, incompatible colour predicates. Thus, 
if the first patch in the series is red, then so is the 
second. Applying this argument throughout the whole series,
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it is oasy to prove that every patch in the series is red, 
or orange, or possibly either. Thus, given any series of 
coloured patches gradually changing from one colour to 
another through the whole range of the spectrum, we can 
arrive at the extraordinary conclusion that all the patches 
are of the same colour.
The purpose of this and other paradoxes is that they 
illustrate how deeply vagueness is embedded in the semantic 
rules of a natural language. It is not as in the Fregean view 
just a matter of intellectual laziness, whereby with sufficient 
attention our language could achieve the ideal precision of 
logic, but rather that expressions with some leeway in their 
applicability are required to describe the world in observa­
tional terras. Imagine an ideal precise language. For every 
discernible shade of colour there would be perhaps a number 
or a different word. These colour-predicates would 
undoubtedly run into hundreds, so that the use of any of 
these predicates would probably require matching the 
colour of the object to which one was referring to the 
appropriate shade on a chart, in order to discover the 
correct word to use. This procedure would not only be 
too cumbersome and inefficient to be useful it would also 
fail to provide us with the continuity necessary to make 
sense of experience. The processes of generalization and 
classification by which we conceptually order the world 
would become impossible.
I would suggest that terms ascribing colour have an 
intrinsic vagueness of the type picked out by category (c)
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of ray classification that, where, though the criteria of 
application of a term may be straightforward, it is 
indeterminate whether they are satisfied.
The other type of descriptive term of particular 
interest is that which is commonly used in the construction 
of paradoxes of the Sorites variety which originally derived 
from Eubilides. Since the argument used is the same in all 
these paradoxes it does not matter much which example we 
choose to examine. For clarity of exposition I think 
Dummett *s presentation in "Wang ^ s Paradox" is to be preferred, 
since he locates the source of the paradox as the difficulty 
of performing a mathematical induction using vague predicates. 
The term Dummett uses is "small" and he formulates the 
paradox like this:
0 is small
If n is small, n + 1 is small 
Therefore, every number is small.
It would be extremely counter-intuitive to deny the 
truth of either of the premises of this argument. There 
is no natural number which marks a division between small 
numbers and large ones, so that it would be regarded as 
small, whereas its successor would not. The conclusion of 
the argument, however, is either patently false or 
meaningless except in the extended sense, that, given an 
infinity of natural numbers any particular one is bound 
to be larger than only finitely many numbers and smaller 
than infinitely many. By an identical process it can be 
shown, for example, that all men are short, that no man
lis.
lacking lia 1rs on his head is bald , or that any single
grain of sand constitutes a heap.
It should; however, be noticed not only that Dummett 's 
exposition requires premises to the effect that "O is
a number", and if "n" is a number, then "n + 1" is a
number to be included, his conception of numbers as "big" 
and "small" is both infantile and confused. Young children 
often speak about "3" as a small number and "100" as a 
large one, but although it might be possible to describe 
the integers from 1 to 10 as small, no sense can be 
given to the notion of a large number, without a specific 
frame of reference. The confusion arises through Dummett *s 
failure to recognize that it is quantities which we describe 
as large or small; numbers of something. Numbers themselves 
are more usually described as high or low, although even 
then a context is required for a description to be 
meaningful. 1 is the highest value it is possible to 
assign in a probability statement.
Despite these objections, the problem raised by the 
paradox is a difficult one to solve. Since it would be 
very rash to dismiss mathematical induction as an invalid 
form of reasoning, it must be concluded that the problem 
arises because of the nature of the particular terms 
involved. "Small", "short", "bald" and the notion of 
a "heap" are all terms which I would classify as vague 
with respect to class (b) - that of being dependent for 
their application on criteria which shift from context 
to context - a superficial vagueness which I have suggested
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is eliininable by specification of the context involved, 
paying' close attention to the purpose of the utterance in 
which the term occurs. What becomes apparent when examining 
this kind of paradox is that all the difficulties are not 
resolved by attempts to eliminate the vagueness of their 
terms in the way outlined above. This would seem to lead 
to one of two conclusions; either the vagueness of the 
terms is of a different type, or else that it is of the 
kind suggested but is not so easily removed.
Reverting to Duinmett *s example, let us place the 
argument in a suitable context. For the purpose of 
classifying educational establishments, let us call a 
school small if it has less than 400 pupils. "Small" now 
is defined as "having less than 400 pupils". Now, in this 
case the basis of the argument would have to be 1, since 
a school with no pupils, it could be argued, is not a 
school. The first premise, then, 1 is small, is true 
under our definition of "small", the second premise is not. 
When we wish to substitute "400" for "n" in the second 
premise, it is false under our definition, and false for 
every substitution of a number larger than 400 for "n".
The absurd conclusion that every school is small cannot be 
derived. The paradox has been avoided, but at what price?
The cost has been defining a term in such a rigid way that 
we are forced to admit that a school with 400 pupils is small 
and a school with 401 is not. This admission is as 
intuitively unacceptable as the rejected conclusion of 
the argument in its previous paradoxical formulation.
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A term, like "small", functions in a language in such 
a way that to define it for a particular instance so 
precisely that there is no leeway over its applicability 
even with respect to a minimal quantitive change, is to 
use it incorrectly.
Wright sums up the situation in this way; "Lack of
sharp boundaries is a semantically deep phenomenon. It is
not generally a matter simply of lacking an instruction 
where to draw the line; rather the instructions we already 
have determine that the line is not to be drawn."
I conclude therefore that descriptive terms of this 
kind are certainly vague in the sense of being dependent 
on context, but this is eliminable, since we can avoid 
the conclusion of the paradox, and that these terms are also 
essentially vague, like colour predicates, with respect to 
class (c). This prevents us from denying the second promise 
of the argument and effectively reinstates the paradox.
While I am not unaware that the question; "Is all
vagueness reducible to predicate vagueness?" has not been 
answered. I have shown I think that there are enormous 
numbers of predicates which are vague, in that their 
applicability cannot be fully determined. It has also 
become clear that, in at least some cases, this indeterminacy 
is fundamental to the function of the expression in a natural 
language. My tentative classification has served to pick 
out two main classes of expression of which this is true. 
Those placed in class (a), the "family resemblance", concepts 
do not, and cannot, have fixed criteria of applicability.
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and therefore must admit of borderline cases. Those placed 
in class (a) are essentially "tolerant", (Wright ’s term), 
since an application survives a small degree of change, 
necessitating, too, blurred or fuzzy boundaries to the 
extension of the expression.
Having discovered the pervasive vagueness in ordinary 
language, it seems reasonable to ask; what, if any, are 
the problems created by this vagueness?
The consequences of treating vagueness seriously, as 
I am doing, are far-reaching. To admit that a very great 
many, if not, as Russell thinks, all, the terms and express­
ions we use in everyday discourse essentially Ihck clearly 
defined boundaries, is to admit that there can be sentences 
using them for which the Law of Excluded Middle fails. In 
Aristotelian terms, the Law of Excluded Middle states that 
"everything either is or is not". Either something possesses 
a property or does not possess it. It is the unnatural 
demand that the whole of reality is exhausted by a predicate 
and its negation, that creates difficulties in the case of 
vague predicates. If it is indeterminable whether a 
predicate or its negation applies to a certain object, then 
a sentence ascribing either to that object, can be said to 
be neither true nor false. This calls for the rejection of 
a further logical principle, often confused with L.X.M,, that 
of Bivalence. This can be expressed as the principle that 
every proposition is either true or false. If vagueness is 
as extensive a phenomenon as it appears to be, then there 
would seem to be a very great number of sentences that
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cannot bo described as propositions, and which therefore 
are beyond the scope of prepositional logic.
Clearly, a sentence ascribing a vague predicate to one 
of the objects on its borderline cannot be said to be clearly 
true or clearly false of that object. To take an example; 
"This leaf is green", where the leaf in question is on the 
borderline between green and yellow, is neither a true state­
ment nor a false one and so the Principle of Bivalence fails 
to hold.
There is a distinction to be drawn in the way in which 
the sentence "This leaf is green" cannot be assigned a truth 
value. It could be argued that it lacks a truth-value because 
it is undecidable whether the sentence (let us call is "s") is 
true or whether "s" is false, though it is one or the other. 
Alternatively, it could be claimed that "s" is neither true 
nor false. Susan Haack (1975» p.113) makes this point and 
suggests that in the first case the failure is epistemological 
the failure to discover the truth-value, whereas in the second 
the failure "is more radical, the failure to bo true or false 
Dummett (1975) argues for the first alternative and thus for 
the retention of L.X.M, Since, he claims, that "red" and 
"orange" are mutually incompatible predicates, it would not 
be correct to say; "That is both orange and red". Therefore
"x is red" entails "x is not orange". If x is an
object which is on the borderline between red and orange, 
then "either x is red or x is orange" is true, and so is:
"either x is red or x is not red." Thus (p v r\j p) ,
one way of expressing the L.X.M., can be true even though
123.
neither the proposition "x is red" or its negation can be 
said to have a truth value. We can, in Dummett*s view, 
maintain that all disjunctions of the type (p v p)
are true, despite the lack of truth value of the disjuncts.
It is this lack of truth-value of the disjuncts, taken 
individually, that suggests that the second alternative 
is the correct interpretation and that neither "is red" nor 
"is not red" applies to x. This amounts to, whilst agreeing 
that nothing is both red and orange, denying that in an 
undecidable case the disjunction: "either that is red or
orange is true, which is not particularly counter-intuitive. 
Max Black in Philosophy and Language, Ch,6, prefers to 
formulate the difficulty with regard to vague predicates in 
terms of negation, I will follow his notation as it presents 
the problem in a particularly lucid form. Black first of all 
notes that if we presuppose that there is a class of 
borderline or "fringe objects to which a vague term might 
or might not apply," then this entails the assumption either 
that there is a sharp boundary between the doubtful and the 
unproblematic objects, or else there is a second-order area 
of uncertainty. In either case the assumption violates the 
usual definition of negation and consequently both the Law 
of Excluded Middle and the Law of Non-Contradiction,
He proceeds to construct a series "s" of terms "c" 
which is linear and finite, containing for example, ten 
terms, the place of each term in the series being used as 
its name, so that the values of the variable "x" are the 
integers one to ten inclusive, "L" stands for a typical
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example of a vague symbol, so that "Lx" means "L applies 
to x" or "Lx is true" and " Oj Lx" means "L does not
apply to "x" or "Lx" is false.
If v/o suppose that LI L2 L3 and L4 are true, 
and L3 and Lo are doubtful, and for any other x in
the series Lx is false, then the range of (Lx) is 1-6
since we cannot positively exclude it from the range 5» 6.
Similarly, the assertion of /\J Lx can only exclude 
the range 1 - 4, and is confined to the range 3 - 10*
Thus the ranges of application of Lx and /\J Lx overlap
in the fringe area, (3, 6), whereas the formal definition
of classical negation allows Lx to be true only when
Lx is false and vice versa. Whenever there is an overlap 
of this sort in the domain of a propositional function and 
its complementary domain, the formal rules governing the 
operation of negation are contravened. To strengthen the 
argument Black then translates "L is vague", into "there 
is at least one terra, to which neither L or its contra­
dictory applies", and symbolises this in propositional 
calculus as:
<C 3  x) which
transformed by the rule of double negation into:
- U
gives a contradiction. It is easy to show that if the 
domains of a function and its contradictory are infinite, 
if there is any overlapping of these domains the same
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contradiction occurs, so it does matter if we assume the 
boundary between the decidable and undecidable cases to be 
clear-cut, i.e. clearly true, clearly borderline, and 
clearly false applications of a predicate, or undefined, 
with an infinite regress of higher order uncertainties.
It appears to be a commonplace to express the L.X.M. 
as (p V r\j p) and similarly the L.N.C. as ^  (p • r\j p). 
However, although both these formulae are provable in the 
Russell/Whitehead system of first-order propositional logic, 
neither hold any special place in the system. No formula 
which is simply a schema into which substitution of 
propositions can be made can be held to express a law. 
Nevertheless, the rejection of the classical definition 
of negation would effectively render these tautologies 
invalid and this is certainly far from trivial.
The L.X.M. is more correctly expressed as: "no
disjunction of the form (p v /\j p) is false", but it 
can easily been seen that if (p v ^  p) is an invalid 
formula then the law itself is violated.
It is the same difficulty that is brought out by the 
previously discussed Sorites paradoxes. It is because it 
is so implausible to deny the second premise of the argument, 
i.e. that if n is small, then n + 1 is small, or if 
n grains of sand form a heap, so do (n - l) grains of 
sand, that the overlap in the domains of Lx and /vi Lx 
occurs, and the contradiction arises. If L stands for 
"is a heap" and the values of x are the numbers of grains 
of sand, ranging from 1 to a million, then it is very
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implausible to suggest that aJ L(x) is true, for all values 
up to and including 600,000 grains and Lx true for the 
values 600,001 to 1,000,000. "Heap is too vague a predicate 
to,admit of any such definition. If one thinks of a term 
like "heap" as defined via sensory presentations in the 
first instance, then the question: "How many grains make
a heap?" is seen to have no place in our understanding of 
the term. There are some heaps, (a heap of garden rubbish 
for instance) which are not even dissoluble into discrete 
countable items of a like kind. Admitting, however, that 
"heaps of sand" are so constituted, the Sorites argument 
can proceed.
It might be thought that we could save the principles 
of logic by simply denying the validity of induction as a 
form of argument in the presence of vague predicates, which 
would surely be a less drastic step than to reject classical 
negation. However, it is not hard to see that one way to do 
this would involve denying the rule of universal generaliza­
tion as valid. This amounts to saying that we cannot pass 
from the truth of "for an (n)p, A (n)" to "for every (n),
(An); but since we can still derive for any particular n, 
(An) , even if we cannot establish "fox’ every (n) , (An) , 
we have not resolved the paradox, ¥e can still derive the 
conclusion (A)n for a specified value of (n), which is 
patently false. We derive the conclusion for each 
particular value of (n), not by appealing to induction 
as a principle of inference, but by a finite series of 
applications of modus ponens. From the premises:
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0 is small
and if n is small, n + 1 small, we can by substituting 
in the second promise derive: If m is small, m + 1 is 
small, like this:
(1) 0 is small )) premises(2) If 0 is small, 1 is small )
(3 ) 1 is small M.P. 1 and 2
(4) If 1 is small, 2 is small
(5) 2 is small M.P. 3 and 4
and so on until we have established 10^^^ is small, which 
in most contexts, (for instance with respect to the number
of pages in a book) is simply ridiculous. To reject Modus 
Ponens as a rule of inference seems a no more desirable 
solution than that of rejecting classical negation. The 
arguments raised against classical logic by the recognition 
of intrinsically vague predicates do not seem to be easily 
demolished; Susan Haack (p.llô) agrees that they cannot be 
"shown to rest on any simple mistake." This being the case 
if the relationship between formal logic and vague ordinary 
language involves ineradicable paradoxes, what is the most 
appropriate line of action?
There are at least two main schools of thought on this 
topic, one advocating the retention cf logic in its 
traditional form, and regimenting language, whenever 
possible to fit the system, the othor to modify logic to 
accommodate the vagueness of language, even to the extent 
of adopting a different system altogether. The debate 
becomes one concerning: the possibility or desirability of 
alternative logics. This is not the place to enter that
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debate. However I include in Appendix B (pp. 1 - 12) a 
summary of some of tlie suggestions which have been made, 
and give an outline of "Fuzzy Set Theory" (Zadeh I965) which 
appears to be a promising approach.
To return, however, to Mill's theory of mathematics, 
the first point to make is that as far as ordinary descriptive 
predicates are concerned, very many of them are essentially 
vague in the ways described, with the consequence that a 
determinate answer to questions of their applicability in 
some instances just is not available. I think the contrast 
which is being drawn between predicates like "red", "hard", 
"smooth", etc., and "a number" if it is to be regarded as a 
predicate applying to a collection of things is that between 
a lack of deterrninacy in borderline cases; the fuzzy 
penumbra of the extension of the term, and in the case of 
number, a lack of determinacy in every application which 
results from the essentially context-dependant way in which 
we count things as forming collections. Numbers are not 
vague predicates. Circumstances could arise with enormous 
collections of minute objects, grains of sand for example, 
where it is difficult to be sure exactly which number applies 
to it, but this is a practical difficulty, that of accurately 
counting these items. It is a problem which could always be 
resolved with more sophisticated technology or with painstaking 
work. How many grains of sand there are must be a determinate 
number, but it is only determinate once we have decided to 
count them in a particular way. In order for "the number of 
the grains of sand" to be intelligible, it must be established
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first that we are counting particles of an approximately 
oven size and composition; i.e. microscopic particles 
rather than sand molecules, or atoms, or anything else.
Decisions too need to be made as to the plausibility of 
notions such as "half a grain", or "a broken grain", or 
"two grains stuck together". Clearly it is possible to 
divide a grain of sand into two, do we then have two grains, 
or two half“grains? It is, I suggest, because the concept 
"grain of sand" is irremediably vague, that problems over 
which number applies to a heap of sand can arise, but these 
problems are ones which can be resolved by adequate 
specification of the context,
Frege's objection in the "relativity argument" derived 
from this need for rigid specification of what is being 
counted. A number does not apply to anything just of itself, 
but only in respect of the way we choose to regard it, A 
pack of playing cards can be 1 pack, cards, 4 suits, 
etc., depending on how we are looking at it, the question as 
to its number is not a determinate one. Frege objects to 
Mill's use of the phrase "the characteristic manner" in which 
an agglomeration can be separated into its parts. There is 
no characteristic manner, only a way of regarding it for 
some purpose or other, A bundle of straws can be divided 
up in a variety of ways, but need they form a bundle at all 
in order to be counted?
Here the definite article in the phrase "the characteristic 
manner" is a mistake right away; for there are very various 
manners in which an agglomeration can be separated into parts,
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and we cannot say that one alone would be characteristic.
For example, a bundle of straw can be separated into parts 
by cutting all the straws in half, or by splitting it up 
into single straws, or by dividing it into two bundles. 
Further, is a heap of a hundred grains of sand made up of 
parts in exactly the same way as a bundle of 100 straws? And
yet we have the same number." (Frege, 1959, 30®)
The idea that Frege is putting pressure on i^ that 
there can be any sense in speaking of the number of an . 
aggregate. Not only must what aspect of an aggregate be 
explained for a number to be applied to that aggregate, but 
also in many circumstances it is peculiar to speak of 
aggregates at all, even though it is perfectly proper to 
employ the concept of number. "Must we literally hold a 
rally of all the blind in Germany before we can attach any 
sense to the expression "the number of the blind in Germany"?' 
Are a thousand grains of wheat, when once they have been 
scattered by the sower, a thousand grains no longer? Do 
such things exist as agglomerations of proofs of a theorem
or agglomerations of events? And yet these too can be
numbered." (p.30®)
The deep difficulty with the view that numbers are 
properties of aggregates is that it presents a false picture. 
It causes us to think of collections of things which can be 
counted. The counting of the individual items in the 
collection tells us what number to apply to it. Is it noli 
the case however that "being an aggregate" is a concept 
which is not independent of numerability? The number of the
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blind in Germany can be said to form an aggregate only in 
the sense that they can be counted. Similarly, proofs, events, 
strokes of a clock, are not pre-existing collections, but can 
be regarded as aggregates (or sets) just because they can be 
numbered. Rather than explaining numbers as descriptive of 
the way aggregates can be divided up, the idea of an aggregate 
gets its sense from the possibility of counting some aspect 
of certain items. It is true that it is possible to have 
unnumbered heaps or bundles and then count them, but the 
sense in which the heap is divided off from the rest of 
reality is that there is the possibility of numbering the 
items belonging to it. At least the possibility is there, 
so long as specific decisions are made as to how much of the 
stuff constitutes the heap. Boundaries need to be drawn 
around it relative to some definite purpose. As we have 
seen "heap" is an essentially vague term, and enumeration of 
its constituent elements can only take place once its extension 
in space has been exactly delimited. The important point 
is however that ennumeration of constituent elements is more 
often used to create aggregates than to describe pre-existing 
ones. The notion of an aggregation derives its content from 
that of numerability (i.e. composed of a number of items) 
rather than numerability being explicable in terms of the 
properties of aggregates.
(c ) Modern attempts to support Mill 's Theory of Mathematics
Frege 's criticisms of the type of mathematical empiricism 
espoused by Mill are so far reaching that it is a surprise to 
discover recent attempts to defend the position. Of the 
two papers which do this, I shall begin with that of -Kitcher
(1900c).
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His exposition divides into two parts; the claim that 
mathematical definitions are factual rather than logical, and 
the account given by Mill of the meaning of arithmetical 
statements,
He begins by pointing to the serious flaws in the 
arguments Mill provides in order to support the claim for 
factual definitions. The basis for this claim is that these 
definitions (mathematical ones) imply the existence of the 
objects which form the denotation of the terms, or at very 
least the possible existence of these objects,
A definition explains the meaning of a name, and 
"covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert assertion
is not a definition but a postulate   The actual
or possible existence of things possessing the combination
of attributes set forth in the definition, " (Bk.l,
Ch.8 , para, 5)
Although Mill recognised correctly that no logical 
definition could entail a proposition with existential 
import, Kitcher believes he overlooked the possibility 
"that the existence assumptions which are found among the 
axioms of Euclidean geometry, can be viewed as characterizing 
the concept of Euclidean space" (l^dOc, p.217). The 
existence assumptions he has in mind presumably include the 
famous "parallels postulate", i.e. that there is exactly 
one parallel to a given line through any point off that line, 
which is peculiarly characteristic of Euclidean geometry, and 
also axioms such as "there is only one straight line joining- 
two given points", and "there is only one line which is 
perpendicular to another line". By asserting what can or
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cannot exist within the geometrical system (for example, 
that there is only one perpendicular and cannot be more 
than one), Euclid can be said to be providing a definition 
of space for his geometrical system; "an indirect logical 
definition of Euclidean space" (p.217).
There is nevertheless according to Kitcher, a defensible 
epistemological thesis embedded in this claim, that 
mathematical definitions imply the existence of objects, 
one that Mill was not unaware of and which is central to 
his general position as an empiricist.
The idea rests upon Mill 's conviction that a priori 
knowledge is impossible. It is not possible to acquire 
knowledge from merely linguistic considerations, for although 
understanding of language can be cited as a justification 
for the assertion of certain sentences (analytic ones, that 
is), this only works so long as we do not raise the question 
of the applicability to reality of the concepts being used.
Judgements concerning the level of fit between the 
connotations of terms and the existing order require 
empirical evidence. There is certainly some sense in this 
observation. In any language words fall into disuse, become 
outmoded and are occasionally abandoned completely because 
the concepts involved cease to have any role to play in our 
description of the world. Scientific terms are particularly 
vulnerable; phlogiston, humours, animal spirits, are good 
examples. To illustrate the logical point Mill cites an 
early definition of "acid" as "containing oxygen." The 
proposition "all acids contain oxygen" was therefore
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analytically true. The discovery of hydrochloric acid which 
is oxygen-free refuted this belief and created pressure 
for a redefinition. Empirical evidence showed the old 
use of language to be unjustified and anyone claiming that 
he knew that acids contain oxygen, because that was part 
of the meaning of the word 'acid * would be held to be making 
a mistake. Kitcher's comment is this and I think it is a 
very good one: "This example shows that, while the appeal
to understanding of our language often serves as a local 
justification for our beliefs, empirical discovery is 
relevant to the continued success of that justification.
Hence our practice of justification by appeal to understanding 
does not provide justification which is independent of 
experience,"
In other words it is not enough to claim that some 
statements are true a priori because of the meaning of 
the words, since the truth of these statements involves the 
implicit empirical assumption that our understanding of 
the terms coincides with current practice, practice which 
can alter with the development of scientific theory.
If knowledge of analytic truths involves knowledge that 
concepts involved in the statement are such that they have 
a role to play in a general theoretical structure describing 
the world then it is a posteriori knowledge. The superficial 
absurdity of Mill's view thus masks a significant thesis.
The only quarrel Kitcher has with Mill is what he describes 
as a predilection for an atomistic interpretation as opposed 
to an holistic one. Mill frequently asserts that for every
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particular arithmetical definition there is presupposed 
an observable matter of fact. It is this that leaves him 
open to Frege *s mocking demands for a description of the 
observable facts related to either nought or very large 
numbers. Had Mill suggested that our use of these definitions 
as a whole must be justified by our experience of their 
applicability, as a system, to the world as a whole, these 
difficulties would be avoided.
Frege considers and rejects the idea of an holistic 
interpretation. "Meantime, perhaps Mill does not mean to 
go so far as to maintain that all these facts would have to 
be observed severally, but thinks it would be enough if we 
had derived through induction a general law in which they 
were all included together." (lOe). The formulation 
of such a law he believes to be impossible. It is not enough 
to suggest a law asserting that there are collections of 
varying sizes which can be separated dLnto parts, because a 
law of this kind does not entail any particular observations. 
It is not clear whether "the system of arithmetic is in 
general applicable to the world" fares any better; despite 
inductive support, it does not appear to offer any commitment 
on particular cases. In any case I do not think the viability 
or otherwise of the holistic approach crucial to the argument 
that mathematical statements are analytic a posteriori.
To return to Mill*s analysis of the meaning of 
arithmetical statements in order to explain how the 
definitions are justified, one thing at least is obvious, 
there is opposition to any suggestion that numerals are names 
for abstract objects, I have already referred to the passage
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(Bk, III, Ch. 22, para.3 ) where Mill says collections of 
things are not numerable in an abstract sense, but only with 
reference to the kind of thing they are. We also have 
already seen the difficulties which arise from a view of 
the meaning of arithmetical statements which is construed as 
implying the instantiation of the objects concerned. Mill's 
underlying empiricist epistemology leads him to base our 
justification of mathematical definitions on observation, 
the observation of physical processes concerning everyday 
physical objects. These processes, commonly available, are 
those of separation, combination and arrangements of things. 
Kitcher thinks it is a pity that when Mill sets about 
explicating the nature of mathematical truth he appears to 
be suggesting that by the use of the terms "agglomerate" or 
"aggregate" he is referring to sets, another form of Platonism 
However, lie remarks that this simple slogan "that numerals 
connote properties of agglomerations, and aggregates masks 
a more interesting view". He acknowledges Kessler's paper 
(1980c, p.223, footnote 13), but considers it to present 
a more cumbersome approach to the construction of a workable • 
Millian arithmetic and one that diverges too far from Mill*s 
clear intentions, whose stated dislike for abstract objects 
renders any interpretation in terms of sets, classes or 
s um s unii k oly.
It is the recognition of this that leads Kitcher to 
postulate "collectings" rather than "collections" as 
fundamental to Mill's ontology. A "collecting" is a human 
observable activity, whereas a "collectioii' is an abstract
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object. In the passage (Bk, |L25V) para. 5) concerning 'modes 
of formation of number' Mill gives an explicit example;
"Thus when we say the cube of 12 is 1728, what we affirm 
is this, that if having a sufficient number of pebbles or 
of any other objects, we put them together into particular 
sorts of parcels or aggregates called twelves, and put 
together these twelves again into similar collections,,,." 
and so on. It is unnecessary to quote further for the 
principle is quite clear. The meaning of the statement 
'l2^ = 1728 ' is to do with operations perforinable on physical 
objects. It is true that if Mill meant that arithmetic was 
limited to strictly physical manipulations he would indeed 
fall foul of Frege 's objection that no sense could be 
attached to three strokes of a clock or three methods of 
solving an equation, but Mill takes pains to make it clear 
that mathematics, algebra especially, is applicable to all 
things, Kitcher quotes Mill (l980c, p.227) "the properties 
of number, alone among all known phenomena, are in the most 
rigorous sense, properties of all things whatever. All 
things are not coloured, or ponderable or even extended, 
but all things are numerable."
Admitting Mill*s dislike for abstraction, it is not 
entirely clear how far one should go in construing "all 
things" here. Far enough to include clock chimes and methods? 
Kitcher chooses to describe the physical operations of 
combination and segregation as crude but useful paradigms of 
mathematical activity, useful in the learning process, but
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easily extendable to mental operations. However, there is 
a limit to which one can fit material to one *s own thesis, 
and I am inclined to think that here he is overstepping that 
limit.
The final section of the paper is concerned with 
describing a system and a set of axioms for a workable Millian 
arithmetic. The details of this and the level of success 
attained is not of particular concern here. 3fhat is relevant 
however is the defence of analytic a posteriori knowledge of 
mathematics and the justification of mathematical definitions 
in terms of properties of physical phenomena.
There is I think some substance to the idea that 
knowledge of analytic truths involves the presupposition 
that the concepts involved are understood in such a way as 
to fit in with a larger theoretical structure, and that 
revision within one part of that structure can cause alteration 
to other parts. This is only to say that concepts are not 
grasped individually but as functioning parts of a whole.
It is also true to say that empirical evidence is often 
relevant in exposing alterations in our concepts. Having 
said that, I do not believe the conclusion (that there is no 
a priori knowledge) is warranted, rather that further detailed 
examination of the a priori/a posteriori distinction must be 
made. Empirical discovery caused the redefinition of the 
term 'acid '. Given sufficient experience to grasp the 
concept of 'acid ' as it is now defined, it can be known 
a priori that "all acids contain oxygen is false". What is 
known a posteriori is that the definition of 'acid ' understood
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in this statement is the current one. What is not clear is 
that this further knowledge forms part of the justification 
for the a priori statement or provides a reason for 
believing it.
Difficulties of this sort can, I thinlc, be resolved 
by the suggested means of construing a priori and a posteriori 
as descriptive of mental processes rather than of 
propositions, and Section II will describe how this idea 
can be sustained.
As far as the justification of mathematical definitions 
as properties of operations on physical phenomena, mental 
or otherwise, is concerned, I think Frege's criticisms still 
stand. Operations of collecting and segregation into parts 
presuppose numerability in the same way as the notion of 
aggregates or agglomerations.
Kessler (1980) is also concerned with formulating an 
arithmetic compatible with Mill's ideas and is as deeply 
committed to overcoming the criticisms of Frege. He provides 
a formalization of numbers construed as 'structural relations ' 
using the calculus of individuals. Here again the details 
of the formalization are not directly relevant and I will 
therefore omit a specific account of them. These details 
can be found in Appendix C,
The motivation for the claim that numbers are relations 
of certain kind derives from the search for a way round the 
previously mentioned relativity argument; i.e. Frege's 
objection to the view that numbers are properties of aggregates. 
Recapitulating Frege *s argument, numbers do not behave like
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properties in that there is not always a determinate answer 
to the question of their applicability. They apply to things 
only relative to a way of regarding them. Frege dismisses 
the notion that aggregates can be composed in a "characteristic 
manner" as senseless, since an aggregate can be made up or 
separated into parts in a variety of ways and no one way can 
be picked out as 'the way '. The supposed oversight on Mill *s 
behalf, his failure to realize that a single aggregate can 
be looked at as being constructed in a variety of ways, is 
in Frege 's opinion fatal to Mill 's entire theory of number. 
Kessler argues that important though this argument is, it is 
not only nothing like as serious as Frege believes it to be ; 
it also rests on an interpretation of the term 'aggregate * 
alien to Mill's express intentions. It is necessary for the 
success of at least one part of the relativity argument that 
Mill is accredited with an account of an aggregate, which 
involves "that the method of construction of the aggregate 
is not relevant to the individuation of that aggregate". 
(Kessler, p.67). Certainly on Mill's analysis a collection of 
pebbles would have the number of the number of pebbles in the 
collection. Not only does this seem to be the characteristic 
manner in which the aggregate is composed, it would seem to 
be the only intelligible manner of individuating it as an 
aggregate. It is just conceivable that reasons might exist 
for singling out a heap of pebbles by the number of molecules 
or sub-atomic particles, the pebbles are constituted from, 
but the context for doing so would obviously be a highly
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specialized one.
If tiie same collection of objects can be numbered in 
differing ways then there are functional criteria for 
distinguishing between the ways, A group of people can be 
counted as the number of individuals for the purpose of 
providing each with a cup of coffee, by age or sex, in order 
to decide an appropriate entertainment, by colour of hair, 
or height, or race or religion. All these various methods 
of subdividing a group are available, but make sense only 
relative to some specific purpose. Mill, having objects 
like pebbles in mind, whose individuation is relatively 
clearcut, does not consider aggregates like decks of cards, 
books, rivers, red things, the criteria for individuating 
which suffer from various types of vagueness. Frege latches 
on to the ambiguity and holds that the question: "How many?"
does not admit of a determinate answer. As I have said, 
the lack of determinacy derives from the fact that counting 
is a highly context dependent activity, once the context 
is sufficiently described, a determinate answer is available. 
Relative to context, sense can be attached to the "character­
istic manner" in which an aggregate is composed. Kessler 
believes that Mill was aware of the need for some kind of 
description of the context when he says that if things are 
two, three or four they are things of a particular kind.
This he claims shows that "for Mill, the identity of an 
aggregate is sensitive to the way we choose to regard it", (p•67 )
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If this is the case, and it is not obvious that Kessler 
is not reading more into Mill's remarks than they warrant, 
then that particular strand of the relativity argument does 
indeed fail. There remain however further problems; the 
definition of the number 0, the fact that we can use numbers 
significantly without actually forming aggregates at all 
(i.e. Frege's example, "the number of the blind in Germany") 
and also another difficulty. Even if we interpret Mill's 
conception of aggregates not as necessarily made up of atomic 
parts but parts of a certain kind relative to some context 
or other, this interpretation conflicts with his axiom, 
"Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those 
parts," If we compose a bundle of straw for some purpose, 
such as drawing lots, then the kind of thing relevant to the 
number applicable to the aggregate will be the sticks of 
straw, not the cells, or molecules, or the straw chopped 
into tiny pieces. On the proposed understanding of Mill 
only the straw counted as sticks will form parts of the 
aggregate. However, by the axiom, the molecules which make 
up each stick are parts of the aggregate, and as such do form 
part of it. Thus Mill cannot avoid the relativity argument 
whilst maintaining his axiom as fundamental to the system.
It is to overcome this difficulty that Kessler construes 
numbers as relations. Frege, he thinks, draws the wrong 
conclusion, that numbers do not apply to objects. Numbers 
are not simple properties of objects, but like directions, 
relations which hold between aggregates and "properties which 
pick out parts of those aggregates" (p,59). He would write
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the claim that an aggregate x contains 52 cards as 
a relation between x and the property of being a card, thus 
52 (x, being a card)". Similar'ly x regarded as a deck would
be written 1 (x, being a deck).
"In general; to say that an aggregate x has n p-parts
(i.e. n parts that exemplify the property p) is to say that
X  stands in the numerical relation n to the property p .....
It should be noted that not all properties succeed in picking
out determinate parts of aggregates. For example, the 
properties of being a sample of gold and being red do not. . V ( p.70) 
A property which does so, he calls an individuating
property, one which "...is the referent of a sortal predicate
or a predicate that divides its reference in the appropriate 
way." (p.70)
On the basis of this analysis, Kessler proceeds to 
construct a set of definitions from which he claims, both 
that Peano 's axioms are derivable, and that they are in all 
likelihood compatible with an account of the extra-mathematical 
applications of number theory, although he admits that more 
work is required in this area. His third claim for his analysis 
and the most interesting one here, is that it fulfils another 
requirement. This is the requirement that an adequate analysis 
must "be compatible with an account of how mathematical 
knowledge is possible" (p.75). Kessler believes that by 
treating numbers as relations, the problem of accounting for 
our beliefs about them is simplified to that of showing how 
beliefs about certain kinds of structural relations are 
possible, in particular beliefs about the part-whole relation.
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He does not commit himself as to the extent which his 
analysis fits with Mill*s general epistemological position 
and his specific claim that mathematical truths are known 
a posteriori, but it seems implausible to suggest that it 
does. Understanding of the relationship of part to whole 
must certainly be acquired experientially but this is 
something that Kant would accept. Having gained an 
understanding of the concepts, particular experiences are 
irrelevant to the forming of individual beliefs about 
mathematical propositions.
These proposals, however, are open to two other sets 
of criticisms. Firstly expressed as they are in terms of 
properties (for even if numbers are construed as relations 
the relations are said to hold between properties and 
aggregates) all the ontological difficulties connected with 
the notion of a property remain. Secondly, none of Frege 's 
objections to the use of the concept of an aggregate are 
satisfactorily met. If numbers are relations between 
aggregates and properties, it is still open to us to ask, 
how we manage to refer to the **number of the blind in Germany." 
It is hard to see that this account offers a significant 
improvement on Milles original theory, and it must be concluded 
that no case has been made for a completely empiricist view 
of mathematics. The interesting product of these discussions 
for present purposes is the epistemological thesis attributed 
to Mill by Kitcher, that mathematical propositions are 
analytic and known a posteriori. The consideration of the 
continuing applicability of concepts within a developing
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theoretical structure is arguably an a posteriori activity; 
and if such an activity has a fundamental role to play in the 
acquisition or justification of mathematical knowledge, then 
it provides a further reason for a serious reconsideration of 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction,
(d) Restatement of the main problem in the light of the
Discussion of Frege and Mill
It is time I think to recapitulate a little. The starting 
point of this inquiry was the proof of the Four-Colour Theorem 
and the original question was this: Does this proof present
a significant divergence from the traditional conception of 
proof? The main claim of this thesis is that it does, so long 
as the a priori/a posteriori distinction is maintained.
Mathematical truths are usually regarded as both 
necessarily true and knowable a priori. It is conventional 
to suppose that their necessity (truth in all possible worlds) 
constitutes a condition for their being known a priori, Kripke 
breaks the chain linking necessary truth and a priori knowledge 
by arguing that there are necessary truths which are in fact 
known a posteriori. The claim to distinction for the Four- 
Colour Theorem is that if it is true, then it is both 
necessarily true and knowable only a posteriori. Tymoczko *s 
defence of this position comes under severe attack from a 
number of sources, according to which the use of computers, 
to prove the Four-Colour Theorem presents no more philosophical 
difficulties than the use of logarithm tables or abaci in 
conventional mathematics. The unsurveyability of the Four- 
Colour proof does not constitute a problem either, since
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however well surveyed a traditional proof, the ineradicable 
possibility of human error introduces empirical considerations 
into mathematics. The counter claim of Tymoczko*s critics 
amounts to this: if the Four-Colour Theorem is known only
a posteriori so are all mathematical propositions. The 
process of computation, the most basic form of mathematical 
reasoning is essentially a psychological process. Proving 
is a human activity and consequently vulnerable to human 
fallibility. This view is implicit in Hume although he 
believes that it is in the area of mathematical reasoning that 
we can achieve the maximum degree of certainty. He maintains 
however that this is no more than the probability of a 
proposition being true approximating to the limit.
Do these criticisms constitute a genuine attack on the 
a priori/a posteriori distinction? Certainly they raise 
difficulties, but ones which I think can be removed, but 
only by adopting an explicitly psychologistic epistemology.
A proof is accepted by mathematicians on the basis of 
an a priori deduction of the conclusion, plus additional 
empirical beliefs that the deduction has been correctly 
performed. Clearly the greater the complexity of the 
deduction, the greater need there will be for checking and 
rechecking it for accuracy. The empirical elements in the 
acceptance procedure increase with the difficulty of the proof 
On the traditional conception of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction, propositions are described as a priori or 
a posteriori depending on the kind of justification available 
for them. Types of justification differ according to
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differences in the way in which propositions can be known, 
ivhat is embodied in the demand for a justification for the 
truth of a proposition is a description of the type of 
process a person would undergo in order to know it to be true. 
Empirical propositions are known via perceptual processes 
and inductive reasoning, mathematical truths via a process 
of deductive reasoning. If it is admitted that this 
deductive process includes beliefs about and assessments 
of the probability of personal accuracy, then the idea of 
a proposition being knowable "independently of experience" 
appears to fall apart and with it the distinction itself.
It is KitCher *s contention that the traditional concep­
tion of proof presupposes such a psychologistic account of 
knowledge as sketched above; that is, that knowledge is 
classifiable into kinds depending on the type of psycho­
logical process that generates it, Frege s^ frequently argued 
opposition to the intrusion of psychological matters into 
logical ones is not in fact in conflict with this view,
Frege himself sees inference making as a psychological 
process.
In order to support the main claim that the Four-Colour 
Theorem involves a significant modification in the concept 
of proof, I shall proceed to examine the basis for a 
psychologistic epistemology, and attempt to determine whether 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction can be sustained within 
it in such a way as to support fche traditional conception 
of proof, If the distinction fails then so does the
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traditional conception of proof as a priori, in which case 
the proof of the Pour-Colour Theorem presents no interesting 
philosophical difficulties. We will be forced to accept some 
form of mathematical empiricism. If the distinction can be 
made secure, then a further explanation of the difficulties 
raised by Detlefsen and Luker and Hume must be given, I 
include an examination of recent interest in J,3, Milles 
mathematical empiricism,for if the distinction collapses 
into obscurity a workable account of arithmetic along his 
lines may point the way to a solution, although it seems 
unlikely, and also because his assertion that the ultimate 
justification for the truth of tautologies rests in empirical 
evidence that the concepts involved are descriptive of the 
world, raises a different kind of question concerning the 
viability of the a priori/a posteriori distinction; a 
question that also deserves some kind of answer.
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SECTION II
CHAPTER V
An Analysis of Knowledge
(a) Knowing - traditional accounts
In this section I want to begin with the very much more 
general and fundamental question - What is knowledge? In the 
course of the following discussion I shall present a brief 
sketch of some traditional analyses of the concept of know­
ledge and the main objections to which they are open. This 
will lead the way to alternative accounts which depend on the 
concept of a 'psychological process * for their bases and which 
thereby manage to avoid the difficulties inherent in the 
earlier ones, at least in some respects. The concern here is 
with a priori knowledge in particular and I hope, therefore, 
to establish the viability or otherwise of a distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge from within this 
general epistemological framework.
From the beginning of civilization, questions as to the 
nature and extent of knowledge have owed their mainspring to 
what often is referred to as 'the quest for certainty '. The 
drive to provide analyses of the concept of knowledge or to 
provide sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
justification of any claim to knowledge derives from the 
threat of scepticism. The sceptic 's suggestion that knowledge 
is in no way even a possibility, that an element of doubt 
pervades every claim, invites the fear that if the edifice 
of knowledge has shaky foundations, we may well find the 
whole thing about our ears. D.W, Hamlyn (l9?0) takes the 
view that this common architectural analogy is a poor one.
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He writes "the growth of knowledge is not really like the 
growth of a building, if only because knowledge does not grow 
simply by way of addition"(p.11). It is his opinion that 
a simile such as fabric or network conveys a better picture 
of human knowledge since it can incorporate the idea of the 
growth and development of a structure capable of withstanding 
extensive revision in some parts, without threatening the 
security of the whole.
Sceptical arguments often take this form: nothing can
be known unless it is in fact true; if there is any reason 
to doubt the truth of what is claimed to be known there is 
reason to doubt the claim to knowledge itself. Since it is 
almost always impossible to prove the truth of what is 
claimed to be known, says the sceptic, it is almost always 
impossible to justify the claim to knowledge.
The need to answer the sceptic motivates the philosophical 
search for a set of truths whose incorrigibility is assured. 
Epistemological inquiry can take at least three main, though 
interrelated, forms. We can inquire into the nature of 
knowledge, into the justification for claims to knowledge, 
and into the scope or objects of knowledge. It is largely 
the result of sceptical pressure, that historically discussions 
have tended to be centred round the question of justification. 
What is certain cannot be doubted, and what cannot be doubted 
can justifiably be known.
The approach to the question, "What is knowledge?", 
therefore has been to attempt to provide criteria, consisting 
of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth
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of a statement of the form "x knows that *p , where 'x ' 
is an individual subject, and 'p ' any proposition whatever.
The conditions put forward are usually threefold: i.e. x
knows that 'p * iff (l) 'p ' is true; (2) x believes 'p *; 
and (3) some formulation of the demand that the belief in 'p ' 
is justified. The first condition is unexceptionable; should 
*p * at any time turn out to be false the claim to knowledge 
is withdrawn. "I thought I knew 'p ', but I was mistaken" 
would describe an occurrence of this sort, and would be 
appropriate no matter what theory of truth is presupposed.
Now, although it is contradictory to say "I know that 'p *, 
but 'p * is false", it does not follow, as some sceptics have 
suggested, that the fact that 'p ' might turn out subsequently 
to be false means that *p ' is unknowable, Malcolm (Mind,
Vol.51, 1952, pp.178-87) suggests that this argument gains 
plausibility from a confusion of two senses of the verb 
'to know '. He distinguishes 'strong ' and 'weak ' senses of 
"know", "Know" is being used in the strong sense where nothing 
present or future could possibly count as evidence against the 
relevant proposition. The weak sense of 'know ' is the more 
everyday one, where we are prepared to retract our claim in 
the face of conflicting evidence, albeit in some cases only 
where the strength of the conflicting evidence is overwhelming. 
Malcolm cites a pair of mathematical propositions in order 
illustrate his distinction and in doing so commits himself to 
the view that not all even structurally similar mathematical 
propositions have the same logical and epistemological status. 
On the one hand he says that is a claim to know that
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92 X lü = 14/2 is questioned, the claimant would almost 
certainly be prepared to recalculate to check his result, or 
in other words to admit that he might be mistaken. He is using 
'know' in the weak sense. If similarly doubt was raised 
concerning his assertion that he knew 2 + 2 = 4  there can bo 
no question of recalculation, for 2 + 2 = 4  does not involve 
calculation. No proof or demonstration could convince him 
that 2 + 2  did not equal 4, for demonstration and proof are 
not required. Nothing whatever would count against 2 + 2  
being 4, and this would be using 'know' in the strong sense.
Alan R. White (1987) argues against this distinction, 
and his objection is based on the view that there is a 
logical difference in the way the expressions "I know", and 
"he knows", operate. In his opinion the use of the first 
person involves making a claim, whereas the expression in the 
third person embodies a judgement about a claim to knowledge.
" 'l know ' is used to make a claim, 'He knows ' or 'You 
know' to endorse or allow, to judge favourably, a claim. 
Similarly 'l don *t know ' refuses to make a claim, while 
'lie doesn't know rejects a claim." (p.lOl).
The difficulty with the 'strong ' sense of 'know ' is 
that its use involves making a claim that is not open to 
invalidation.
"But it is a logical characteristic of all claims that 
they may be validated or invalidated; it is a characteristic 
of all pretensions to knowledge that they may be exposed as 
fraudulent; of all confidence that it may be misplaced." (p.l03) 
This is a good point. A claim that is not open to rejection
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is no claim at all, just an assertion. White therefore 
rejects the idea that in using 'know' in the strong sense 
we are not refusing to allow that anything could count against 
this claim; it is just that we cannot see any way in which 
it could be invalidated. Our justification for the claim 
rests on the fact that it would be unreasonable to expect that 
any one could see a way of invalidating it.
This does appear to be a more satisfactory way of 
describing what is involved in the assertion that one knows 
that 2 + 2 = 4 .  It is not that we would refuse to allow 
anything to count against it, it is that we cannot see how 
anything possibly could do so.
The sceptic who demands that all claims to knowledge 
are of this type is still refusing to endorse almost all 
the claims we make. In saying 'l know', I admit that I 
might be mistaken, although I do not think I am. Should 
it turn out that I am, the claim would be retracted. What 
I cannot do is claim to know 'p ' and at the same time believe 
*p * to be false.
The second condition too, presents few difficulties. 
Although not clearly contradictory, there is at least 
something paradoxical about the assertion "I know that 'p', 
but I don't believe it". Knowing includes believing and 
implies it. It has sometimes been suggested, however, that 
this is not the case, that since it is quite possible to say 
"he does not know it, he only believes it", there is 
therefore a contrast between knowing and believing rather 
than a relationship of implication. A.J. Ayer (l95&) replies
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to this hy saying that in general people make the strongest 
claim they can concerning their epistemological states.
*1 know ' is stronger than 'l believe '. Consequently they 
would assert belief where an assertion of knowledge is not 
justified. They would make a weaker claim where a stronger 
one could not be sustained. This does nob prevent belief 
being a necessary condition for knowledge.
Other considerations familiarly adduced as objections 
to the view that knowledge necessarily involves belief 
are cases of self-deception and lapses of memory. There is 
the situation where the delighted prize-winner or perhaps the 
suddenly bereaved might be heard to say "I know it *s true, 
but I don't believe it". This type of emotional response to 
a disruptive experience should not be interpreted literally. 
What is being said is more like, "Despite the evidence, I 
find this hard to believe" or "I don't want to believe this."
The reason for considering lapses of memory is a different 
one. It frequently happens that well-known items of 
information are temporarily forgotten. Someone might 
declare "I know it, it just escapes me for the moment".
Until the item is recaptured, it is argued, it cannot be 
believed, although it cannot be denied that it is known. 
However, there does not seem to be any more reason for refusing 
to ascribe belief than for refusing to ascribe knowledge in 
this case. Not all one 's beliefs are continually available 
to one 's consciousness, any more than everything one knows. 
People can have unconscious beliefs.
"In sum, the fact that knowledge requires of the person
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only that he is capable in principle of producing the 
relevant information does not rule out the possibility of 
ascribing belief to him as well, since just the same may be 
said of belief", (Hamlyn, 1970, p.83).
The third condition is subject to much more serious 
difficulties. It has been formulated variously as (a) x is 
justified in believing 'p (b) x has adequate evidence 
for 'p (c) "x has the right to be sure that *p (A.J.Ayer,, 
I95G, p.34). That true belief does not suffice for knowledge 
is quite clear; good guesswork is not knowledge, something 
more is required. Plato (Theœtetus, paras. 201-210) suggests 
some form of evidence condition, then rejects it on grounds 
of circularity. If 'x ' has to know a set of propositions 
which provide evidential support for his true belief, and 
also know that they support the belief, then knowledge is 
presupposed in the suggested definition. None of the 
formulations (a), (b), (c) clearly avoid this problem, and
even if they did that would not be the end of the matter. 
Questions can be raised concerning the justification of the 
evidence statements themselves. If they are known, presumably 
there is a further set of statements encapsulating individual 
support for them, and a still further set supporting the 
evidence supporting the evidence supporting the item of 
knowledge. /In infinite regress develops. Should a condition 
be contrived which escapes both circularity and infinite 
regression, an enquiry into the nature, scope and relevance 
of the required justification soon reveals the obscurity of 
the notion of evidence itself. How much evidence? What is
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to count as relevant evidence? Can not someone possess 
relevant evidence and yet maintain a true belief on the 
basis of a strange sensation; a sudden pain in his big 
toe, for example?
Should any lurking doubt remain as to the possibility 
of equating knowledge as justified true belief in some form 
or another, Edmund Gettier (1963) presents an argument that 
clinches the matter. He begins by noting two things, firstly 
that it is possible to be justified, in the sense demanded 
by condition three, in believing a proposition that is in fact 
false. Secondly, he draws attention to the fact that if x 
is justified in believing *p ' and deduces 'q ', a consequence 
of 'p ', from 'p * and therefore accepts 'q ' as a result of 
that deduction, 'x ' is justified in believing 'q '. He 
proceeds to describe two possible situations. In the first. 
Smith infers the conclusion that the man with ten coins in 
his pocket will get the job, from the false but strongly 
supported proposition that Jones both will get the job and has 
ten coins in his pocket. In fact, unknown to Smith, it is 
he himself who ia in this condition, so that although Smith *s 
conclusion is justified by his evidence, is true, and is 
believed by Smith, it does not constitute knowledge.
The second case involves Smith's belief, on excellent 
grounds that Jones 01m s  a Ford. Gettier proceeds to construct 
a serious of disjunctive entailments of the proposition 'Jones 
owns a Ford ' involving the whereabouts of Brown, i.e. either 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 'x ', Smith accepts these 
entailments on the basis of his original belief. They are
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all believed, with justification by Smith, However, 
unknown to Smith, Jones has sold the Ford, but coincidentally 
Brown does happen to be in one of the places mentioned in one 
of the entailed propositions. That proposition is then also 
true, justifiably believed, yet fails to be knowledge.
Gilbert Harman (l97'j) locates the source of the trouble as 
reasoning which makes use of intermediate conclusions, which 
are in fact false and proffers a rough and ready principle.
" (P) Reasoning that essentially involves false
conclusions intermediate or final, cannot give one knowledge."
In both of Gettier *s examples Smith infers an 
intermediate false conclusion because there is further 
evidence he does not possess. If he did, he would no longer 
be justified in his inference, but although this is the case, 
it does not follow that he is unjustified in his inference 
without the additional evidence. It only follows that the 
claim to knowledge is undermined. Without going into the 
details of Harman's account of inference, the conclusion 
he draws is that "all legitimate inductive conclusions take
the form of a self-referential conjunction whose first
conjunct (usually left implicit) is the claim that there is 
no undermining evidence to the whole conclusion".
Since the publication of Gettier 's paper several attempts
(l) taken from footnote (l) A Causal Theory of Knowing - 
A. Goldman, J. Phil, June 196/; M. Clark, Analysis, 
December I9Ô3 , pp. E, Sosa, Analysis, October
19vJo, pp. 2-3; K. Lehrer, Knowledge, Truth and Evidence. 
Analysis, April 19^5, PP. 168-1/3.
158.
have been made to provide alternative analyses of "x knows 
that *p *'* , which avoid the kind of difficulties it raises.
It is, however, to a causal account of knowledge that I shall 
turn in order to create a route back to the subject of the 
a priori/a posteriori distinction.
(b) Knowing - An Alternative Account
"A Causal Theory of Knowing" (A. Goldman, 19^7) has as 
its specific purpose the avoidance of the problems raised 
by Gettier, This, Goldman hopes to achieve by formulating 
the third condition for knowledge in terms of causal 
connections between "the truth of 'p and "x *s belief 
in *p .
Although Goldman explicitly maintains that the 
traditional analysis is adequate for cases of a priori 
knowledge and his only concern is with empirical knowledge, 
the underlying presupposition of his theory, that is, that 
it is the kind of way in which the belief is generated on 
which the distinction between knowledge and true belief rests, 
forges a link with some important accounts of a priori 
knowledge, which have the psychologistic basis suggested 
in Section I. The crucial concept in Goldman 's account is 
that of psychological processes as productive of knowledge. 
Differences in the belief-generating process mark off cases 
of knowledge from cases of true belief, and also, cases of 
a priori knowledge from cases of a posteriori knowledge,
Goldman's interest lies with the first part of the above 
conjunction, for him, as far as a posteriori knowledge is 
concerned, the important process is a causal one. It is a
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psychological process in that various factors cause an 
alteration to x *s psychology in the form of a belief in 
•p'.
To state his case Goldman reverts to the second of 
Getter's imaginary situations, that where Smith believes in 
the truth of the disjunction "either Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona", not because as is the case, Brown 
is in Barcelona although Jones has sold his Ford, but because 
of his false though well justified belief that Jones does 
actually own a Ford. The circumstance which makes *p ' (the 
disjunctive proposition) true, has nothing whatever to do 
with Smith's belief in 'p'; a causal connection is lacking.
If Smith was aware Brown was in Barcelona and believed 'p ' 
on that ground, we would admit he knew 'p '. The absence of 
any link between the obtaining situation and Smith's belief 
is the reason for the denial of knowledge. The requirement 
of a causal connection of this sort is what Goldman wishes to 
insert to amend the traditional analysis. The notion of a 
causal process is explicated by the examination of the forms 
it may take; it may be a perceptual process, one based on 
memory, or inference or any combination of these. Perception 
provides the most obvious example. It is a necessary condition 
of X seeing there is a vase in front of him, that there is 
a causal connection between the presence of the vase and x's 
belief in the presence of the vase. This view which Goldman 
claims coincides with Grice 's version of the Causal theory 
of Perception (l9ol) need not be described in detail, that 
he says is more a matter for "special sciences, not for
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philosophy", (p.253), It is enough to see that if the causal 
requirement were not fulfilled, we would be disinclined to 
say that the subject x saw the vase.
For the sake of simplicity Goldman regards perceptual 
knowledge as non-inferential. It is not crucial to his 
analysis to do so; it could be maintained as some might 
prefer, that only sense data are directly perceived and 
physical objects inferred from them. However, this would 
only require a description of a more complex causal process 
involving both perception and inference. Another question 
is the scope of non-inferential perceptual knowledge. Goldman 
takes the example of knowing that the painting in front of me 
is a Picasso, as opposed to just a painting. Can it easily 
be said that, "that it is a Picasso", is knoivn non-inferentially? 
It is a question he does not feel it is necessary to answer, 
since he believes his analysis adequately accounts for both 
inferential and non-inferential knowledge. There are more 
difficulties arising from the view that knowledge generated 
inferentially can be described as essentially causal in 
nature than Goldman recognizes, and I shall shortly raise 
some objections to this account. To further the exposition 
of the Causal Theory of Knowing, however, knowledge generated 
via processes of memory need to be considered. According to 
Goldman, a causal connection must exist between an earlier 
belief 'p * and x *s later knowledge of 'p * for a genuine case 
of remembering to have occurred. It is not sufficient that 
someone maintains the same belief at two different times.
He may have forgotten and relearnt it. It frequently occurs
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that a combination of both perception and memory play a role 
in the causal chain from fact to belief. Nevertheless, the 
role of inference in the acquisition of knowledge cannot be 
underestimated. In his use of the word "inference", Goldman 
does not intend that an "explicit conscious process of 
reasoning" should have occurred; the term is broadened to 
cover both subconscious and immediate inference. Here again 
it is a continucus causal chain linking fact and belief that 
distinguishes knowing from not knowing. The theory is 
developed, illustrated with diagrammatic representations of 
causal processes to cover not only Gettier examples (the 
failure to obtain knowledge in these cases is the result of 
a break in causal chain), but also to elucidate the deficiencies 
of other attempts to solve the problems raised by Gettier.
A complete account of the means by which this is done is 
not needed here, but a few more points must be noted. Firstly, 
the knower's reconstruction of the causal chain must be a 
correct one, mistakes revoke the claim to knowledge.
It would be helpful and explanatory to describe Goldman's 
example here, j\n event 'p * is observed and reported in a 
newspaper. However, owing to a printing error what is actually 
asserted is "not *p'", A subject S reads the report 
superficially, missing out the incorrect 'not * and thus takes 
the paper to have asserted *p *, Since the paper is generally 
reliable, he believes *p '. A continuous causal chain connects 
'p ' with S *s belief that 'p ', Nevertheless, he cannot be 
said to know 'p ', The reason he doesn *t know is that he 
erroneously believes that the newspaper actually printed 'p ',
lo2,
His version of the chain is inaccurate. It is important to 
quote what Goldman says on this point, because I think this 
part of his argument is questionable (p,363). "But if he is
to know 'p his reconstruction must contain no mistakes, 
though he need not reconstruct every detail of the causal 
chain he must reconstruct all the important links,"
Now, firstly, I would disagree with his claim that there 
is a "continuous causal chain leading from 'p ' to S 's believing 
'p *" in this situation. From within Goldman *s theory I would 
suggest that at the point where 3 wrongly reads the printed 
'p ' as "not *p '" it is reasonable to ask what kind of causal 
connection is supposed to exist between reading the negation 
of a sentence when it is the sentence itself which.is printed. 
The fact that a sentence is printed could be seen as causing 
the content of that sentence as opposed to any other content 
being apprehended by S, but it is hard to see how the 
printing of any sentence can cause an individual to apprehend 
the negation of it. In such circumstances, other causal 
factors may be responsible for the misinterpretation of the 
report. If 3 were previously expecting to read the negation 
of 'p ' because of his previous knowledge of the content, then 
perhaps a causal link between his expectations and the report, 
and his misreading of the report, would obtain. In the 
absence of such detail I would deny that such a continuous 
chain exists.
It is for this reason 3 does not know *p *, More 
importantly, however, he appears to be asserting that in 
order for there to be knowledge the knower must be able to
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reconstruct the chain accurately for himself. This seems 
to directly contradict a later part of the paper in a 
section dealing with claims to knowledge where the knower has 
completely forgotten the source of his belief. Here (p.3?0) 
Goldman claims as an advantage of his analysis over the 
traditional one, the fact that the causal theory does not 
require the knower to be able to state his justification for 
his belief. What is accurately "reconstructing the causal 
chain" if not "being able to state the reasons for the belief"? 
The relevant example here is of knowing an historical fact 
originally by reading it in a book. Although the fact is 
accurately remembered, the knower can no longer recall how 
he originally came by the knowledge. The inference from the 
trustworthiness of the book and reading the fact there, to 
the belief in the fact, is forgotten. The knower, says 
Goldman, has no pertinent beliefs to confirm the proposition; 
he certainly cannot reconstruct the causal chain from the 
belief to its source himself. Nevertheless he knows the 
proposition to be true. The knowledge is preserved by the 
"causal process of memory." (my underlining).
Either the ability to reconstruct the chain is essential 
to inferential knowledge or it isn't. Goldman cannot have 
it both ways. Harman (l973i p.128) also has doubts about 
"reconstruction". I think the point here is that knowledge 
which results from memory is not classified as knowledge 
based on inference, even though the original formation of 
the belief, which is remembered, involved a process of 
inference. Thus the process of recalling the information
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does not require the ability to reconstruct the inferential 
chain, whilst for the belief to count as knowledge when 
initially acquired, such a reconstruction is demanded. 
Nevertheless, the issue is far from clear. Much of the 
unclarity derives from Goldman's lack of any real explanation 
of the notion of causality here. The demand for a 
"reconstruction of the chain" by the knowing subject is 
a confused demand because Goldman himself confuses "causes 
of a belief" with "reasons for a belief". It is well known 
that the reasons someone gives in support of a claim to 
knowledge do not necessarily coincide with the factors that 
in fact caused the relevant belief in the first place.
Perhaps Goldman is suggesting that where the factors which 
cause the belief are not part of the knower 's justification 
for his claim to knowledge, then the claim fails. But in 
this case claims to knowledge based on processes of 
remembering a fact but not how knowledge of it was acquired 
do still seem to present a problem.
Yet another problem for the theory seems to be embedded 
in a further requirement for knowledge based on inference; 
the demand that the propositions on which a belief is based 
must genuinely confirm it "very highly whether inductively 
or deductively. Reconstructing a causal chain merely by 
lucky guesses does not yield knowledge." This condition 
must surely reintroduce the old Platonic charge of 
circularity and if not, then no less fall foul of all the 
host of difficulties connected with the concepts of evidence 
and confirmation.
Iü5.
In spite of these objections I have raised to parts of 
Goldman's analysis, I believe that his approach is what is of 
importance here. It might be argued against the causal 
theory that it is committed to supposing that the original 
formation of a belief is essential to its status as knowledge 
at a later stage. It is the familiar charge of confusing the 
"context of discovery" with the "context of justification".
Now it seems perfectly clear that whilst the existence of 
an appropriate causal chain is required for the original 
belief to be counted as knowledge, this type of analysis in 
no way precludes an alternative or extended process 
constituting a justification, .for that item of knowledge at 
any later time.
Goldman explicitly states that the object of the causal 
theory is to give the truth conditions for "S knows 'p '" and 
that "Truth conditions should not be confused with verification 
conditions. My analysis of "S knows 'p '" does not purport to 
give procedures for finding out whether a person (including 
oneself) knows a given proposition." (p.3/2). Thus it is 
the aim of the analysis to state the conditions that must 
be fulfilled in order for "S knows 'p'" to be true, not 
to describe how an individual has acquired the knowledge 
he actually has.
What the theory is committed to is a view of epistemology 
that takes "knowing" as a causal interaction between a human 
subject and the world. It is naturalized epistemology in 
Quine 's sense (W.V. Quine, 19o9, p.82),
"Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into
lot) .
place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural 
science."
A little should bo said by way of an explanation of both 
the conception of naturalized epistemology and its 
philosophical history. First of all, what were the factors 
which brought about its development? Initially naturalized 
epistemology was motivated by despair; despair of grounding 
natural knowledge, the foundations of science, in sense 
experience. The hope had been that if all statements about 
the world could be deduced from statements concerned only 
with immediate experience, either as sense-datum reports 
or observation sentences, using only logic and set theory, 
then science would inherit the certainty and incorrigibility 
of those statements of immediate experience. The aim of 
Carnap's 'Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt" (l92â) was exactly 
this; to provide an account of the external world as a 
logical construction out of sense data. The programme was 
one of translation. If all statements about the world could 
be effectively translated into statements about sense data 
or observation, depending on which reduction basis was viewed 
as epistemically prior, the desired logical construction 
would be achieved. Unfortunately for Logical Positivists, 
it was quickly recognized that although a statement can be 
translated into terms only of sense data, logic and set theory, 
it cannot be proved from sense data statements by logic and 
set theory. "The most modest of generalizations about 
observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can 
have had occasion actually to observe." (Quine, 1969, p.?4)
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The main purpose of the undertaking was defeated.
Nevertheless, there was still point to the programme, 
even if it was not possible to deduce science 
from immediate experience, a translational reduction could 
still clarify the relationship between sensory evidence 
and the world, and further, by showing that scientific 
concepts were theoretically dispensable, endow them with 
familiarity and certainty of observational ones. This 
envisaged translational reduction was however impossible 
to achieve. All the construction could provide were 
reduction forms which, falling short of definitions, 
yielded not equivalences but implications. The meaning 
of a term is partially given by the specification of some 
semtences which imply or are implied by sentences containing 
the original term.
The realization of the failure of rational reconstruction 
provided the stimulus for relocating epistemology within the 
the discipline of psychology, where the processes by which 
human beings actually develop knowledge of the world from 
sensory experience can be studied, rather than providing 
a 'fictitious history' of that development.
An earlier objection to incorporating epistemology into 
psychology was that to do so involved circularity. If 
empirical science is to be given secure logical foundations, 
recourse to any form of empirical science, including 
psychology, to achieve this, defeated the whole enterprise. 
Once the idea was abandoned that such a course was even 
possible, the charge of circularity lost its grip.
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"If wo are out simply to understand the link between 
observation and science, we are well advised to use any 
information available including that provided by the very 
science whose link with observation we are seeking to 
understand." (Quine, 1969, p.76).
Naturalized epistemology therefore is epistemology 
viewed as a part of psychology, with the resources and 
methods of natural science available for its furtherance.
However illuminating and exciting this idea may be 
for explaining how we acquire a posteriori knowledge, the 
naturalized epistemologist faces problems in accounting 
for a priori knowledge. The difficulties lie not so much 
with the explanation of how a priori knowledge is acquired 
(l think an analysis on the lines of that suggested by 
Kitcher (see Chapter VIl) can do that), but with providing 
an acceptable account of logical truth.
An explanation of how a psychologistic analysis of 
a priori knowledge can be consistently contained within a 
truly naturalized epistemology must be given, and naturalized 
epistemology must be defended against the criticism that it 
is committed to an unsatisfactory explanation of logical truth.
Quine (pp. 82-84) describes the object of epistemological 
study as "a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject." 
This human subject is regarded as receiving a certain input, 
"patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies" and as 
delivering an enormous output in terms of a three-dimensional 
externally existing world. It is the relationship between 
input and output that is of interest to the epistemologist.
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This mothod of study, it is claiinod , sot ties a lon^ disputed 
question, which is that of episteinic priority. The issue 
raised concerns the primary objects of observation. When 
we talk of sense experience are we talking about two- 
dimensional reception, or three-dimensional conscious 
awareness? Quine settles for the former. Observation 
consists in stimulation of sensory receptors, "let 
consciousness fall where it may" (p.84).The difficulty 
that arises is that if stimulation of the sensory receptors is 
the only form of input, how are we to account for knowledge 
(part of the output), which doesn't seem to depend on any 
particular sensory stimulations. In addition, if the output, 
knowledge, is a result of the totally contingent empirically 
discoverable input, how can any of that knowledge be 
intelligibly regarded as non-empirical, Quine gives a pai’tial 
answer in alluding to stored information. Clearly, the human 
subject has the capacity to store, recall and carry out 
operations on the so-called stimulations of its receptors,
A version of a mind/brain identity thesis is required to 
provide a link between the suggested unconscious reception 
and the consciously articulated descriptions which result, 
but assuming that one can plausibly be maintained, it becomes 
clear that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge must be drawn in terras of different types of 
psychological process. If the original source of knowledge 
is what is to be counted as empirical or non-empirical then 
for the supporter of naturalism all knowledge must be 
empirical. This is to say no more than Kant (l93 8, p,4l)
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"ThorG can be no doubt that all our knowledge beings with 
experience," It is merely a denial of the possibility of 
innate knowledge, What, I have argued, is empirical or 
non-empirical is the type of operation required for a 
particular type of output and what is provided by Kitcher 
is a set of conditions a mental operation must fulfil in 
order to generate knowledge of this type.
Quine 's naturalism does not recognize this possibility.
Like Carnap, he equates being analytic or true a priori with 
being true solely by virtue of the meaning of terms. Unlike 
Carnap, Quine, in the famous paper "IVo Dogmas of Empiricism" 
(reprinted in "From a Logical Point of View, 19bl) rejects 
the analytic/synthetic distinction and implicitly the 
a priori/a posteriori distinction as incoherent on the 
grounds that all intensional notions can only be explained 
by the mutually inter-defined terms, synonymy and definition.
Any attempt to construe analytic truths as true "by convention" 
encountered difficulties, the principle one being that either 
each of an infinite number of possible analytic sentences has 
to be regarded as "a convention" or "linguistic rule" or else 
most must be held to be consequences of a primitive set of 
conventions, The problem with the first alternative is tliat 
it lacks explanatory power and with the second, that only by 
using logic can a statement be derived as a consequence, 
and it is logic that the notion of "truth by convention" 
is invoked to explain,
"The 'exciting ' thesis that logic is true by convention
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reduces to the unexciting claim that logic is true by 
convention plus logic. No real advance has been made."
(Putnam, 1979, p.424)
Quine offers a further argument against the a priori/ 
a posteriori distinction. He believes that given sufficient 
readjustment and revision of our belief network, any statement 
could be held to be true, and any rejected.
"Any statement can be held to be true come what may 
if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the
system  Conversely, by the same token, no statement
is immune from revision," (1961, p.43)
It is as a result of these views that Quine is led to 
explain the apparent unrevisability of such truths by the 
fact that they are "subscribed to by all fluent speakers 
of a language". The notion of analytic truth should be 
dispensed with and replaced by "straightforward attribute 
of community wide acceptance," The truths of logic and 
mathematics as paradigm examples of analytic truths are 
therefore to be regarded as true because they are universally 
accepted,
Manley Thompson (1901a) makes the suggestion that the 
naturalized epistemologist may have to offer an explanation 
of the human disposition towards unreserved acceptance of 
such truths in terms of neurophysiology and evolutionary 
theory. Nowhere, in fact, does Quine offer an indication 
that an explanation of this type is required, Thompson is 
confusing, I think, Quine 's remark (1969, p.90) that "a more 
emphatically episteraological topic that evolution helps to
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clarify is induction, now that we are allowing opisteinology 
the resources of natural science " with his own view that if 
a psychologistic account could be given of knowledge of 
logical truth, it would be in terms of a theory of rational 
behaviour. He appears to think that the ability to behave 
rationally is a trait favoured by natural selection. Vague 
references to "survival value" however do little to indicate 
the kind of role the theory of evolution could play in such 
an explanation.
Thompson, however, does not in any case believe that 
the naturalized epistemologist has even this option open 
to him and considers the inadequacy of the account of logical 
truth sufficient reason for rejecting the whole idea of 
naturalized epistemology, It is the emptiness of the notion 
of truth by convention as far as laws of logic are concerned, 
that creates the situation where all that is left for the 
naturalized epistemologist is the claim that logical truth 
rests in universal acceptance.
The difficulty with construing laws of logic as 
conventional truths arising out of the development of language 
is that at least one, the Principle of Non-contradiction, 
cannot be formulated without previously being adopted.
"We may take the schema 'not both p and not p ' as 
a formulation of the convention that a sentence and its negation 
cannot both be true in the same respect. But then if we have 
not already adopted this very convention we must accept as 
true not only a sentence proclaiming that we have formulated 
the convention but also the negation of this sentence" (Thompson,
1981 a , p .o ).
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Unless the law of non-contradiction has already been 
adopted we can only claim that we have both formulated 
a convention and not formulated it. In order to escape from 
this kind of absurdity, the only course seems to be to drop 
the idea that these are true by convention and revert to that 
of a priori truths. By doing so, however, the naturalized 
epistemologist is faced with either forfeiting his claim 
that the evidence for all knowledge is sensory evidence, 
or with accepting the rather weak notion that logical truths 
are merely truths human beings are disposed to accept under 
any circumstances. He cannot consistently maintain that 
some truths are a priori true independently of experience, 
or of any possible empirical observations, while at the same 
time holding that the human knowing subject and its mental 
operations provide the evidence for all truths whatever.
The explanation provided however, in terms of universal 
acceptance of logical principles, probably for reasons of 
what he vaguely calls "evolutionary survival value", just 
will not do, and the reason it will not do is, in a sense, 
the same reason that the "true by convention" account was 
rejected.
Not only is it impossible to formulate these principles 
as conventions without previously adopting them; the matter 
goes deeper. It is impossible to mean anything at all without 
adopting them. To assert that one rejects the Law of Non­
contradiction presupposes accepting it. Otherwise the 
assertion can only amount to the claim that one rejects the 
law and does not reject the law. Where nothing is ruled out
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nothing is specified. Meaning, as Saussure taught us, 
consists in specifying something by ruling out what is not 
specified. Where everything is included nothing can be 
asserted,
Logical principles, Thompson concludes, have indisputable 
epistemic priority as regulative principles required to form 
even a single meaningful assertion of a truth from experience. 
To recognize this priority is to reject naturalism.
"There is thus regulation by logical principles even 
in the acceptance or rejection of a single putative elementary 
truth of experience. Epistemic priority, even in this case 
comes from above." (l98la, p.12),
Thompson speaks generally about "logical principles", 
but it is clear that it is not any tautologous formula that 
he has in mind, or even the so-called "laws of thought"*, the 
principle on which his argument rests is what Putnam describes 
as a denial of the Absolute Inconsistency Rule (l979, p.429), 
which simply expressed is "not every statement is true".
It is impossible to reject this principle and make any 
meaningful assertion at all.
Acceptance of it is a "formal condition of communication" 
(p,3). Naturalism is deemed to fail because at least one 
"a priori truth" has to be accepted before any intelligible 
judgement can be made with regard to the sensory information 
a human being receives. This truth "that not every statement 
is true" is epistemically prior to any experiential statement 
whatsoever.
It seems to me that Thompson is confusing empirical and
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linguistic coiasidorations .
In tho first place, to talk of human beings accepting 
or rejecting such a principle seems misguided, Putnam (1979, 
p.435) says that "It is clear from the notion of rationality 
itself that to accept the (A,I,R,) would be to abandon 
rationality," I would suggest that it is incoherent to 
suppose that the sentence "not every statement is true" 
actually formulates a principle. It has the appearance of 
a principle on the surface, but what kind of situation is 
described by "He counts every statement as true"? No genuine 
possible state of affairs is described at all. The idea that 
this is a rule or principle which is up for acceptance or 
rejection is unintelligible. The concept of accepting a 
principle only is coherent where there is a possibility of 
not accepting it. No such possibility is open here. It is 
not the case that first we accept that "not every statement 
is true" and proceed with this knowledge to make sense of our 
experience. Yet this is what Thompson's claim that this 
a priori truth is "episteraically prior" seems to suggest.
That a statement can bo formulated which expresses the 
essentially empirical fact that intelligible experience 
presupposes making differentiations within the total stream 
of sensory input, (this I take to be the distinctive feature 
of consciousness; a capacity to recognize sameness and 
difference amongst the continuous flow from the sensory 
receptors) does not mean that all human beings have knowledge 
of the a priori truth of this formulation. Certainly they ' 
would for the most part assent to it if caused to reflect
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upon it (if tlioy considered it comprehensible), so in that 
sense the linguistic expression can be held to be "true 
a priori", but to combine this fact with the realization 
that no experience is possible where no differentiating 
judgements are made, and conclude that knowledge of this 
principle is therefore prior to empirical knowledge rests 
on a confusion between a question concerned with the nature, 
not just of rationality as Putnam believes, but with tho 
nature of consciousness itself, and a question concerning 
the acceptance and rejection of a statement.
The claim that nothing meaningful can be asserted where 
the principle of minimal contradiction (i,e, not every 
statement is true) is rejected is a redescription in semantic 
terms of the impossibility of judging an experience to be an 
experience of something, without separating it from other 
experiences as experiences not of that thing. Apprehending 
sensory experience as experiences of things is required even 
of irrational beings, if they are to be conscious.
Even if I am right in rejecting Thompson's argument for 
dismissing naturalized epistemology as a viable theory, the 
problem still remains to provide an account of logical or 
necessary truth which amounts to more than the bald empirical 
statement that these truths are universally accepted and held 
to, "come what may", Putnam says (p.435) "1 do not see
any explanation. If one gets comfort by saying 'the 
principles of logic,(some of them) are true because we hold 
them immune from revision', that is fine (some people enjoy 
chanting 'llare Krishna ', too), but the 'because ' escapes me;
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Why should one not just as well say, 'We are able to 
stipulate that some but not all atatements should be true,
(or assertible) because the Minimal Principle of Contradiction 
is true? * My own guess is that the truths of logic we are 
speaking of are s^ basic that the notion of explanation 
collapses when we try to 'explain* why they are true.
"I do not mean that there is something 'inexplainable ' 
here; there is simply no room for an explanation of what is 
presupposed by every explanatory activity - and that goes 
for philosophical as well as scientific explanations, 
including explanations that purport to be therapy."
It may be therefore wrong to look for any epistemological 
explanation of "logical truth"; however, if there is any 
explanation to be had then I believe it is in naturalized 
epistemology that we should look for it, not in terras of how 
our dispositions lead us to accept or reject certain statements 
but in terms of a developed theory of consciousness, McGinn 
(1980, p.33) in arguing against anti-realism maintains that 
"the content of our sentences (or those of my model linguistic 
community) just does transcend dispositions to determine truth- 
value by responding appropriately to suitable evidence: and
I agree too [with Quin^ that how this comes to pass is a 
fit subject for naturalized epistemology to investigate".
The great advantage of naturalized epistemology is that in 
studying the relationship between sensory input into the human 
subject and the enormous output, "a description of a three- 
dimensional external world and its history" (Quine, 1959, p.83) 
episteraologists are free to make use of empirical psychology,
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"We are studying how the human subject of our study 
posits bodies and projects his physics from his data, and
we appreciate that our position in the world is just like 
his. Our very epistomological enterprise, therefore, and 
the psychology wherein it is a component chapter, and the 
whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component 
book - all this is our own construction or projection from 
stimulations like those we are meting out to our epistemological 
subject." (p.83)
A psychologistic account of what it is to know something 
framed in terms of the type of processes a human subject 
needs to undergo in order to have that knowledge, can be 
seen as forming part of the more general enterprise of 
naturalizing epistemology.
If, as Goldman suggests, the processes which generate, 
at least a posteriori, knowledge are causal processes, i.e. 
that there is a causal connection between objects and events 
in the world, the sensory stimulations they provide and the 
subsequent knowledge the subject attains, it remains to ask, 
what exactly is the notion of causality presupposed here?
Nothing is made explicit on this point, but presumably the 
assumption is of some type of mind/brain identity thesis.
Are there only physical causes or do we admit that mental 
events can interact with physical events in a causal network?
It seems to be suggested that physical objects or events cause 
physical events in the form of sensory stimulations of tlie 
subject, these in turn cause the occurrence of certain mental 
phenomena, inferences, beliefs, etc., which in turn generate
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knowledge.
Quine makes the claim that naturalized epistemology 
resolves "a stubborn old enigma" (p.84), that of epistemological 
priority; that is, which items are episteinologically prior 
to which, the unconscious reception of sensory information 
or the conscious apprehension of that information. As far as 
he is concerned the matter can be settled in purely physical 
terms, in the unconscious stimulation of sensory receptors,
"let consciousness fall where it may", (p.84), Now while it 
is plausible to take this view as far as what is to count as 
observation is concerned, more is required to develop a theory 
of knowledge and here I suggest that a workable account of 
the relationship between physical stimulations of the brain 
and resulting mental occurrences must be given to explain 
how there is a continuous causal chain linking our beliefs with 
the subject matter of those beliefs. A mind/brain identity 
theory would seem to be the most plausible candidate.
It has already been stated that Goldman rejects the 
possibility of providing a causal analysis of a priori knowledge 
but this is not to suggest that 'knowing ' a priori is not to 
be construed as a psychological process if not as an essentially 
causal one. Goldman raises but leaves open the question as to 
whether inference itself is a causal process, although he is 
inclined to the view that it is. Inferences clearly form 
parts of a causal chain; if they are not causal in nature 
it would suggest that the chain is broken. This is not 
discussed in any detail, it is simply asserted that if 
a"chain of inferences is added to a causal chain, then the
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entire chain is causal". (Goldman, 19^7, p.3o2). This 
doesn't seem very satisfactory. It is not clear wha I, Goldman 
means by 'added to ', In fact his diagrams appear to 
represent inferences as integral parts of the chain rather 
than any form of additions. The point at issue is really 
whether a belief on which another belief is based can be 
construed as a cause of the latter belief. This is a view 
on which Goldman does not wish to commit himself, not 
surprisingly, for if beliefs were to be allowed to figure 
as causes, there could be no objection to considering the 
deductive process as causal, thus possibly making way for a 
causal analysis of at least some a priori knowledge.
Colin McGinn in 'A priori and A posteriori Knowledge ' (1976) 
though in favour of a naturalized epistemology, explicitly 
maintains that the causal condition of Goldman's analysis 
cannot be satisfied for a priori knowledge. This leads him 
to reject the CTK (Causal Theory of Knowledge) as an analysis 
of knowledge, preferring to retain the notion of causality in 
the criteria for determining whether an item of knowledge 
is a posteriori. Although I shall examine his arguments 
more closely later, two points should be noted here. In the 
first place, it is McGinn's purpose to maintain the traditional 
a priori/a posteriori distinction, as exhaustive and exclusive, 
and in the second, the reason that he claims the causal 
condition is unsatisfied stems from the view that abstract 
objects cannot function as causes. Postponing a discussion 
of the subject matter of a priori propositions (i.e. what kind 
of things they are propositions about) until a later section.
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I shall sum up this section by saying that while it is 
doubtful how successfully Goldman *s achieves his object 
in providing adequate criteria for x knows that *p *, the 
naturalized psychologistic approach to epistemology is the 
one I wish to adopt, and it remains to examine the 
possibility of drawing the distinction between a priori 
and a posteriori knowledge from within this epistemological 
framework.
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CHAPTER VI
A Priori Knowledge - Recent Discussions
(a) Direct Knowing
At til© beginning I stated wliat I consider to be the 
traditional account of the a.priori/a posteriori distinction* 
In drawing the distinction two questions need attention:
What is the difference in the way we know a priori truths 
and what are the characteristics of the kinds of truth known 
a priori? Kant answers the first of these by his criterion 
of "independence from experience", and the second by 
attributing to a priori knowledge the properties of necessity 
and strict universality.
In recent years there have been frequent discussions 
of the distinction and attempts to provide more rigorous, 
less disputable characterizations of it,
I shall give short expositions of some of these, giving 
most close attention to those which embed the distinction with 
a naturalized epistemology, namely those of McGinn (1976) and 
Kitcher (1980). Initially, however, it is an account given 
by Benfield (l9?4) that deserves some consideration. He 
claims in the first place that the distinction has never 
been clearly drawn, despite the ease with which it is grasped 
and utilized by professional philosophers and students alike. 
An important point he makes is that even greater confusion 
is generated by the failure to specify adequately exactly 
to what type of entity or entities the terms apply. A list 
can include knowledge, truths, evidence, sources of knowledge, 
propositions, facts, ways of knowing, etc.
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Although Benfield does not take 'way of knowing * as 
fundamental in his analysis he does suggest that it might 
be the case that it is to this notion that a priori or 
a posteriori should apply since they "do have the virtue 
of emphasising the basically epistemological character of 
the a priori" (p.155). This is an intuition with which 
I agree.
As’ far as a general analysis of knowledge is concerned, 
he rejects the claim of Goldman and others that whilst 
a posteriori knowledge requires a distinct set of criteria 
(in Goldman's case the addition of a causal condition), the 
more traditional "justified true belief" account suffices 
for a priori knowledge. Both types of knowledge should be 
accommodated within a single analysis.
In the first place a series of definitions is constructed, 
the primary notion being what perhaps not totally felicitously, 
is called "intuitive knowing" (p.152)
(l) "S knows *p ' intuitively = using only ordinary
• ‘ human epistemic capacities, S
knows 'p ' directly and not by 
virtue of any other knowledge S has.
The restriction, in the definition, that only "ordinary 
human epistemic capacities" are to be used, is an important 
one. If, for example, it was open for beings with augmented 
or alternative capabilities to know things intuitively, it 
is difficult to see how any proposition could not be known 
a priori in this sense. The Christian conception of God 
surely involves a being with the capacity to know all 
propositions a priori, but this is not the case for human
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beings. If the distinction between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge is to be drawn successfully, the possibility of 
God-like beings must be ruled out as irrelevant.
It should be asked what is intended by the expression 
"directly and not by virtue of any other knowledge S has." 
Can empirical propositions about the world, or about 
immediate experience be known directly? Benfield himself is 
not entirely clear about this; he argues that the argument 
from illusion supports the view that empirical knowledge is 
not directly known, since evidence would be needed to show 
that one was not a victim of an illusion. However, he 
concludes that;
"It is far from certain that this argument is correct, 
and it may ultimately be difficult to show that ordinary 
perception is not an instance of direct knowing...." (p.152).
The criterion for knowing a proposition directly or 
not, thus emerges as one of whether evidence is relevant 
to the acquisition of the knowledge or not. In this case, 
propositions such as "I have a headache, feel sick, feel 
angry", etc., would certainly seem to be a priori according 
to this definition, and others, i.e. "there is a coffee cup 
on the desk in front of me", at least arguably, would be 
too,
However, taking this definition together with a further
one, that of an *a priori proof*
(2) "S can construct an a priori proof of p =
S can construct a deductive proof of *p * such
S knows intuitively that the premisses are 
true and the inferences employed are 
deductively valid.
185.
he defines the critical notions, those of knowing
a priori, and of an a priori proposition
(3) "S knows *p ' a priori = S knows *p *, S can 
construct an a priori proof of *p *, and S 
believes 'p * on the basis of the existence 
of the proof.
(4) *p ' is an a priori proposition = it is logically 
possible that someone knows 'p ' a priori.
On the basis of propositions 1-4 Benfield proceeds to 
define other notions; a priori judgement, truth, concept, way 
of knowing, etc.
It is clear that (l) is intended to be substantially
the Kantian criterion of 'independence from experience ' and
the difficulties in this analysis must arise in the 
interpretation of 'direct knowledge ', not only because the 
lack of evidence criterion may allow certain empirical 
propositions to be known a priori, but also because the same
difficulties arise as with the Kantian notion. Neither
Kant nor Benfield wish to suggest that all a priori knowledge 
is innate, but to avoid being committed to this view, some 
account must be given of the formation of the concepts
necessary to know any propositions at all. The problem as
I see it is that although no items of knowledge could be 
produced as evidence for a proposition such as A is A, 
this fact does not rule out the possibility that other 
knowledge, not in the sense of discrete propositions, but 
in the sense of knowing how to use language, how to function 
in a linguistic community, etc., is required in order to know
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the truth of the proposition. Such knowledge is necessarily 
experiential. Traditionally, "independence from experience" 
refers to the justification of the truth of the proposition. 
The conceptual equipment to understand the proposition is 
regarded as given, A proposition is a priori, if it can he 
known to be true, or its truth can be determined without 
empirical evidence. If it is recognized that the way in 
which its truth is determined presupposes an understanding 
of language, it must be seen that empirical evidence, in 
the form of observation of the speakers of that language, is 
an integral part of that justification.
"Carnapian analyticity suggests the parallel-sounding 
claim that whatever evidence there is for analytic truth is 
linguistic evidence. But then, what is to be taken as 
linguistic evidence? Does it consist in a grasp of meanings 
of linguistic rules, - in short, in understanding one *s 
language? Or does it consist in facts about the behaviour of 
people identified as speakers of a certain language? Those 
questions hardly present distinct alternatives. One comes 
to understand a language by observing the behaviour of its 
speakers and trying to communicate with them. And one comes 
to identify people as speakers of a certain language when one 
has acquired (or at least is in the process of acquiring) some 
understanding of that language. Understanding a language 
and identifying its speakers are not entirely separable," 
(Thompson M, I981)
By distinguishing "direct knowing" from indirect on the 
grounds of the evidence required in order to "know the truth
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of the proposition, Benfield is relinquishing his explicit 
purpose of providing an account which clarifies the a priori/ 
a posteriori distinction. His analysis, despite his insight 
into, and insistence upon, the distinction being drawn in 
terms of human epistemological activity merely reformulates 
the traditional account without overcoming the difficulties 
of it,
This approach, however, does have some advantages.
Firstly, he distinguishes clearly between the metaphysical 
concept of necessity and the epistemological concept of a 
priority, denying that there is an extensional equivalence 
between them. His conviction that epistemological issues 
are only to be considered from the point of view of beings 
with normal human capacities makes room for unknowable necessary 
propositions,
The second benefit the analysis confers is that it makes 
it possible to unite criteria for distinguishing between 
a priori and a posteriori propositions within a single theory 
of "what it is to know something". Thirdly, there is his 
observation that a priori propositions are also liable to 
Gettier-type difficulties. He cites the case of the 
mathematician who constructs a proof of a proposition and 
thereby believes it. The proposition is in fact true, but 
owing to an unnoticed error in the proof structure he cannot 
in fact be said to know it. He has justified true belief, 
justified because he is unaware of the error in the proof, 
but not knowledge.
It could be argued that no one is ever justified in
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believing a theorem on the basis of an erroneous proof.
The fact that it is erroneous removes the justification 
for belief in it. Here again it is the ambiguity of the 
way in which the term "justification" works. The 
mathematician in this case is justified in his belief, in 
the sense that no one would reproach him for holding it.
He is usually careful, rarely makes mistakes; there is no 
reason to think that he has done so this.time. If this 
sense of "justification", i.e. that there are good reasons 
for holding a belief is confused with the sense in which 
the conclusion of a proof is justified by the validity of 
the structure of the proof, it is easy to make the claim 
that the belief is not justified in the first sense. If 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction is drawn in terms of 
"ways of knowing" as opposed to "types of justification" 
confusions of this kind are avoided.
The advantages of Benfield *s analysis notwithstanding, 
it must be concluded that the difficulties inherent in the 
central concept, that of "direct knowing" are such that 
the adequacy of the whole must be seriously doubted.
(b) The Extensional Equivalence Hypothesis
E. Erwin (1974) in a discussion not of the a priori/ 
a posteriori distinction as such, but of the thesis that 
a priori truth and necessary truth are extensionally 
equivalent, puts forward an argument which if sound proves 
fatal to Benfield *s definition of a priori knowledge. In 
the course of his exposition he brings to the surface many 
of the unclarities embodied in the traditional conception
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of a priori knowledge, and concludes that unless a measure 
of reinterpretation of the distinction is made, it breaks 
do^m altogether.
There is, implicitly a large measure of agreement 
between Benfield and Erwin, not only in the conception that 
a priori refers to *a way of knowing ' rather than anything 
else, but also in that they both rightly reject the concept 
of superhuman epistemic agents as a part of their analyses.
Both are in fact endorsing a psychologistic epistemology and 
Erwin suggests at one point or at least implies, the need 
for a causal explanation of "knowing".
The crux of this paper turns on the distinction between 
'in fact ' and 'in principle '. I have already raised doubts 
about limits of the usefulness of the concept of 'in principle ' 
when applied to human intellectual capacities. The so-called 
'correllation argument * more than confirms those doubts.
The first interpretation of the notion of a priori truth 
that Erwin's considers is the Kantian one, that these truths 
are knotm independently of sense experience. The equivalence 
of the classes of necessary and a priori truths; abbreviated 
to the EEH (Extensional Equivalence Hypothesis) could be 
instantly rejected under this interpretation since some 
necessary truths, as Kripke suggests (1972), can be known 
a posteriori. An example of this would be a mathematical 
proposition known to be true because it was learnt from an 
accredited textbook. The natural way to save the EEH from 
this sudden death would be to insist tliat what is meant by 
an a priori truth is that it is one which can be known
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a priori, even if it is actually on a particular occasion 
known a posteriori. As a counter measure this would be 
sufficient except for the ambiguity of the word 'can '.
'Can ' can be read as 'can in principle ' or 'can in fact '.
In other words, it could still be argued that since 
in making the distinction we are concerned not with questions 
concerning how individuals gain knowledge in particular 
cases, but with how propositions are justified;that a 
proposition is a priori if it 's truth value can be determined 
independently of experience and that this is the case 
irrespective of how it is known by individuals on particular 
occasions. The problem is, as I have repeatedly made clear, 
that the notions of both "justification", as it is used here, 
and "determining the truth value", amount to providing a 
description of the kind of way in which a proposition can be 
knoifn to be true or false. To say that "2 + 2 = 4" is an 
a priori proposition is only to say that "2 + 2 = 4" can be 
known to be true, or perhaps, alternatively, it can be decided 
that it is true, independently of experience. The distinction 
between "in fact" and "in principle" is no less important 
on this traditional interpretation of the distinction, as 
it is on a psychologistic one.
If we take 'can in fact ' as the interpretation, the 
claim of the EEH looks very shaky. There are surely, and 
Benfield makes this point, many propositions which if true 
are necessarily so, and which are too complex for anyone 
"in fact" to know a priori. Probably if it is true, the 
Pour-Colour Theorem, due to its unsurveyability, is one of
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these, and there may well be also many other which may be 
formulated, but never known by anyone at all. Goldbach's 
conjecture, although a proposition, and if true, presumably 
necessarily true, provides a good example, I do not wish 
unreservedly to make the strong realist claim that there are 
necessary truths which may never be kno^m.
McGinn (1980) sums up such a claim in this way;
"Realism is the thesis that truth (falsity) is an 
epistemically unconstrained property of a sentence; there 
is nothing in the concept of truth (falsity) to exclude the 
possibility that a sentence be unknowably true (false).
This property of truth reflects the realist conviction, 
embodied in our customary linguistic practices, that the 
world or a given sector of it, is determinately constituted, 
quite independently of any limitations on our capacity to 
come to know truths concerning it,"
The anti-realist argument against this commonsense view, 
briefly, is that if understanding a sentence involves an 
understanding of its truth conditions, i.e. the conditions 
under which it would be said to be true, then since grasping 
the truth conditions of a sentence involves essentially a 
capacity to recognize that they obtain, where the truth value 
of a sentence transcends this recognitional capacity, realism 
cannot account for how the sentence can be understood.
Without entering this deep and complex dispute, I think 
it is at least clear that human beings can make and understand 
conjectures whose truth values are recognition-transcendent, 
and that a theory of meaning which equates the meaning of a 
sentence with its truth conditions is inadequate. It is the
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job of th.0 naturalized epist emologist to explain human 
beings' actual dispositions to linguistic behaviour 
and how the everyday metaphysical assumption of realism 
arises. A further reason a traditional a priorist might 
have for rejecting the 'can in fact ' interpretation, is that 
it ties the concept of a priori truth down to certain 
empirical states of affairs, for example, that the universe 
is populated with human beings with roughly the intellectual 
capacities they actually do have. "Massive and universal 
brain damage might as a matter of fact, prohibit us from 
knowing any truths a priori and hence on the above 
interpretation, would result in there being no a priori 
truths." (Erwin, 1974, p.394), To say that, whether or 
not any truths are actually known a pri ori is irrelevant if 
the justification of them is a priori, is to adopt implicitly 
an '**in principle" interpretation of "can be known". The 
concept of what is knowable in principle is subject to even 
more problems than that of wliat is in fact knowable.
It seems to me that this, difficult for a traditional 
account, points to the merits of a psychologistic one. A 
proponent of the latter type of theory would find no difficulty 
in countenancing the possibility of a universe wherein nothing 
is knoivn a priori. The concept of knowledge, itself, implies 
a knowing subject. That subject is a human being, which 
functions within certain limits imposed by its physical 
structure. To talk of knowledge without specifically tying 
the concept to the human subject with the type of genetic 
construction human beings actually have, is to renounce
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epistemology in favour of Hume's fairyland.
"We are got into fairyland, long ere we have reached 
the last stops of our theory; and there we have no reason 
to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that 
our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority."
(Hume, 2nd Ed., 1902, p.72).
*A priori' construed as a *way of knowing ' is merely 
descriptive of part of these contingent human capabilities.
I think we should be happy to let the EEH go.
The alternative solution, that of construing the 'can' 
as 'can in principle ' would have the advantage of maintaining 
the EEH, but the clear disadvantage of allowing, not only 
Kripke's examples of necessary a posteriori truths, such 
as the alleged identity statements: 'water is H^O', etc.,
as a priori truths, but also, in Erwin 's view, any propositions 
whatever.
The criterion for a priori propositions if interpreted 
as "can in principle be known a priori", is so weak, that
it is logically possible that all knowledge is a priori.
Erwin's "correlation" argument is developed by means of a
somewhat complicated example, the substance of which is this%-
It happens to be the case that whenever a certain individual 
reflects upon and believes a certain proposition, we can 
discover by empirical means that the proposition is true. 
Similarly, if he believes a proposition to be false, it is 
discoverable that it is false. There is a consistent 
correlation between his beliefs and disbeliefs and empirical 
testing. Given a level of total consistency eventually we
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believe the hypothesis that any statement that that 
individual reflects upon will have the truth value he decides 
it has. If everyone developed such an ability, finally, 
empirical testing could become redundant. The probability 
of the result of reflection producing the right answer 
would be so great that we would merely rely on reflection 
as a source of knowledge. As a result any truth whatever 
would be said to be known a priori.
This is not the case in the actual world. Needless 
to say, the correlations between intuition and truth value 
are scarce. However, should such correlations hold, the 
evidence of the senses would become totally dispensable.
Such a situation is not a logically impossible one, and is 
one which is consistent with the idea that "in principle" 
an item of knowledge could be acquired a priori. It is 
logically possible that all knowledge is innate, and given 
such a logical possibility, everything can "in principle" be 
knovm a priori. If what is intended by the expression "in 
principle" is that "it is logically possible that....." no 
restrictions on the extension of the a priori can be imposed.
If it is the formulation of the definition of a priori 
knowledge that allows for this conclusion, it would seem 
sensible to try some alternatives, Erwin does, only to 
discover the same problems arise, precisely because whichever . 
formulation of a criterion you choose, be it "reflection on 
the meanings of words * or ’due to analyticity ’ there is always 
need to include some paraphrase of "can be known" in the 
definition; a proposition ’x * is a priori if it can be known
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by reflection on the meanings of words, for example, or 
if it is knowable duo to analyticity, or self-evidence. 
Whatever the formulation of the definition, the expression 
"knowable" has to be interpreted as either "knowable in fact",” 
or "knowable in principle". In either case the EEH must be 
rejected.
An objection to the correlation argument can be made.
It consists in the view that, since inductive support is 
necessary for the belief that intuitions are reliable, an 
experience of a kind would provide the evidence for these 
beliefs. This objection highlights a confusion in the 
traditional conception of the a priori distinction. If, 
like Benfield, we admit that the norion of evidence is 
crucial in explaining the concept of "independence from 
experience" then "the notion of an a priori truth will be 
made even more unclear to the extent that it is unclear how 
to circumscribe the evidence for the belief." (Erwin, 1974, 
p.598). Is evidence that beliefs founded on a particular 
kind of evidence are usually reliable, evidence for the 
beliefs themselves or not?
"Suppose I reflect upon the statement "l4 + 7 = 21" and 
believe it to be true. I, too, might conceivably be like 
a small child who often makes mistakes about mathematical 
matters or like a brain-damaged person who is invariably 
mistaken about any a priori truth. If my empirical evidence 
for believing that I am not like that is part of my evidence 
for believing l4 + 7 = 21 to be true, and if I and everyone 
else need to rely on such empirical evidence in order to know
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something by reflection, then no statement is known to be 
true independently of experience. In that event, there are 
no a priori truths and the extensional equivalence thesis 
still fails." (p.599)
The traditional a priorist will hold that it is not the 
method of acquiring knowledge that is relevant for its 
classification as a priori or a posteriori, but the kind 
of evidence involved in determining its truth value. The 
distinction owes its lack of clarity to the confusion of 
the concepts of evidence and justification and the ambiguity 
of these concepts themselves. If knowledge is classified 
in terms of the type of process which generates it, no appeal 
to the evidence, grounds, or reasons for belief, need be 
made. It is often the case that the reasons we would produce 
in support of a belief have little to do with the way in 
which the belief was generated.
One can only agree with Erwin *s belief that although 
the traditional ways of drawing the distinction fail to 
provide a useful means of distinguishing between kinds of 
truth, this does not mean that the terms cannot function 
as categories of "ways in which human beings can and cannot, 
as a matter of fact, acquire knowledge" (p.600).
He is here clearly espou'sing a psychologistic account 
of "knowing" very much as hinted at by Benfield, and actually 
demanded by Kitcher in his discussion of Frege, He explicitly 
rejects the view that the terms a priori and a posteriori mark 
a distinction in kinds of truth,
"Instead of classifying kinds of truths, we might use
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the notion to contrast ways in which human beings can and 
cannot, as a matter of fact, acquire knowledge. Thus, we 
might say that just as human beings cannot, as a matter 
of fact live to be ^00 years old, but can live to be 70, 
they cannot, as a matter of fact know some things independently 
of sense experience, but can know other things in this way.
¥e might then attempt to explain the phrase "known 
independently of sense experience" in terms of the kind of 
method used in obtaining the knowledge or more plausibly, 
in terms of kinds of justification." (1974, p.60l)
Erwin is effectively equating types of justification 
with types of method of acquiring knowledge. Ho suggests 
that the notion of a priori knowledge is described as 
"S knows ’p ’ a priori if S *s belief that ’p ’ is justified 
on the basis of S ’s reflection that *p ’ (plus, of course 
whatever other conditions are required for knowledge itself.)
(p.601).
A consequence of this reconstruction of the distinction 
is that some empirical information will be necessary in order 
to determine the extension of the a priori. Evidence will be 
needed as to what human beings can in fact know by reflection, 
but this is hardly objectionable since one of the objectives 
of naturalized epistemology is to utilize the resources of 
psychology in order to provide an account of human knowledge 
in terms of the psychological processes required for its 
generation.
Swinburne (1975) provides an examination of the concepts 
of the analytic, the necessary and the a priori; the
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conclusion of which is that "a proposition is a priori if and
only if it is analytic and can bo known to be such," I do
not wish to take on here the problem of analyticity; there 
is enough discussion of that elsewhere. I just want to 
point out that Swinburne^s definition, although utilizing 
the expression "can be known’ does not recognize the 
distinction drawn by Erwin between ’in fact ’ and ’in 
principle The interesting point is tliat while he appears 
to agree that there is a need for a proposition to be known
’in fact ’ (he asks the question: "are all analytic
propositions a priori, that is, can all analytic propositions 
be known to be such? (p.24)), he immediately confuses this 
by arguing that all analytic propositions can in fact be 
known by ’a rational being of sufficient ability ’ (p.24j, 
my underlining), What this amounts to is the demand that 
all a priori propositions must be analytic and in fact known 
in principle. A condition of this sort would be remarkably 
difficult to fulfil.
The confusion of ’in fact ’ and ’in principle ’ is an 
important one; one which undermines Swinburne’s analysis. Even 
more devastating to this analysis is that it is merely 
tautological to suggest that any analytic proposition can be 
known by a rational being of sufficient ability. Sufficient 
ability to do wliat ? To know the proposition, is the obvious 
answer. Thus any proposition can be known by a being who can 
know it. No one, I think, would disagree but to say so hardly 
offers an explanation of either analyticity or a priori 
knowledge.
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Having agreed that the Extensional Equivalence Hypothesis 
cannot be satisfactorily maintained, it still remains to 
decide which interpretation of ’can be known ’ should be 
adopted. For the naturalized epistemologist, whose interests 
lie with the psychological capacities of human beings, ’can in 
fact * is the only plausible alternative. He is not concerned 
with the logically possible, but with what actually is the 
case. He is not prevented, however, from making some sense 
of applying the terms a priori and a posteriori to proposi­
tions as a derivative from their primary reference to "ways 
of knowing". A proposition can be said to be a priori if 
there is an a priori method by which human beings with the 
type of cognitive powers they actually have could in fact 
know it to be true. No commitment to the view that it is 
actually known in that way by an individual is required. The 
demand could be reformulated as "a proposition is a priori if 
there is an a priori method by which, in principle, it could 
be known, in fact, by actual human beings". Far from being 
an impossible criterion like Swinburne’s, it simply articulates 
the sense in which the expression "in principle", can function 
usefully; the commonplace sense in which in principle there 
are a great variety of things which in fact I could be doing 
at the moment even though I am not actually doing them. It 
would be absurd to suppose that in making such a statement,
I am including in those things which I could be doing the 
full extent of the logically possible.
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(c) A Causal Condition Relocated
A further analysis of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction, which purports to offer a clarification of the 
traditional one is, as mentioned earlier, provided by 
Colin McGinn (l9?6). It is of interest here because of 
the explicit commitment to naturalizing epistemology and 
because, as with Goldman’s analysis, the concept of causality 
has a central role to play. To recapitulate, Mcginn’s 
purpose is to maintain the traditional division of truths as 
a priori and a posteriori, but within the framework of a 
naturalistic epistemology. He believes the distinction to 
be exhaustive and exclusive, and that it should be draim 
using a causal condition as a criterion for a posteriori 
knowledge. The deficiencies of the method centre round the 
lack of any explanation of how we do come to know a priori 
statements to be true. From these initial premisses, the 
exhaustiveness and exclusiveness of the distinction, and 
the propriety of a causal condition, he espouses the Kantian 
view that a priori knowledge is constituted from any items 
not captured as a posteriori. He is not presenting, as Goldman 
(p.357) suggests, two analyses, one for a posteriori knowledge 
and another for a priori knowledge, a naturalistic one and 
a traditional one; he is presenting a single naturalistic 
analysis and including the rest by default.
Naturalism in epistemology presupposes causal commerce 
with the world. Empirical knowledge is derived from 
perception and perception involves a causal interaction 
with the world, an account of a posteriori knowledge 
therefbre logically requires a causal element in its analysis.
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The types of subject matter associated with a priori 
knowledge are causally inert, "it w o n ’t in general be the 
case that the subject-matter of what you know a priori 
(or that of some statement ’suitably related ’ to what you
know) causes you to know that thing  " (p.198).
It is for this reason that a distinction can be 
effectively made,
McGinn first defines what it is for a statement to be 
termed a priori or a posteriori. Statements are bearers 
of these modifiers in so far as they "come to be known in 
this way or that". This is equivalent to the thesis that 
"ways of knowing" are what are fundamentally to be 
distinguished by the terms, and statements or propositions 
only derivatively, in the manner suggested at the end of 
the last section.
"It is important to realize that, because the distinction 
is epistemic in character, what it originally partitions are 
prepositional attitudes. The properties of a priority and 
a posteriority hold of a statement, therefore, only according 
as that statement comes to be known in this way or that.
So if we are to classify statements as a priori or a 
posteriori as the case may be, it will be because the 
prepositional attitudes consisting in a recognition of their 
truth meet certain epistemic conditions." (p.195). The 
approach therefore is similar to that of Goldman, Benfield, 
Erwin and others, in that it recognizes that it is the way in 
which what is known is known, which is fundamental to the 
a priori/a posteriori distinction. His definitions are
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constructed to account for the fact that some statements 
can be known in both ways. A statement is true a priori 
if it is possible for it to be known a priori. No 
distinction is made here between ’in fact * or ’in principle ’.
A statement is true a posteriori if it can only be known 
a posteriori.
(1) It is a priori (true) that ’p ’ iff O
(x knows that ’p ’ a priori)
(2) It is a posteriori (true) that *p ’ iff C3
(x knows that ’p ’ — ^ x
knows that ’p ’ a posteriori) "
(1976, p.196)
The formulation of (l) is deliberately broad, i.e.
"it is logically possible that something knows *p * a priori" 
in order to cover cases such as the Four-Colour Theorem.
McGinn describes the possibility of a proof, though finite, 
so long, that its execution would exceed more than a lifetime,
or the capacities of human beings as such. Unless the pcope
of the modal operator is broad enough to range over
logically possible beings perhaps "transcending our- powers 
of ratiocination - there is the chance that not all 
mathematical truths will be reckoned a priori by (l)"11976, 
p.196).
Once again it appears that in order to sustain the 
traditional partition of truths into a priori and a posteriori, 
"knowable" has to be interpreted as "knowable in principle",.
The possibility of superhuman epistemic agents has to be 
invoked. There is a direct conflict of aim here. On the
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one hand McGinn wishes to adopt a view of epistemology- 
as a branch of natural science, concerned with the 
capabilities and dispositions of human beings, on the other 
he is determined to retain the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction as having exactly the same extension as it 
would under a Kantian interpretation.
"Those theses just are not co-tenable. The main claim 
of this paper is precisely that we have in the Four-Colour 
Theorem an example of an a posteriori mathematical proof,
because of (l) its unsurveyability and (2) the belief that
beings with super-human epistemic capacities are irrelevant 
to the subject of epistemology. In other words, the Four- 
Colour Theorem cannot in fact be known a priori by a human 
being, and it is pointless to speculate about hypothetical 
beings with capacities other than ours. It is not obvious 
that it even makes sense to talk about "knowledge" or 
"knowing" with reference to such creatures. The requirement 
that a proposition should be "in principle knowable" conflicts 
directly with this belief.
Even if McGinn’s aims demonstrate an underlying confusion, 
his account can bear further consideration. Those are his 
conditions :
" (3) X knows that ’p ’ a posteriori, iff
(i) X knows that ’p * &
(ii) (S is X *s ground or reason for
believing that ’p ’ w 
(iii) the subject-matter of S causes x to 
believe that ’p ’ )
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and (4) X knows that ’p ’ a priori iff
(i) X  knows that ’p ’ 6
(ii) (S is X  *s ground or reason for
believing that *p ’ &
(iii) it is not the case that the subject- 
matter of S causes x to believe 
that *p ’ ) *' (196-197)
It is to be noted that the definitions allow for non- 
inferential knowledge, in which case the variable S stands 
for 'p* itself. "Subject matter" is to be construed 
very broadly as referring to "entities", however this term 
is understood, or events in which such entities paritcipate.
The assumption is also made that where the grounds for
a belief are mixed, a posteriority is dominant.
The concept of causality is to bo tied to that of a 
posteriori knowledge because, as I have said, McGinn does 
not aljow for the possibility that the subject matter of 
a priori statements are characteristically the kind of entities 
which are capable of possessing causal powers. Since some 
items of knowledge do not require a causal analysis, such an 
analysis cannot be correctly attributed to knowledge in 
general. However this is of small importance to McGinn since 
he is of the opinion that (though he does not explain why), 
the causal theory of knowledge fails in its chief aim of 
avoiding the problems caused by Gettier examples.
There follows an account of how different types of 
knowledge, usually held to be a priori, are picked out as 
such using the stated criteria. These are logical,
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mathematical; and analytic truths. The subject matter of 
logic is "deducibility relations among sentences" (p,199) 
and logical knowledge is therefore knowledge of these.
Since these relations can be studied independently of any 
interpretation of the non-logical constants, the particular 
entities the sentences might be about play no part in forming 
our belief in the truth either of a statement or in the 
conclusion of a logical proof. Sentence schemata cannot 
operate as causes since they are not verifiable by perception. 
The suggestion is, and it may well be a correct one, that 
nothing can operate as a cause unless it is perceptually 
verifiable. It does however presuppose an account of what 
it is to be a cause, namely one that firmly ties the notion 
of causality to the realm of the physical. Nevertheless, it 
is not at all clear that the concept of a non-physical cause 
is self-contradictory unless it is specifically defined to 
be so, and secondly lacking an explanation of what McGinn 
takes to be perceptually verifiable, certain borderline areas 
raise some interesting questions.
Concerning the point about non-physical causes, Goldman 
(1967, p.362) would certainly be prepared to admit the 
possibility of beliefs as causes, and at least leaves it 
open as to whether inference making is itself a causal 
process, McGinn, I assume, would say that it is the subject- 
matter of a belief which determines whether it is causally 
active or not. If the belief is about a matter of empirically 
verifiable fact then that belief might be the ground for 
further belief, perhaps via an inference, and that further
. 1
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belief will be an example of a posteriori knowledge, if 
the subject matter of the initial belief is the cause of 
the first belief being held. For example, if I believe 
that it is raining, my ground for this belief is that I can 
see the rain falling. The rain, the subject matter of my 
ground, causes the belief. If this belief is the ground 
for a further belief that the grass will grow, the subject 
matter of the ground is again, the rain, so that the physical 
phenomena is the cause of both the first and the second belief. 
As with the previous discussion of a causal condition 
for knowledge, it must be asked what kind of causality is 
being envisaged here. Again I think that the only consistent 
interpretation is that of the presupposition of mind/brain 
identity, but such a presupposition would significantly 
weaken McGinn’s argument. If beliefs are taken to be able 
to enter into causal relationships because they are identical 
with certain physical phenomena, i.e. brain states, then 
there seems to be little reason to distinguish amongst beliefs 
on the grounds of the type of subject matter they are about.
If the initial belief is concerned with a matter of logic why 
deny that a causal process is possible. It is at least odd 
to suggest that only certain classes of beliefs have causal 
powers, and the possession of causal powers or the lack of 
them is determined not by the nature of belief itself, but by 
distinctions as to the subject-matter of individual ones,
A causal theory of a posteriori knowledge can only work if 
beliefs are admitted as causes, but they are only in an 
extended sense perceptually verifiable. I do not know how
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I would set about verifying whether I have a belief in 
proposition ’x I f  I have such a belief I just know I 
have it. In what sense can I verify that "I believe the 
grass is green"? I d on’t have to carry out tests to see 
if I assent to or dissent from the proposition when questioned 
either by others, or introspective!/, by myself. No more 
do I need to verify whether I believe that "2 + 2 = 4".
I think what McGinn is suggesting is that physical phenomena 
which are perceptually verifiable can cause beliefs, this 
ability to enter into causal relationships is then transferred 
to those beliefs, which can then cause other beliefs. If 
the original phenomenon is abstract in nature then no beliefs 
about it, are caused by it, or can causally produce further 
beliefs. Of course we can ask for an explanation of how 
such beliefs do arise, but McGinn doesn’t find it necessary 
to provide an answer, since he is content to call all non­
caused beliefs a priori and let the matter rest there.
It is not that I believe that the case for a causal
analysis has to be maintained at all costs. It is more that
McGinn’s criterion for distinguishing causally active subject- 
matter of grounds for beliefs is not quite such an obvious
matter as in fact he takes it to be.
The issue of mathematical knowledge is clearly more 
complicated since the argument for the insufficiency of the 
causal condition depends on which of a variety of possible 
interpretations of mathematical entities is adopted. 
Fundamentally though, the same arguments apply. If strict 
logicism were an adequate account of mathematics, mathematics
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would be a priori, on McGinn's criterion i'or the same 
reason as logic. If mathematical objects were construed 
Platonistically, it would also be classed as a priori,
' abstract objects having on the profCerred criterion, no 
causal powers. Here again, there appears to be an element 
of confusion because of the lack of a distinction between 
a proposition and a belief in a proposition. It is not 
always clear whether the so-called subject-matter of one *s 
ground for a belief is a proposition, as such, or a belief 
in a proposition. Suppose I wish to purchase an article 
costing fourpence. I can surbly claim to know that two two­
pence pieces will be adequate. The ground or reason for 
that claim to knowledge is ray belief that 2 + 2 = 4 ,  Possibly 
this belief only forms part of the grounds, others deal with 
with empirical facts about coinage, etc., but it is certainly 
an indispensable part. If my belief that 2 + 2 = 4 is (at 
least part of) the subject-matter of ray grounds for 
believing in the correctness of my profferred payment, does 
not this belief cause ray further belief relating to the 
payment? Not according to McGinn, because my grounds for 
the initial belief that 2 + 2 = 4 is not caused by the 
mathematical objects involved (however they are construed).
It is nevertheless a little odd to hold that ray belief that 
2 + 2 = 4  has no causal role to play in forming ray belief 
that twopence and twopence equals fourpence. In order for 
the suggested definitions to be adequate, one of two equally 
counterintuitive views has to be adopted. Either one must 
hold that all beliefs are causally inert, or that whilst
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a proposition lias no causal powers, it can magically acquire 
them once it is believed. It is of no real help to say that 
all beliefs can interact causally with other beliefs, if 
they are construed as physical brain states, for the question 
still arises, how are some brain states caused by physical 
phenomena and some not? It would surely be better either 
to abandon a causal analysis altogether or to admit that 
all physical states of the brain have physical causes, and 
draw the distinction between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge in terms of different types of causal processes.
McGinn does not address himself to the problem of 
adjudicating between competing theories about the process of 
acquiring mathematical knowledge; it suffices he says, "that 
the criterion proposed delivers the right verdicts with 
respect to the a posteriori/ a priori distinction given 
each doctrine as input," (l9?6, p,202). His further claim 
for his analysis is that his criteria have the advantage of 
rendering statements concerning one 's own mental states 
a posteriori since he believes it is feasible to hold that 
subject-matter of the grounds for a particular mental state, 
belief is that mental state itself and that mental state
is causally responsible for the belief in its own present 
occurrence. This is what Goldman (p,12) refers to as the 
limiting case of a causal chain leading towards knowledge.
There are some difficulties in this view, most of which 
form part of a different discussion; that of our knowledge of 
our otm mental states in general. It is however worth noticing 
here that McGinn explicitly allows mental states the property
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of being causally active. If beliefs are to be thought of 
as mental states, then it does seem difficult to deny that 
beliefs in propositions such as 2 + 2 = 4  have causal 
properties. Once more the problem arises, as to how such 
beliefs not caused by their subject-matter can occur at all.
McGinn next turns to the connections between the 
episteraological and the metaphysical distinctions between 
items of knowledge; that is, to the relationship between 
a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and necessary and 
contingent truth, I have already stated that I am prepared 
to regard mathematical propositions, if true, as necessarily 
true. Even should it turn out that our knowledge of 
mathematics is either wholly or in part a posteriori, I 
believe with ICripke and McGinn that this does not commit us 
to the view that mathematical propositions are, therefore, 
contingent.
McGinn (p.204) raises a point mentioned previously 
concerning the difference in the kind of knowledge that can 
be acquired when a proposition is known by either a priori or 
a posteriori means, I suggested that whilst it is clearly 
possible to know that, for example, the sum of the interior 
angles of triangles amounts to l80° by repeated measurements 
(an a posteriori process), it is not clear that it is possible 
to know both that the statement that this is the case is true, 
and that it is necessarily true. The individual, who deduces 
the truth of the statement on the other hand, will be in the 
different position of recognizing both the truth of the 
statement and its necessity.
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McGinn’s opinion is this; whilst he can accept that 
certain necessary truths can only be known a posteriori he 
is "anxious to insist however, that we must beware of an 
ambiguity in attributing a posteriori necessity to statements" 
(p.204). This ambiguity leads us to confuse the acceptable 
claim that there are necessary truths whose truth we can 
know a posteriori, with the false claim that there are 
a posteriori truths whose necessity we can know a posteriori.
The solution he proposes for eliminating the ambiguity in 
favour of the acceptable reading, by careful attention to 
matters of scope, is by "bringing the attribution of necessity 
(or contingency for that matter) out from under the scope of 
the epistemic operator", (p,204).
Perhaps an accurate interpretation of the situation could 
be expressed in this way;-
P  p —^ (it is known a priori that Q p )  V
(it is known a posteriori that p )
This caters both for the possibility of a proposition 
being known by either route and for the asymmetry of the 
modal status of the knowledge thus acquired, whilst not 
requiring that ’p ’ is known at all.
McGinn prefers to say that the necessity of a proposition 
can be knoTra by inference from the knowledge that it is known 
a priori and the belief in proposition (o) of his paper (p.203): 
"It is a priori at ’p ’ — ^ Q  p".
I shall not embark on a full discussion of necessary 
truth, but it is nevertheless worth mentioning McGinn’s 
account of how we acquire knowledge of the modal status of
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statements. île summarises tlie process thus:
"We assess a statement 's modal status by constructing or 
surveying possible worlds; if the result is that the statement 
is true at all worlds it is presumed necessary, if at only 
some then contingent," (p,204)
This process of reflectively examining possible worlds, 
as he calls it, or kind of "Gedanken experiment", turns out 
to provide a priori knowledge on the McGinn criterion, for 
much the same reason as mathematical and logical knowledge.
Here possibilia like abstractions, variables, sentence schemata, 
etc., cannot enter into causal relationships. Since the 
argument is the same as for other kinds of a priori knowledge, 
the same questions can be raised as to the adequacy of it.
I would like to return to my previous example, concerning the 
mathematical knowledge involved in beliefs about financial 
transactions. An individual could reasonably be said to know 
that if he buys an article for 4 p in a shop, he will be given
6 p. change from a 10 p. coin.
I shall use a diagram, constructed using the same
conventions as Goldman does in "A Causal Theory of Knowing", 
to represent the causal process which on McGinn *s analysis is 
required for an individual to have this knowledge. In the
diagram, the lower case letters (s) and (p) stand for
contingent facts about the world. By (s) and By ( p) indicate 
the beliefs formed by an individual y that (s) and (p). 
Further beliefs required by y are indicated by By (r^ - r^) 
and By (q) , ilrrows formed from solid lines represent causal 
connections, and arrows formed from dotted lines, inferences
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to a further belief By (t), 
Figure I
By (r^ - rn)
(Beliefs to do with ^monetary transactions in the purchase of goods.) ^
(Item 'x ’ in shop costs 4p.) ^  ^ By(t) ^  Ky(t)
(if y buys x y will have 6p.
^  ^  change )
(p)-- - --------------------- ^(By(p)'' ^
(money in pocket = lOp) y
/
/
/
/
/
By(q) ^
(10-4 = 6)
Thus (s) and (p) causally produce in y the beliefs 
that (8) and (p). (s) and (p) form the subject matter
for y *s justification for the beliefs that (s) and (p).
These beliefs, together with a sufficiently rich set of 
background beliefs about the way in which a monetary system 
operates when purchasing goods, and also the further belief 
(By (q)) that 10 - 4 = 6, produce the belief (By (t)) in y
that the purchase of item x will leave him with 6p, This
belief serves as the ground for y ’s knowledge that he will 
have op, change.
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Tlio question is, is the process a causal one or not? 
Goldman would, I think, say - yes, it is. He allows 
inferences, represented by dotted arrows, to form part of 
causal chains, despite mentioning a level of anxiety on 
this point. McGinn on the other hand, would surely be 
committed to saying - no, since belief (q) that (lO - 4 = 6), 
being of an abstract nature, cannot contribute causally 
to his final belief (t) concerning the amount of change.
If y *s knowledge is a posteriori it must, according 
to McGinn, be the result of a causal process. Further, he 
takes the view that a posteriority is dominant over 
a priority.
"It seems appropriate where a person has both a priori 
and a posteriori grounds to let a posteriority be dominant 
with respect to a priority." (p.197)
Here the grounds are certainly mixed, but the belief 
By(q) is what actually determines the exact nature of By(t). 
It is because 10 - 4 = 6, that y believes his change will 
be 6 p., rather than 5 p. or 7 p . The causally produced 
element in By(t), that y will have some amount of change, 
is clearly a posteriori, but y 's ground for.his belief By(t) 
must be said to be primarily a priori. If asked to justify 
his claim to know what change he will have, y is almost 
certain to respond "10 - 4 = 6",
How can it be said that this knowledge, a posteriori 
because the justification for it is mixed, is the result of 
a causal process, when the determining factor for that 
particular item of knowledge is a mathematical fact which
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cannot interact causally with anything? It is, of course, 
possible that y ’s knowledge could have been gained simply 
by observing that each time he gave 10 p, for a 4 p. item 
the shopkeeper returned op. to him - he need not have any 
arithmetical beliefs at all. That the knowledge-generating 
process was like this, is however extremely unlikely, though 
undeniably possible.
Consideration of this kind of example points to two 
things. Firstly, the difficulty of resting the distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori knowledge solely on the 
notion of causality. Neither Goldman nor McGinn are 
sufficiently explicit in describing their understanding of 
a causal process. Secondly, the problem of the relationship 
between pure and applied mathematics arises to confound any 
such simple analyses. Does the fact that there are three 
apples in the dish causally produce my a posteriori knowledge 
that there are three apples in the dish? It is not clear 
that McGinn can say ’yes ’ to this,
A possible reason for the difficulties encountered in 
McGinn’s analysis may well be that he is taking too vague 
a view both of the concept of causality, and, more generally, 
of the notion of knowledge-generating processes. His anxiety 
to secure a naturalistic epistemology leads him to the view 
that all knowledge of the world must be obtained by ’causal 
commerce’ with it (p.198). His restriction of causal 
interaction to that between physical states of affairs and 
perceptions of them only forces him to ignore the question 
of whether beliefs, inferences, thoughts, etc., all contingent, 
temporally locatable phenomena, causally interact with
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further beliefs, inferences, etc. In doing so he is in 
a sense denying his principle aim that of founding 
epistemology within the framework of natural science.
One reason, I think, that the analyses discussed so 
far fail to provide an adequate account of the a priori/ 
a posteriori distinction is that they depend on the notion 
of causality as the single crucial concept in the formulation 
of the condition that a true belief must be warranted in some 
way in order for it to be knowledge. Vague statements about 
"causal chains", and "causal paths" from empirical facts to 
knowledge of those facts, provide little in the way of a 
characterization of the psychological processes by which 
propositions are kno'im. It is here that the resources of 
the discipline of psychology might be used to provide 
characterizations which are both more complex, more various 
and conceptually more sophisticated than any relying only on 
an unspecific causal relation.
A further attempt to analyse the concept of a priori 
knowledge is made by Kitcher (A priori Knowledge, 1980a).
This account takes seriously the idea that the types of process 
by which knowledge is generated can be described in more or 
less detail, and can be classified according to varying sets 
of principles. It is because of the recognition of the great 
complexity of the ways in which knowledge is acquired, that 
this account appears to offer more hope of finding a satisfactory 
way of securing the a priori/a posteriori distinction*
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CHAPTER VII
A Psychologistic Account of A Priori Knowledge 
(a) Introduction
The motivation for this type of analysis has two main 
elements* There is first the desire to see epistemology 
naturalized and there is also the opinion that, although 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction has been an enduringly 
popular one, it is also one that has resisted clear 
characterization* The purpose of this analysis is to provide 
an adequate characterization which clarifies the Kantian 
conception of the distinction and gives a firm foundation to 
the notion of a priori knowledge.
As a starting point some interpretation must be made 
of Kant’s definition of a priori knowledge, "knowledge which 
is absolutely independent of all experience", (Kant, 1933» 
p.43) or in fact of the idea of experience itself.
The preliminary description Kitcher offers is this: 
"Count as a person’s experience the stream of her sensory 
encounters with the world, where this includes both "outer 
experience", that is, sensory states caused by stimuli 
external to the body, and "inner experience", that is, those 
sensory states brought about by internal stimuli. Now we 
might propose that someone’s knowledge is independent of 
her experience just in case she could have that knowledge 
whatever experience she had had". (l980a, p.4), Obviously 
this will not do. A belief that a priori knowledge is 
possible does not necessarily involve the view that such 
knowledge is innate. ÎVhether there is any innate knowledge 
or not, and I do not think there is, the bald claim that
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certain propositions are known innately lacks any explanatory 
power; it amounts to no more than the admission that an 
explanation cannot be given.
To avoid the equation of a priori knowledge with innate 
knowledge, "Wo must allow a minimal role to experience, even 
in a priori knowledge", (p, 5 )« Ir order to know any 
a priori proposition, understanding of a language is necessary. 
A competent use and understanding of a language must be 
acquired experientially, To repeat Thompson’s remark, 
"Understanding a language and identifying its speakers are 
not entirely separable," (l98la, p,3)* In order to acquire 
an understanding of language, to grasp the roles which words 
and expressions play during linguistic communication, in other 
words, to develop concepts, experience of a linguistic 
community is essential, Kitcher (p.5) says "knowledge is 
independant of experience if any experience which would enable 
us to acquire the concepts involved would enable us to have 
that knowledge."
I think this would be better expressed as "knowledge is 
independent of experience if any experience which would enable 
us to understand the statements in which it is expressed, 
would enable us to have that knowledge". To talk of acquiring 
concepts, as if it were analogous to acquiring new clothes, 
is to present a misleading picture. The development of a 
system of concepts is part of the general process of becoming 
a competent user of a language with all that that entails, in 
the way of correct usage of a term, recognition of examples 
in its extension, the capacity to define or explain the word
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in a wider context. Not all these abilities need 
necessarily be purely linguistic in character. Certain 
behaviour patterns can provide evidence for the belief that 
particular concepts have been acquired. The difficulty 
I see with the use of expressions like, "Given a grasp 
of the concepts involved, we can know independently of 
experience, that a square is a four-sided figure", is that 
the understanding of the truth of an analytic or otherwise 
a priori proposition, would in itself form one of the family 
of criteria determining the adequacy of that individual*s 
grasp of the concepts involved. The picture provided 
suggests that a person through a rich enough experience of 
the world acquires a collection of concepts (a bit like 
collecting postage stamps) - he is then in a position to 
reflect on relations between them, thereby coming to know 
a priori the truth of a set of relevant propositions. However, 
the real situation is a rather different one. Anyone denying, 
for example, that anything red is coloured, would be unlikely 
to be accredited with a grasp of the concepts. Thus analyses 
of the form, "given an experience rich enough to acquire 
the relevant concepts, *x* knows *p* independently of any 
other experience *x * has "suffer the defect that *x ' knowing 
*p ^ could be construed as part of having a sufficiently rich 
experience. Although this is something which creates 
difficulties for the view that a priori knowledge is knowledge 
which is "independent of experience", these can bo avoided by 
careful attention to particular examples,
Kitcher*s account requires some rather detailed
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exposition, I shall begin with some definitions. Firstly, 
there is the notion of an individual's "life"*
X *s life at t is "the total sequence of experiences 
X has had up to time t" (l^GOa, p.5 ): "total experience"
comprises an individual*s entire history of sensations 
(from both inner and outer sources) up to a particular time.
The second notion to be defined is that of a life 
which is "sufficient for x for p", A life is sufficient 
for an individual x, with respect to a proposition p, 
if X "could have had that life and gained sufficient 
understanding to believe that p" (1980a, p.6), Where the 
proposition *p * is one which would traditionally be 
described as a priori, the "understanding" required to believe 
it should be construed as understanding of, or competence 
in, the language in which is is expressed. Clearly the notion 
of "a sufficient life" allows for the possibility that x *s 
understanding of the proposition coincides with his belief 
in its truth. No experience beyond understanding the 
proposition is needed to know that it is true,
Kitcher makes the proposal that "x knows a priori that 
p, if and only if X knows that p, and given any life 
sufficient for x for p, x could have had that life and 
still have known that p" (p,6).
This formulation embraces the idea that the knowledge 
that p does not depend on any particular experiences in x *s 
life beyond those required to form a belief that p, thus 
excluding most cases of knowledge held to be a posteriori. 
These would require particular observations to warrant the
:2l.
claim to knowledge. One immediately obvious consequence 
of the analysis, however, is that it appears to allow 
knowledge of our inner states, e.g. (l am in pain) as 
a priori. This objection is dealt with later. This 
suggested definition of a priori knowledge nevertheless 
is not adequate. It fails to distinguish cases of a priori 
knowledge, from cases where a proposition, which could be 
known a priori, is in fact known a posteriori, Kitcher 
is aware of this and suggests amending the analysis so that 
a differentiation between these cases is made. The crucial 
difference here, the one that must be accounted for, is 
the difference in the 'ways of knowing ' what is known, in 
the two cases. The recognition that detailed attention should 
be paid to distinctions between "ways of knowing" something 
to be true leads to a reappraisal of the general analysis of 
knowledge, provided by ICitcher in the previously discussed 
examination of Frege's epistemology (Kitcher 1979).
This is the account for which he adopts the term 
"psychologistic", since it describes the important 
difference between his analysis and traditional ones.
To recapitulate on the fundamental ideas behind this 
analysis; what it is that distinguishes knowledge from 
true belief is the process by which the belief is generated, 
and what it is that distinguishes one 'way of knowing ' from 
another is the particular nature of the process involved. 
Kitcher reiterates the point made in the earlier paper, that 
taking the notion of a knowledge-generating process as 
fundamental in no way commits an adherent of the theory to
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the view that the original formation of the belief is relevant 
to its epistemological status. A psychologistic account is 
not guilty of confusing the context of discovery with that 
of justification.
Together with the definitions of a 'life *, the total 
experience of an individual at time t, and of a 'sufficient 
life ' for an individual x to form a belief that p, 
a third is required. This is the conception of a 
psychological process as a 'warrant ' for the belief it 
produces. The form the general analysis takes is - "x knows 
that p, just in case x correctly believes that p, and 
X's belief was produced by a process which is a warrant 
for it," (p.8)
Since the aim is to specify conditions which distinguish 
a priori from a posteriori knowledge, this criterion for 
"x knows that p" needs to be extended to embody this 
distinction. The suggested formulation is this;
"x knows a priori that p, just in case x has a true 
belief that p , and that belief was produced by a process 
which is an a priori warrant for it," (p.8) The notion of 
an 'a priori warrant ' emerges as the crucial one, and one in 
need of characterisation in order to explain it and to 
distinguish it from that of other warrants. This Kitcher 
proceeds to do. Perception is the type of psychological 
process which would generally be regarded as warranting only 
a posteriori knowledge. The type of process which would 
warrant a priori knowledge is a more difficult matter. The 
Kantian notion of 'pure intuition ' is chosen as a tentative
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example, not particularly in order to maintain that such 
a notion would fulfil the role of an a priori warrant, but 
only to examine the distinguishing features of that type of 
process. In Kitcher 's view, three conditions need to be 
met in order for a process to function as an a priori warrant. 
Summing these conditions up, the process must independently 
of experience, be available and produce warranted true belief 
even "in counterfactual situations. where the experiences 
are different," (p.9)
TÜiat exactly are we supposed to understand by these 
three conditions?
Firstly, condition (l) states that the same type of 
process must be available independently of experience. To 
grasp what is intended here, the use of an example rather 
more familiar than Kantian pure intuition, may be of 
assistance. Consider the psychological process of "reflecting 
on the meaning of a proposition". Every time an individual 
has occasion to reflect on the meaning of a proposition, he 
is undergoing a mental process. Thus, when it is suggested 
that a process be available, clearly it is not intended that 
an exactly identical process must be experienced, only one 
of the same general type. The expression "same process" can 
suffer from type/token ambiguity. Each individual mental 
occurrence is a token of the same type of process if it 
shares a broadly similar structure. Now it is obvious that 
a process of reflection does not require any particular 
external conditions to obtain, i.e. any special sensory input, 
in order for it to occur. It is therefore available to the
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individual independently of* any experiences ho has, over 
and above those necessary to understand the proposition 
itself. Of course, such a process would not be available if 
he were unconscious, or brain-damaged, or asleep; he must 
be in a condition to entertain the proposition, but this 
is unobjectionable since the process is supposed to generate 
knowledge, and knowledge cannot be acquired by the unconscious.
The second condition, that the process warrants the 
belief it produces, is rather more difficult to explain.
Kitcher himself does not go into the general question of 
what it is for a process to warrant a belief; in my view, 
a rather serious omission. "The task of specifying the 
conditions on warrants" he says; "can be left to general 
epistemology", (p.8). My interpretation of the idea is this;
a process provides a warrant for a belief if, and only if, it 
constitutes a method of determining the truth value of the 
proposition which is believed. In other words, if the type 
of process justifies the belief. A type of process which 
would afford a justification for the belief produced 
independently of experience would be a valid deduction from 
logically true premisses, or a process of reflection on the 
constituent terms of a proposition. Processes of this second 
type would only warrant the beliefs they produce if the indivi­
dual undergoing them was a competent user of the language. 
Someone, whose grasp of a language was defective, might 
suppose that "father" meant "mother", and reflecting on the 
propositions "all fathers are female", believe it to be true.
A mental process of this sort fails to warrant the belief.
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It is this condition that provides the link with the 
Kantian account of the distinction, by which a proposition 
is a priori if it can be justified independently of experience. 
According to psychologistic theory, the justification just is 
the way the proposition can in fact be known to be true, by 
human beings.
The third condition, that a process is only a warrant 
for a belief if it produces a true belief, is clearly 
essential as the falsity of a proposition revokes any claim 
to knowledge of it. This condition, however, is relatively 
easy to fulfil, given the second requirement, for any 
processes which lead to a false belief would not warrant that 
belief. An invalid deduction, or a reflection involving a 
misuse of language, could produce in an individual a belief 
that was false; but since a warrant for the belief would be 
lacking, there is no chance of such a belief being described 
as knowledge.
The last restriction, that the process produces 
warranted true belief in "counterfactual situations where 
the experiences are different" is included in order to leave 
the possibility of contingent a priori knowledge open, since 
Kitcher, too, rejects the view that a priori and necessary 
propositions are extonsionally equivalent. Knowledge, as 
opposed to belief, can only be generated if the process is 
one which despite a background of misleading experience 
guarantees the truth of the proposition in question. It is 
necessary to suppose that, "in a counterfactual situation 
in which an a priori warrant produces a belief that p , 
then p" (p.9).
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A discussion of the possibility of contingent a priori 
knowledge will be included in a later section. For the 
moment, it is enough to note that in rejecting the 
Extensional Equivalence Hypothesis ICitcher, unlike Erwin 
and Swinburne, allows for both necessary a posteriori and 
contingent a priori knowledge under his analysis.
It is, I believe, important here to quote the summary 
of the analysis in full;-
"1, X knows a priori that p, if and only if x knows
that p and x's belief that p was produced by
a process which is an a priori warrant for it.
2, 'a ' is an a priori warrant for x's belief that p
if 'a* is a process such that, given any life e,
sufficient for x for p, then:
(a) some process of the same type could produce in 
X a belief that p;
(b) if a process of the same type were to produce 
in X a belief that p then it would warrant x
believing that p;
(c) if a process of the same type were to produce 
in X a belief that p, then p." (p.lO)
Thus the first condition states ICitcher *s analysis of 
a priori knowledge in terms of a type of psychological process 
and the second part expresses the features that that process 
must-have in order to be adequate. Sub-conditions (a), (b)
and (c) embody the requirements of availability, "warranting"
and truth. The demand that the process available be of the 
same type is made to rule out cases of a posteriori knowledge 
of truths which could be known a priori, being counted as
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instances of a priori knowledge.
It should be fairly clear that this analysis captures 
the idea of independence from experience whilst taking on 
a naturalistic approach. So far, however, little has been 
said about the central concept of a psychological process, 
nor has it been indicated what we are to understand by 
a process of "the same type",
(b ) A Priori Warrants and Types of Process
Knowledge is always generated by a psychological process 
of some kind or other. This is the main claim of Kitcher's 
paper. It must therefore be observed that his analysis is 
fundamentally a causal one. The word 'cause' is ambiguous 
for it can be used both to refer to a specific initiating 
event, a state of affairs, or to a sequence of events. All 
expressions such as "process", "produce", "bring about", 
"generate", very broadly involve the concept of causality,
A series of random events could scarcely be described as 
a process, which at least implies the possibility of 
repetition. Thus the notion of a generating process is 
doubly infected with causal overtones. Kitcher makes these 
explicit, "To specify a process which produces a belief is 
to pick out some terminal segment of the causal (p.lO) 
ancestry of the belief". As beliefs are produced by certain 
processes, so it can be said that those processes cause the 
beliefs. This, however, is using causality in a much more 
general sense than either Goldman or McGinn, who both wish 
to identify a fact or a state of affairs (in Goldman's case 
empirical facts, in McGinn's the subject-matter of the ground
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for the beliof) as the cause of an item of knowledge. Some 
beliefs have much longer and more complex causal ancestries 
than others. Beliefs formed from immediate observation can 
be traced to their source or factual subject-matter with 
little difficulty. î^y belief that there is a bottle of 
blue ink in front of me now, is caused by the presence of 
a bottle of blue ink in front of me. ]\Iy belief that the 
world is round is caused by no such direct observation, but 
by the gradual learning and appreciation of a body of 
astronomical theory: To suggest that my belief was caused
by the fact that "the earth is round", would be naive, for 
without the whole history of geographical and astronomical 
discovery, the belief would be no more than metaphysical 
guesswork. In order to avoid the requirement of tracing 
the ancestry of a belief through the entire conceptual 
development of mankind, Kitcher restricts his interest to 
the 'terminal segment ' of that causal chain; to the part which 
differentiates one particular individual's belief from 
another's, and therefore to the part which involves one 
individual's mental states and events. Since his concern 
is with those processes which might provide a priori warrants 
for beliefs, nothing is lost by this restriction, since to 
consider cases in which the causal histoxy of a belief takes 
us beyond the believer, would be to pick out processes which 
which were not independent of experience in the requisite sense.
Having eliminated all but purely psychological processes 
Kitcher enlarges on the concept of 'type of process '.
Knowledge is obtainable in different ways, and in some cases 
there are different ways of coming to know the same thing.
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The example provided is that of knowing a theorem either 
by listening to a lecture or by following a proof. The 
inclusion in proposition 2 (a), (b) and (c) of the
requirement that the process be of the same type, prevents 
a situation arising where the person who comes to know a 
theorem tlirough listening to a lecture, is credited with 
a priori knowledge of that theorem.
The principles of classification we utilize in 
dividing processes into types are various. ICitcher suggests 
consideration of belief content, inferential connections, 
causal connections, use of perceptual mechanisms as examples 
of those principles; we probably employ many others but 
these are some of the most obvious. The important point 
is that these principles do not uniquely determine Vays of 
knowing '; rather employed either singly or in different 
combinations, they give rise to alternative ways of 
dividing processes into classes, and into classes within 
which there is room for more or less detailed characterization 
of those processes.
"1 suggest that these principles of classification 
probably do not give rise to one definite taxonomy, but that 
by using them singly or in combination we obtain a number 
of different taxonomies which we can and do employ. However, 
within each taxonomy, "We can specify types of processes 
more or less narrowly". (p.ll)
Kitcher's argument would seem to imply that while the 
diversity of our principles of classification allows us to 
divide processes into types in a variety of ways, some of 
the types picked out may provide a posteriori warrants for
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the knowledge generated, some may provide a priori warrants 
but there may well be cases where the type of processes 
picked out by a complex of classificatory principles do not 
clearly just if}/" the claims that they provide warrants which 
are purely a priori or a posteriori.
That there are some propositions about which it is 
not clear whether they are known a priori or a posteriori 
is unsurprising. Consequences of physical theory involving 
the behaviour of theoretical entities might be examples. 
However, Kitcher does insist that his analysis is only 
applicable where sufficient information on the causal 
ancestry of a belief is actually available, and that in 
many cases "no firm decision about the a priority of a 
belief can bo reached." (p.15.) The onus is on the 
a priorist to justify his claim, by clearly specifying 
both the segment of the history of the belief which is 
contained within the psychological states of the believer 
and the type-identity conditions utilised in accordance 
with some standard set of principles of classification.
These are very stringent requirements to satisfy and 
one consequence of this theory might be that actual cases 
of a priori knowledge are much fewer than traditionally 
supposed. However, before passing on to a discussion of 
the adequacy of Kitcher*s analysis, a few further comments 
are necessary which relate to another entrenched distinction, 
the source of a host of extravagant claims, that is, the 
distinction between possibility 'in practice ' and possibility 
'in principle ', This, of course, is exactly the distinction
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discussed earlier in connection with Erwin's rejection 
of extensional equivalence between a priori and necessary 
truths. The "in fact (or practice)" and "in principle" 
ambiguity involved in the interpretation of what "can" 
be known needs to be resolved, and for naturalized 
epistemology, the modal participle "can" must be construed 
as "can in fact". Kitcher explicitly rejects the 
suggestion that the type of possibility involved in his 
conditions for a priori knowledge is that of logical 
possibility, or possibility in principle. The question 
he asks is whether, when we assert that given a sufficiently 
rich life, an individual could have formed a belief as 
a result of a particular process, there are any assumptions 
that some features of the actual world remain fixed. It 
is his belief that there are. Tfhat we are in fact 
imagining is a world in which the individual*s cognitive 
powers are those he possesses in the actual world.
Assuming any different background of experience with the 
exception of that required to form the necessary concepts, 
we nevertheless envisage the individual*s mental faculties 
to be held constant. Kitcher uses the phrase 'the kinds 
of cognitive capacities distinctive of humans * (p.12) 
and does so for reasons which are vital to his whole 
epistemological approach.
Essentially, epistemology is concerned with knowledge. 
Knowledge is something that human beings acquire (the 
question of whether any animals can be said to know 
anything can be left open). It is, I suggest, a concept
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that can only function in a human context. One reason 
why we are reluctant to admit that the mystic can gain 
any knowledge as a result of his revelation is that no 
explanation is available in terms of actual cognitive 
powers. Should we be led into the trap of postulating 
knowledge which could be acquired by beings with different 
or extended capacities we have defeated the enterprise 
of providing an analysis of 'knowing ' at all.
Admittedly, human cognitive capacities vary, and the 
borderline between those which could be classed as human 
and those which could be classed as non-human or super­
human is necessarily fuzzy. It nevertheless remains 
important to retain a healthy sense of what is clearly 
human and so resist resting air^r case on 'in principle ' 
extensions of those capacities.
The presupposition of this view, one shared by McGinn, 
Quine and others is that epistemology should be regarded 
as a branch of empirical science; this is what is meant 
by naturalizing epistemology. McGinn (l97b, p.198) makes 
this explicit: "I prefer a causal condition partly out
of a desire to see empiricism naturalized." Quine 
(19&9, p.82) says: "Epistemology, or something like it,
simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology, and hence 
of natural science," What is possible in principle should 
all or some scientific laws be different is unintelligible,
A naturalistic epistemology restricts it concerns to 
actual human capacities for knowledge, and recognises 
that speculation about the abilities of logically possible
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super-brains is simply irrelevant.
I liave already suggested, following Smithurst 
(1980/61), that the notion of what is logically possible 
begins to break down when applied to human beings with 
vastly extended capacities. Is it really clear that 
an almost omniscient human being is logically possible 
any more than it is clear that a hundred foot high, 
six-headed human being is logically possible? Doesn't 
being human involve having a specific genetic structure 
with the limits imposed by that structure?
There is also perhaps a deeper reason for the 
insistence on dealing only with human intellectual 
capabilities. Putnam in a paper entitled "Analyticity 
and Apriority" (Mid West Studies in Philosophy 4, 1979 
pp.423-439) argues convincingly against the Wittgensteinian 
view of how proofs are accepted as proof. The inter­
pretation of Wittgenstein he attacks is one put forward 
by Barney Stroud (Phll, Rev. 74, 19^5 , pp.504-5l6) in 
response to Dummott (l959)(reprinted, Cambridge Mass. (1978) 
Ch. 11), Stroud rejects the suggestion that Wittgenstein 
was a radical conventionalist and concludes rather that he 
held it was our 'forms of life ' (explained by Putnam 
(p.425) as "our human nature as determined by our 
biological-plus-cultural history) that is responsible for 
our acceptance of proofs. %ilst Putnam finds this 
position seriously flawed; he believes there are objective 
mathematical facts, they do not merely arise from us, he 
agrees with Wittgenstein that all truth is in a sense
2’jk,
porspectival, What counts as a fact is dependent on 
our 'conceptual lenses ' which are in turn dependent on 
our genetic programming, The recognition of this, of 
itself provides a reason for restricting our attention 
to actual human capacities, but Putnam has a more 
sophisticated point to make. It is actual human practice 
that fixes the interpretation of mental signs, "For if 
two species in two possible worlds,.., have the same 
mental signs in connection with the expression 'add one ', 
it is still possible that their practice might diverge; 
and it is the practice, as Wittgenstein shows, that fixes 
the interpretation - signs do not interpret themselves, 
not even mental signs". (p.426).
And again (p.42o); to take a simple example - a 
variant of Wittgenstein's oim 'add one ' example - even 
if someone pictures the relation " is the ponential of 
A and B" (i.e. C follows from A and B by modus ponens) 
in his mind just as we do and has agreed with us on 
finitely many cases (e.g. that q is the ponential of 
I^CpV r) cy) <xt\<i/pV vt)) stlll he may have a divergent 
interpretation of ponential of "which will only reveal 
itself in some future cases".
To extrapolate beyond actual human capabilities into 
the realm of ideal or super intelligent minds is to run 
the risk of ignoring the possibility of divergent 
interpretations emerging. The logical possibility that 
the extension of concepts, such as 'ponential of' may 
not be fixed for cases of mathematical proofs or statements
235.
which involve increased cognitive capacities for their 
demonstration, gives us reason enough to reject the 
suggestion that it is what is "knowable in principle" 
that we are concerned with, IVhat would count as 
"following a rule" where in practice we are incapable 
of performing the particular operation is not determined.
To claim that the operation (mathematical or 
otherwise) could be performed "in principle" by a creature 
with augmented or alternative faculties, would be to miss 
this point entirely. Kitcher 's notion of a life being 
sufficient for an individual to acquire certain concepts 
is to be understood to include the condition that the 
individual*s faculties or "genetic programming" remains 
fixed as that which he has in the actual world.
(c) Summary of the Analysis
The account under discussion can be summarized as j
follows;
1. A human being is a cognitive device with a 
particular structure.
2. The device undergoes a stream of sensory experiences 
with the result that it develops certain concepts.
3. The class of experiences which are "sufficiently 
rich" for a particular proposition to be known 
are exactly those required for the device given 
its actual structure, to develop the concepts 
necessary to believe the proposition.
4. For any proposition to be described as "known 
a priori" it is necessary to look at the type of
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process which produced the belief, and decide 
whether it is a type of process which would 
have been available to the device even if it had 
had different experiences (these experiences would 
still have to be sufficiently rich in the required 
sense) and in these circumstances whether the type 
of process would both warrant the belief in the 
proposition and produce true belief in that 
proposition.
This structure provides a method of deciding with 
regard to any particular proposition claimed to be known, 
whether it is known a priori. There is however, one very 
important proviso, and that is that the application of 
the analysis in the individual case requires a high level 
of information. It requires an awareness of the way in 
which the proposition in question has come to be believed, 
which is sufficient to ensure that conditions embodied 
in (4) are met. In other words, it is necessary that the 
causal history of the belief is available for assessment.
In many cases, and Kitcher is certainly aware of this, 
the information may well be unobtainable, with the 
consequence that no decision on the a priority or otherwise 
of a proposition is possible. The effect of the strictures 
imposed by the analysis is that of restricting the class of 
propositions actually known a priori severely beyond that 
which is commonly supposed. Kitcher believes this not to 
be the case, but I think careful attention to examples may 
prove him wrong. The most severe way of testing a theory
237.
or analysis is to examine its application in particular 
cases, I shall therefore select some examples of 
propositions, traditionally held to be a priori (as 
diverse as possible) in order to see how they fare when 
subjected to an analysis of this type. Before doing so, 
however, some account must be made of possible objections 
which could be raised concerning this way of approaching 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction, and of the response 
Kitcher makes to these objections.
(d) Objections to the analysis
The first criticism to be considered is that the 
analysis allows too much to count as a priori knowledge; 
in particular, that knowledge of our own mental states will 
count as a priori. Self-knowledge is an area re'^nowned ^
for providing problems for the epistemologist, Few would 
wish to classify such knowledge as a priori. However, the 
type of process which gives us knowledge of, for example, 
our own inner experiences is one which seems to fulfil the 
conditions of an a priori warrant. In order for me to 
"know that I have a headache," I must have formed the 
belief that I have a headache. Clearly no sense can be 
attached to the idea of having a headache, but not 
believing that one has a headache, or similarly believing 
that one has a headache, when one doesn't have one. To 
believe one has a headache is simply to have one. What is 
involved here is just the limiting case of the notion of 
a process, that is where the belief-forming process consists 
entirely in the belief itself. The headache and the belief
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that one has a headache are coincident. Given this, we 
must conclude that any belief that "I have a headache" 
is both true and warranted by the minimal process involved, 
(Conditions 2(b) and (c)). Only condition (2a) remains.
Is it the case that given any sufficiently rich life,
"some process of the same type could produce in x 
a belief that p"? Since the process and the belief 
are not distinguishable, the answer must be "yes". To 
believe that p, requires that type of process.
Some of our self-knowledge could therefore turn out 
to be a priori and rather more of it than Kitcher is 
prepared to admit. He considers that it is only where the 
mental states in question are voluntary ones; where we 
can ourselves produce the states within us, that we are 
committed to this outcome. In all cases of involuntary 
mental states, he believes, that condition (2a) or else 
condition 2(c) will be violated.
"Either the process which leads from the occurrence of 
pain to the belief that I am in pain can be triggered in 
the absence of pain, or not: if it can 2 (c) would be
violated; if it cannot then 2(a) would be violated", (p.15)
I disagree with him for two related reasons. In the 
first place, since "being in pain" is not distinct from 
believing one is in pain" the question of the belief being 
triggered in the absence of pain, is unintelligible. 
Secondly, this being the case, the possibility of his 
conditions 2(a) or 2(c) being violated just does not arise.
The mistake arises because of his failure to distinguish
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cases which I would regard as essentially different. He 
considers the process of coming to believe that *I am 
seeing red ' and recognizes that if the 'belief ' was 
formed in the absence of red 2(c) would be contravened, 
but nevertheless, if the belief could only be formed in 
the presence of red then 2(a) would be contravened. The 
process of forming a belief that one is 'seeing red ' 
however, differs from that in pains, itches, etc., in that 
more information is available. I can distinguish veridical 
from hallucinatory experiences of 'red ' by using other 
senses to confirm the shape, size, or texture of the 
experienced example, and by contemplating the degree of 
coherence of the experience with the rest of my stream 
of consciousness. If 'l am seeing red" ' means 'l am 
seeing something red" then it is possible that condition 
2(c) can be violated, I can believe p, whilst p is 
false, but if on the other hand 'l am seeing "red" ' works 
like 'l am hallucinating "red" ' or 'I have a headache ' then 
the belief is an incorrigible one.
If the presence or absence of 'something red * is 
required to decide whether condition 2(c) is fulfilled, 
it is also required to make the same decision regarding 
condition 2 (a). To move from this to suggest that the 
presence or absence of pain, an itch, or a hallunication 
of 'red ' is required to determine the fulfilment of these 
conditions, is to overlook the impossibility of mistakenly 
believing oneself to be in pain, be itching or hallucinating. 
To make all this clear one only has to recall the old
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example of the argument from illusion. A stick is half 
submerged in water. The statement *I believe I am seeing 
a bent stick* is ambiguous. Either the speaker intends 
to convey *I believe the object that I am seeing is a bent
stick * or *1 believe I am conscious of the image of a bent
stick". In the first case the statement is corrigible and 
conditions 2(a) and (c) may or may not be violated. In 
the second, it is incorrigible and unless ruled out by 
a particular theory of mind, conditions 2(a) and (c) are 
inviolable. Kitcher, I believe, slips from one inter­
pretation to the other.
What is not in disagreement, however, is that it is
not really so counterintuitive to admit that some of our 
knowledge of our mental states is a priori. It is the 
conviction that a priori knowledge and necessary truths 
are extonsionally equivalent that gives rise to the 
reluctance to accept the possibility, since mental-events 
statements are clearly contingent. The statement *I have 
a headache * is an example of one such. It is a matter of 
empirical fact, not logical necessity, that anyone's 
head aches. What, however, is not so obviously contingent 
is the statement 'if I believe I have a headache, then I 
have a headache '.
ll/hat is being suggested is that there is a class of 
propositions, which although contingent, cannot both be 
false and believed by us to be true. Some statements 
about our own mental states seem to fall into this 
category and seem to come out as a priori on this type of
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analysis. There does not appear to be any genuine 
objection to their doing so, since the assumption of the 
coextensiveness of the epistemological category of a priori 
propositions with the metaphysical category of necessary 
ones, is not one we are forced to make. Not only is this 
assumption not forced on us, Kitcher offers an argument to 
show that the popular reasoning behind it is invalid.
The popular argument is described thus: (p.17)
"Assume a person knows a priori that p. His knowledge 
is independent of his experience. Hence he can know that 
p without any information about the kind of world he 
inhabits. So, necessarily p."
Presenting this argument differently, in order to 
clarify it, in the form of a reductio ad absurd urn, and 
also in his own terminology:
"Assume that a person knows a priori that p, but 
that it is not necessary that p. Because p is 
contingent, there are worlds in which p is false.
Suppose that the person had inhabited such a world and 
behaved as she does in the actual world. Then she would 
have an a priori warrant for a false belief. This is 
debarred by 2(c), So we must conclude that the initial 
supposition is erroneous; if someone really does know 
a priori that p then p is necessary." (p.l7)
This formulation of the argument displays an invalid 
step. We are not entitled to conclude from the premise 
that there are worlds at which p is false, that someone 
could inhabit such a world and have exactly the same beliefs
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as in the actual world. Examples of propositions which 
might belong to the proposed class of contingent a priori 
are "I exist", "I have some beliefs", and I would go 
further than Kitcher, and suggest that "I am in pain", and 
"I have a headache", etc., fall into the same category.
It is not only in the area of self-knowledge that the 
account can be charged with excessive liberality. There 
is the possibility that some perceptual processes may 
provide warrants for a priori knowledge. The kind of 
case Kitcher has in mind, is that of what he calls 
"universally empirical knowledge". There are some highly 
generalized propositions about the world which can be 
known to be true given only just enough experience to 
understand their content, at any possible world of which 
we as human beings could have experience. Kitcher cites 
as examples propositions such as "there are objects" and 
"some objects have shape," Presumably, there are others. 
T w o options are available. It is not clear whether the 
traditional a priori/a posteriori distinction would 
require that such propositions were to be held to be 
a posteriori. One could argue either way, using Kitcher *s 
analysis. It is open either to declare them to be 
a priori, and admit some perceptual processes as providing 
a priori knowledge, or to add a further clause to the 
analysis specifically debarring such processes. My 
inclination is towards the former approach, but I do not 
believe that the issue is a crucial one in any case.
Having admitted the possibility of one class of contingent
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a priori propositions, there is little to be lost by 
admitting a further class, even of a perceptual nature.
The case for a psychologistic epistemology has 
been argued earlier. It is, however, not surprising that 
the most persistent and fundamental objection to this 
type of theory is that such psychological considerations 
are totally out of place in an analysis of knowledge,
Kitcher *s response is to attack the coherence of 
apsychologistic accounts.
The significant difference in the two kinds of 
approach is one of depth. The more traditional accounts, 
(that of the logical positivists, provides one example) 
propose to supply two separate analyses, one for a 
posteriori knowledge, and one for a priori knowledge.
A posteriori knowledge is explained by one or other of 
the versions of the "justified true belief" theory.
A priori knowledge on the other hand has a quite different 
analysis: "analytically true belief" would be a simple way
of summarising it.
Quite apart from the problems inherent in the notion 
of the analytic, this interpretation of the a priori fails 
to take account of the fact that "the nature of the 
reasons for which a person believes is relevant to the 
question of whether he has knowledge". (Harman, 1973i p.2o). 
This is something which applies equally to cases of 
a priori and a posteriori knowledge, ^Analytically true 
propositions can be believed for reasons which would, if 
known, have the effect of undermining any claim to knowledge.
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Suppose a theorem was claimed to be known "because 
of dreams, trances, fits of Pythagorean extasy" (Kitcher, 
p.22); it is not likely that such a claim would be 
sustained.
Mathematical knowledge and factual knowledge are 
on a par in this respect. Both can be based on good 
reasons or bad, but if the reasons are bad in neither 
case can the claim to knowledge be allowed.
Apsychologistic accounts fail because they provide no 
way of distinguishing between analytically true beliefs 
held for good reasons and those held for bad reasons.
On that view an individual must be credited with a priori 
knowledge of true mathematical propositions even if he 
believes them because he gets a strange sensation in his 
elbow whenever he entertains them.
Kitcher makes the claim that, "Although horror of 
psychologizing prevented the positivists from offering 
a defensible account of a priori knowledge, I think that 
my analysis can be used to articulate most of the doctrines 
they wished to defend." (p.23)
The explicit purpose of the analysis is to provide 
a useful and illuninating development of the Kantian 
conception of the a priori and to show how this distinction 
can be successfully embedded in a naturalistic episteraology, 
The outline ho provides embodies several important 
intuitions :
(1) that the difference between true belief and
knowledge depends on the characteristics of the
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process which produced the beliefj
(2) that (1) is as relevant in cases of a priori 
knowledge as in a posteriori knowledge;
(3) that only actual human cognitive capacities are 
relevant to epistemology;
(4) that the extensional equivalence of a priori 
and necessary truth need not be maintained.
and
(5 ) that where information is lacking no decision 
as to the a priority or otherwise of a 
proposition can be reached.
Since it is Kitcher^s intention, however, to 
clarify an existing concept rather than to replace one 
it must be important to show that the clarification does 
not define a completely different extension for the 
concept. Although there may be differences in 
borderline areas, i.e. self-knowledge, general empirical 
propositions, etc., the bulk of what constituted a priori 
knowledge in the traditional sense should still count as 
a priori under the new analysis. If not, there is no 
case for maintaining the use of the term.
The next section will therefore consider several 
paradigm examples of a priori propositions and return to 
the question of the epistemological status of the Four- 
Colour Theorem.
(e ) Trial by Example
I have selected the following:
(1) All red things are coloured;
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(2) th.© angles of* a triangle add up to l80°;
(3) a white horse is a horse;
(4) the sum of the first 100 positive integers
is 5050 (Gauss);
(3 ) every normal map is four-colourable (Kempe),
It might be thought that the first tiiree of these 
examples are unnecessarily commonplace; philosophical 
examples tend to be so, because it is usually the case 
that differences in type of proposition are more easily 
displayed by the use of simple illustrations»
The point here is to choose precisely the kind of 
proposition that has always had a role to play in 
discussions of the a priori, since my purpose is to try 
to establish whether the proposed psychologistic analysis 
picks out as a priori the same central core of propositions 
as has hitherto fallen into that class. (l) has been 
chosen to illustrate the type of general statement 
usually held to be true a priori "because of the meanings 
of the words", though not directly analytic, (2) is 
included because geometrical propositions are paradigm 
cases of what was thought by Kant to be synthetic 
a priori and (3) because it is clearly analytic. It is 
not that the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
truth is of any great importance here, merely that it has 
been used in the past to categorize instances of a priori 
knowledge and it would therefore seem useful to select 
a representative from each major category. (4) "Gauss * 
Little Theorem" is here for two reasons. In the first
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place because arithmetical propositions (along with 
those of logic) are probably the most central of all 
to the a priori/a posteriori distinction and secondly 
because it was this particular arithmetical proposition 
which was cited by Tymoczko as an example of pure 
a priori proof, and to which the proof of the Pour-Colour 
Theorem is contrasted. Finally, the Four-Colour Theorem 
itself, the central concern of this paper, must be 
subjected to the proposed analysis.
(l) All red things are coloured
It must be emphasized at the outset that it is impor­
tant to be clear as to exactly what is being characterized. 
Ifliat is primarily a priori is an "item of knowledge" 
(Kitcher, p.3), not a proposition, although a derivative 
use could be made of the term as a predicate or 
proposition. Now an item of knowledge is something 
that a particular individual knows at a particular time, 
and is something which can be classified as a priori or 
a posteriori depending upon the way in which it is known.
It is quite possible for some propositions to be known 
in one way at one time and in another way at another time. 
Other propositions may turn out to be always known in 
the same way irrespective of the individual. Nevertheless, 
the a priority or otherwise of an item of knowledge is in 
a sense relative to both individual and point in time.
I have previously called into question the notion of 
"the same item of knowledge". Specifying identity criteria 
for such items does not obviously rest solely with the
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specification of linguistic expressions of the same 
proposition, I may know Pythagoras * theorem a priori 
or a posteriori, but whether the "item of knowledge" is 
identical in both cases is far from clear. Settling 
this kind of issue is a further task for the epistemologist 
Here it serves to draw attention to a difficulty fundamen­
tal to the attempt to use examples as a method of testing 
this type of analysis. We do not have an information to 
hand in a particular case. The process by which an 
individual x^ * acquires his knowledge of a proposition 
'p' is only partly accessible to us. Close interrogation 
may provide an outline, but in general all that is 
available, by thought and introspection, is a rough and 
ready description of a hypothetical case. This is not 
to say that such a description will not suffice. All 
that it is necessary to show is that the type of process 
broadly described would fulfil the conditions on 
a priori warrants set out in the analysis, so that 3^
* did undergo such a process in acquiring his knowledge 
of p^ ^ he could be said to have a priori knowledge, or 
not, as the case turns out.
Let us construct such a hypothetical case. Suppose 
x^ * to be an individual with the kind of cognitive 
capacities human beings actually have; *x* is a 
"human being" of average intellectual powers. Let us 
further suppose that *x experience has been sufficient 
for him to understand *p*, the proposition "everything 
red is coloured". Clearly this requirement implies
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that V* has an adequate grasp of a language, in this 
case, since ^p* is expressed in hnglish, of the English 
language.
is a strange proposition. It is not one that 
would naturally occur in discourse or thought. It is 
also one of those propositions about which it could be 
said that believing them was part of what understanding 
the constituent terms involved. Someone who denied such 
a proposition could be said to lack an understanding of 
the meaning of *red * and ^coloured *,
If we are to suppose that an individual has a belief 
that * then we must also suppose that the individual 
*x^  specifically entertains, considers and claims to 
believe *p *.
Although *x * might be thought to misunderstand 
the terms he denied p^ *, to have a belief in a
proposition, as opposed to just knowing how to use the
words correctly, requires that a formulation of the 
proposition is explicitly entertained and its truth or 
falsity considered.
Given this somewhat unlikely scenario, how can we 
describe the process by which *x *s belief in p^ ^ is 
generated? Perhaps in this way, x^ * considers *p *, 
reflects on the meanings of the words *red  ^and
^coloured % and the logical structure of *p *x * forms
the explicit belief that *p \ Other elements may enter 
into the process. It is possible that *x* calls up 
mental images of red things, and examines them. He may
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consider glass, or liquid tinged with just a hint of 
red, and seriously wonder if they can be described as 
coloured or not. Whether these elements occur or not, 
however, is incidental; what is important is to see if 
the unembellished process of reflecting on "meanings" 
can fulfil the conditions imposed on a priori warrants.
The first condition is that of availability. Would 
such a process be available to * whatever his experience? 
Since ox hypothesi 'x*s previous experience and cognitive 
capacities enable him to understand *p*, it must be the 
case that he is in a position to reflect on the terms 
involved in p^*. The availability condition is fulfilled. 
Secondly, does such a process warrant *x *s belief in *p '. 
This is not so obvious. Exactly what characteristics are 
crucial for a process to warrant the belief it generates 
is a subject requiring lengthy discussion. However, what 
is clear is that some reflective processes would not do. 
Reflecting on the state of the weather, sensations in the 
big too, God, etc., could not plausibly be considered as 
providing a warrant for a belief in p^ % At least one 
characteristic of processes of reflection emerges. They 
must involve reflecting on concepts involved in and 
relevant to the proposition in question. On this ground 
I would suggest that the type of process described does 
fulfil the condition of warranting the belief.
Thirdly, is it possible to believe 'p* by reflecting 
on the meanings of the constituent terms and for *p * to 
be false? No, I don^t think so, for if *x^ mistakenly
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came to believe *p^  when *p* was false, it could only 
be by misunderstanding the terms, or interpreting them 
idiosyncratically, the first of these circumstances would 
contradict the assumption that * understands *p^  and 
the second wauld moan that *x ^ doesn ^ t have a belief 
in p^ but in some different proposition.
Thus I maintain that all the conditions are fulfilled 
and that a psychological process, of the type discussed, 
can generate a priori knowledge. Our first example of 
traditionally a priori knowledge comes out as a priori 
on this analysis too,
(2) The angles of a triangle add up to l80°
Geometrical propositions since Kant have been held 
by some philosophers to belong to a class of propositions 
that are both synthetic and a priori. Wlaether they are 
analytic or synthetic is not an issue here. Having left 
the case for the contingent a priori open, it is not 
important to decide whether they are necessary or contingent 
The only concern is to characterize the way in which they 
are known, that is, a priori or a posteriori. As with 
the previous example, the aim is to provide a description 
of the type of process an individual would undergo in 
coming to know the truth of the proposition. As before, 
certain suppositions must be made that *x * is an 
individual with normal human cognitive capacities, and 
*x *s life so far has been sufficient to provide him with 
a grasp of the concepts, triangle, degree, the operation 
of addition, and those of arithmetic and geometry.
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Clearly * could form a belief that the sum of 
the angles of a triangle = l30° by drawing triangles and 
measuring them, or by measuring all triangles he comes 
across, until he is convinced that l80° is the correct 
sum. Such a process, however, is dependent on perceptual 
mechanisms and in some relevant counterfactually situations 
these might easily be unavailable to *. In other 
situations, a variety of answers might be obtained owing 
to the approximate nature of measurement. In the first 
circumstance, condition 2(a) is violated, and in the second, 
condition 2(c), This type of process cannot possibly 
provide an a priori warrant for the belief.
*x *s knowledge may have been acquired differently by 
a process something like the Kantian notion of *pure 
intuition *. He creates in his 'mind 's eye * a picture of 
a triangle, produces one side to a further length, and 
imaginatively constructs a line parallel to the side 
opposite the vertex from which the side is extended, thus;A
S c
He then notices that x = p, and y = q, and deduces 
therefore that x + y + z = p + q + z  and that 
p + q + z = 180°,
Sketched in this way it becomes obvious that 'x's
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background of geometrical knowledge must be substantial, 
lie must be able to recognize the equality of corresponding 
angles, and alternate angles, and that the angles z, p, q 
form a semicircle, that the angles about a point equal 
3oO°, etc. Given the extent of the geometrical knowledge 
required the question arises as to how this background 
knowledge fits into the picture.
Four alternatives present themselves. We can choose 
to regard this necessary but rather detailed knowledge as 
a part of what it means to have a grasp of the concepts 
involved, although this seems a little far-fetched (it 
seems perfectly possible to have an adequate concept of 
a triangle without knowing any further theorems of geometry) 
or we can regard it as additional knowledge independent of 
an understanding of the proposition. In the first case, 
the belief would come out as a priori, in the second it 
might not. Some possible lives of 'x ' might well preclude 
tho formation of the belief, thus once more violating 
condition 2(a),
A third course would involve the demand that the 
belief-forming process should include the deduction of all 
the relevant Euclidean theorems, and here again a good 
case could be made for the a priority of the belief, A 
fourth and final way of approaching the problem would be 
to claim that an understanding of the concept of a triangle 
necessarily involves knowing that its interior angles equal 
l30^. In these circumstances the deductive process would be 
redundant and the knowledge certainly a priori. This,
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however, is not a particularly appealing solution, I 
would want to insist as Kant would have done that the sum 
of the interior angles is not an essential element in the 
concept of a triangle.
What is brought out by this last discussion though, 
is the difficulty of interpreting tho notion of "a life 
'e * sufficient for * x f o r  p" in individual instances.
Nevertheless, I believe that some version of the 
third option is the most plausible, I am not suggesting 
that a single identifiable intellectual process, involving 
the step-by-step deduction of enough of the consequences 
of Euclid *s postulates to arrive at this particular proof, 
must occur. The set of beliefs pertaining to a particular 
deductive system are better described as forming a network 
rather than a chain, individual beliefs having both linking 
and supporting roles. Corresponding to this network of 
beliefs will be a network of psychological processes or 
sub-processes which generated them, I\lliat is required for 
a particular process to be said to provide an a priori 
warrant for a particular belief, is that it can be shown 
that all the beliefs sbout that system are similarly 
a priori. If the type of process which generates one 
belief can be shown to be available for the formation of 
tho rest of the beliefs about the system, it should be 
safe to assume that processes of this type in general 
warrant tho claim to a priority.
To generalize, therefore, the question is whether a 
process of inferring the consequences of Euclidean postulates
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could be available, whatever the particular experiences 
of an individual, to give warranted true belief in 
geometrical propositions. Certainly the type of process 
makes no demands on experiences beyond those necessary to 
understand the proposition and reflect on it. It also 
seems clear that a process of deducing consequences would 
warrant belief in the conclusion obtained provided it was 
correctly executed. If, for example, a true conclusion 
was reached via an invalid piece of reasoning, the process 
which constituted the reasoning would fail to warrant the 
conclusion. The individual would not be held to have 
knowledge of the conclusion at all, merely true belief.
It also seems clear that, so long as Euclidean geometry is 
viewed as an uninterpreted formal system, valid reasoning 
must guarantee the truth of the conclusions obtained. More, 
however, is demanded of a geometrical system. It is not only 
required to be internally consistent; it is also expected 
to describe the spatial characteristics and relationships 
of the world. The formal system is given an interpretation 
involving points, lines, pianos, etc. It is no longer 
sufficient to make sure the conclusions are valid 
consequences of axioms; the question arises as to the 
truth of the axioms themselves. Rival geometric systems 
provide differing descriptions of actual space. It is now 
well known that over vast distances in interstellar space, 
Euclidean geometry ceases even to approximate to reality.
At least one of the axioms is not only not knowable a priori, 
it is just false.
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The distinction being drawn is that between a pure 
and an applied form of mathematics. So long as the 
concern is with pure geometry, it is possible that its 
propositions are knowable a priori, but as soon as it is 
regarded as an applied science, describing features of the 
actual world, this ceases to bo the case. All three of 
tho conditions supplied by the analysis fail to be fulfilled. 
Our knowledge of geometrical propositions (in this sense) 
can only be a posteriori.
Two points remain to be made. The first is that in 
most cases geometrical beliefs are in fact beliefs about 
spatial relationships in the world rather than beliefs 
about consequences of an uninterpreted formal system.
Thus I would hold that for most individuals the belief 
that the interior angles of a triangle = l80° is a belief 
formed a posteriori.
The second point is that although I have claimed that 
a case can be made for the a priori knowledge of geometrical 
propositions, if they are taken as theorems of a deductive 
system, I nevertheless believe that most cases of knowledge 
of such propositions is not of this type. In the vast 
majority of instances geometrical knowledge is acquired via 
particular experiences. The kind of experiences I have in 
mind would include listening to a lecture, using a textbook, 
following a programme of instruction, in fact, all the 
usual methods by which people learn mathematics. What should 
now be clear is that all those normal learning situations 
involve perceptual mechanisms which may not always be
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available to an individual whose life has nevertheless 
provided him with the concepts of a triangle, a degree, 
etc. The demand that given any sufficient life, a process 
of the same type be available is obviously not fulfilled, 
and as a consequence it must be concluded that most cases 
of geometrical knowledge cannot be counted to be a priori.
3. A white horse is a horse
This example has been selected as it presents a 
paradigm case of Kantian analyticity. He characterizes 
analytic judgements thus;
"The former, Q:he analytic} , as adding nothing 
through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but 
merely breaking it up into those constituent concepts that 
have all along been thought in it, although confusedly, can 
also be entitled 'explicative '" (Kant, 1933, p.48).
This example is so straightforward that no analysis 
is required to observe that the predicate adds nothing to 
the concepts contained in the subject, but is merely a 
reiteration of one of them. Propositions of this type 
have traditionally been regarded as not only necessarily 
true, but also clearly a priori. It remains to be seen 
how in this particular case the proposition fares when 
subjected to the sort of analysis which centres a priority 
on the way in which a proposition is known, as opposed to 
the nature of proposition itself. Care must be taken to 
rule out of consideration such non-standard interpretations 
as the subject term referring to a china model, etc. Quine 
(Quine and Ullian (1970)) reminds us that: "Care
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must be taken not to abuse logical forms." Every A that is 
B is an A" may be all very well, but its variant "Every 
BA is an A" as in "Every white horse is a horse" skirts 
pitfalls. lüiat are we to say of "Every expectant mother 
is a mother", or "Every intellectual dwarf is a dwarf"? (p.24).
If the standard form is kept in mind then problems 
arising from ornamental, sculpted, or toy horses are 
avoided.
Even more than my first example, "everything red is 
coloured", this proposition seems to provide a limiting 
case of the idea of a process. It is peculiarly self- 
evident. Anyone equipped by life with only an understanding 
of the logical particles "every" and "is", i.e. possessing 
the concepts of universality and identity would on 
entertaining such a proposition know it to be true.
Since the capacity to entertain a proposition is ex 
hypothesi essential to knowledge of it, and in this case 
knowledge is immediate on entertaining it, the question of 
unavailability does not really arise. The way of knowing 
the proposition must be available. Whether such knowledge
is warranted or not is similarly difficult to dispute. i
IA process can fail to provide a warrant for a belief only 
if it involves some steps in which it can go wrong. This i
is not to say that people never leap to instant and |
fallacious conclusions, but that if they did so in this }
kind of circumstance, it would not be explained as a 
failure of the process to warrant the belief, but that 
contrary to condition (l), the individual concerned had
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not had a life sufficient for him to understand the 
proposition.
As far as condition (2(c), the guarantee of the truth 
of the proposition, is concerned,,tho same argument applies. 
If someone entertained the proposition and believed it to 
be true, is it possible that it could still be false?
No, because here again a lack of grasp of the concepts 
would be imputed to the person to explain the failure.
Knowledge of self-evident logical truths, therefore, 
can be said, in line with tradition, to be a priori.
4. "Gauss' Little Theorem". "The sum of the first
100 positive integers i ^ 5050”* ^
The reasons for the inclusion of this item were stated 
at the beginning of the chapter, firstly, the centrality of 
arithmetical propositions to the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction, and secondly, that this particular one has 
been selected to provide a contrast with the.Four-Colour 
Theorem.
To recapitulate a description of the method of this 
proof, you write down (or imagine) the numbers 1 to 100 
arranged in two rows of fifty columns like this;
1 2 3 4 .......  49 50
100 99 98 97 ........ 52 51
and observe that the sum of each column is 101 and that by 
summing the 50 columns the figure of 5050 is reached. It was 
objected by Detlefsen and Luker (1980) that as a description 
of the intellectual process of proving this theorem, these 
directions are drastically over-simplified; that far from
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merely observing the sums of each column and of the total 
number of columns, a "significant amount of computation 
must take place" in order for the conclusion to be reached, 
Ivhilst I am prepared to agree with them that at least 
a limited amount of computation is required (no one needs 
to compute the sum of 1 and 100 but might need to work out 
the sum of 36 and 65) this in no way affects the issue of 
whether the proof is known a priori or not, as these writers 
suppose it does. A slightly embellished account of the 
method of proof should therefore dispose of the objection 
and offer a more accurate picture of the psychological 
process involved. This should suffice:- ilrrange mentally 
or on paper, the first one hundred positive integers in 
two rows of fifty columns, the first row comprising the 
integers one to fifty in ascending order and the second 
row the numbers 100 to 51 in descending order. Observe 
or calculate where necessary that the sum of each column 
is 101 and calculate by addition or multiplication the sum 
of the sums of the 50 columns. Conclude that this sum 
is 5050.
It should be easy to see that a piece of deductive 
reasoning of this sort requires no particular experiences 
beyond those needed to acquire the appropriate arithmetical 
concepts, and that consequently a process of the relevant 
type will be always available. Secondly, since the 
reasoning involves only applications of arithmetical laws, 
understanding of which is part of acquiring arithmetical 
concepts, this process of reasoning if carried out correctly
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must warrant the conclusion reached. Should an error 
in the reasoning pass unnoticed by the individual then 
the possibility arises that the process or type of 
process has produced a false belief. This would not 
mean, however, that there would be an a priori warrant 
for a falsehood for the inaccuracy in the deduction would 
automatically prevent the process from providing a warrant 
for the belief.
Again, knowledge of this sort comes out under this 
analysis as clearly a priori.
It might be held that it is a redundant exercise 
to show that in each case the truth of the proposition in 
question is guaranteed by conditions of the hypothesis 
(i.e. the notion of a sufficiently rich life) or by the 
requirement that the process warrant the belief formed.
It could be argued that the truth of the proposition is 
already secured by the demand in condition 1 that "x knows 
that p", If p wore false, x could not be said to know 
that p. However, I believe it is important to show 
exactly why 'x ' can be said to know p, rather than 
merely believe p. The conditions on a priori warrants 
described here do just this.
The Four-Colour Theorem
Finally, I shall consider the example which is the 
focus of this entire discussion - the Four-Colour Theorem 
(4c 2 ). An immediate difficulty arises. This is the 
problem of giving even a rough and ready description of 
the type of process undergone by those engaged in proving
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this theorem. Fortunately, it is a difficulty which 
dissolves upon the realization that such a description 
is not really required, as nothing crucial depends upon 
the details of the formal mathematics used in the proof,
I shall make the assumption therefore that the proof 
consists entirely of a chain of rigorous mathematical 
reasoning, except for one small part, a lemma which turns 
out to he particularly resistant to proof by formal means. 
The lemma is proved by an immensely long run on a computer.
The process of coming to know the truth of the 4 CT 
therefore is largely a deductive one, but also involves 
the observation of the result of the computer program.
The print-out of the program is so long that it would 
require more than a human lifetime to follow through every 
step, so the possibility of proving the theorem by a 
completely deductive process is ruled out. Part of the 
process is of an altogether different type. It would 
either consist of observing the result for each 
configuration examined in the course of the program as 
to is reducibility, and forming the conclusion that in 
every case an affirmative answer was delivered, or by 
checking tlirough the print-out, as far as time allows, 
to satisfy oneself that the program functions as intended, 
and extrapolating from the conclusion that it works well 
for a part, to the conclusion that it does so as a whole, 
and in addition noting the specific results. Of course, 
the entire print-out can be checked by a team of 
mathematicians, and each individual's belief in the
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final result would be acquired by noting tlieir several 
conclusions. Given a further set of beliefs concerning 
the skill and accuracy of each member of the team, the 
required belief (that the 4 CT is proved) could then 
be formed.
Ifiiilst it has been argued that in general purely 
deductive processes can provide a priori warrants for 
the knowledge they generate, it should by now be obvious 
that none of these processes, taken singly or together, 
can fulfil the conditions for a priority, since none of 
them can sustain the belief in the proof of the lemma 
in counterfactual situations where particular experiences 
are different. In the circumstances where the computer 
program produced at least one negative result instead of 
entirely affirmative ones, the process of observing the 
results could not produce the required knowledge. A lack 
of trust in the ability of a member of the team would have 
the same effect as would a declaration by a member of the 
team that a flaw either in the program, or the machine 's 
operation had been discovered. In every case the 
availability condition is violated. Even if this were 
not so it is not clear that such types of process would 
provide warrants for the belief engendered. Many other 
considerations are involved here; the reliability of the 
machine, the flawlessness of the program, the accuracy of 
the operators, and other mathematicians. Background 
beliefs in all these must all have a role to play in the 
production of a belief in the conclusion, and all these
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belief’s need to be warranted ones.
Whilst inductive inferences in general can be said to 
warrant the conclusions obtained, it is always arguable 
in a particular case whether the sample is large enough, 
or where the conclusion depends, as in this instance, on 
a complex set of further inductive inferences whether 
each of those inferences is sound. A great deal of very 
specific information would be required to reach a decision 
as to the warranting of an individual belief by an 
individual process. Often such information would be 
either unavailable, or too complex to assess. Condition (2) 
could fail tor be fulfilled a# could condition (3 ). Processes 
of inductive reasoning never guarantee the truth of their 
conclusions, but confer on them greater or lesser degrees 
of probability.
IVhat emerges therefore is that, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the Four-Colour Theorem cannot be kno^m a priori when the 
distinction is analysed in this way any more than it could 
with the distinction analysed in the traditional way.
Parts of the proof, even most of the proof, can be known 
a priori, but the unsurveyability of the reducibility lemma 
prevents the conjecture itself, that "every normal map is 
four-colourable", being known except by a process which 
combines a priori and a posteriori elements. It is one 
of the more attractive aspects of this type of analysis 
that it only allows for a decision as to the a priority 
or otherwise of an individual piece of knowledge. It is 
not committed to asserting that instances of knowing which
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are not a priori are therefore a posteriori. The 
possibility remains open for a combination of types 
of process to be required in order for knowledge of 
some propositions to be gained. Since it is not the 
proposition itself, but the way in which it is known to 
which the distinction applies, it is possible to 
recognize that knowledge can be gained;
(1) purely a priori
(2) possibly purely a priori but often a posteriori
(3) by a combination of methods
(4) purely a posteriori
Although no knowledge gained by a mixture of a priori 
and a posteriori processes can ever be held to be "a priori 
knowledge" this analysis removes the necessity for the 
over simple decision, that it is therefore just "a posteriori 
knowledge". It is an achievement of this approach that it 
enriches our methods of categorizing types of knowledge 
beyond a mere two-way division. By characterizing different 
kinds of process it is also open to us to subdivide both 
the a priori and the a posteriori classes further and 
provide a more useful and developed understanding of human 
knowledge, by distinguishing a variety of kinds of 
a posteriori knowledge, of a priori knowledge, and of 
knowledge gained by a combination of both routes,
(f ) Summary of Results
I-Iaving examined in detail the application of the 
suggested analysis to five particular propositions, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that this way of drawing the
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distinction does in fact maintain the traditional 
extension of the term. Exactly the same classes of 
propositions are held to he a priori by both methods.
Logical truths, truths of pure mathematics, analytic 
propositions and those true "in virtue of the meaning 
of the words" can all be shown to be a priori; that is, 
it can bo shown that it is possible for them to be known 
a priori, even though on very many individual occasions 
it is not the case that they are known in this way. 
Geometrical propositions can be known a priori only if 
taken as consequences of a formal system. If regarded 
as descriptions of actual space they are known a posteriori. 
The Four-Colour Theorem is easily shown to be unknowable 
a priori by this method, as it would also be by any other 
means of distinguishing propositions epistemologically, 
that does not invoke unlimited extensions of human 
capabilities to support the claim that certain items can 
be known a priori "in principle". The unacceptability 
of this manoeuvre and the confusions engendered by the 
"in practice" "in principle" distinction have already 
been argued for.
Since the psychologistic method provided by Kitcher 
divides knowledge into substantially the same groups as 
any other way of articulating the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction it is safe to assume that the method succeeds 
in clarifying and strengthening the old distinction, rather 
than describing a different one. The advantages it has in 
addition to greater clarity have been discussed, but it
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might be useful just to list them here for emphasis;
1. The distinction is drawn in terms of differences
in the way what is known is known, rather than
labelling types of proposition.
2. This method makes room for the possibility of 
necessary a posteriori propositions, thus avoiding 
confusion between metaphysical and epistemological 
categories.
3. It is only concerned with normal human capacities, 
and has no need to postulate hypothetical supermen.
4. The concern with psychological processes permits 
the distinction to be made within a unified 
naturalistic general theory of knowledge.
5. The way is left open for further classification of 
types of knowledge in terms of combinations of types 
of process, and in terms of subdivisions of types 
within the broad categories of a priori and
a posteriori.
However, I am sure that despite the forgoing, there 
will be some who will still want to insist that this 
kind of analysis cannot possibly offer a clarification 
of the Kantian conception of the distinction for one 
important reason. The objection is that the psychologistic 
analysis provides a subjective criterion for distinguishing 
individual cases of a priori knowledge, whilst the Kantian 
formulation is intended to offer an objective means of 
distinguishing types of proposition. I have repeatedly 
argued that it should be noticed that an objective criterion
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in terras of the kind of justification available for 
the proposition fundamentally is located in differences 
in the way the proposition can be known to be true. To 
say that a proposition is a priori, is to say that its 
truth can be established a priori. To establish the truth 
of a proposition is to come to know it to be true. The 
psychologistic account labels "methods of knowing" a priori 
or a posteriori, thus enabling a distinction to be draim 
between individual instances of "knowing". Sense can be 
made not only of the idea that a proposition might be 
known a priori by some, and a posteriori by others, that 
its truth value can be established by more than one method, 
but also of the idea that within the class of a priori 
methods different processes can occur. An example would 
be where a proposition of some complexity might be self- 
evident to some and known to be true by just entertaining 
the proposition, whilst for others its truth is deduced 
by a series of transformations and inferences.
The fact that it is possible to distinguish 
particular cases of knowledge as a priori or a posteriori, 
doesn't prevent the development of an objective criterion 
for classifying propositions, A derived use of the terms 
a priori and a posteriori can be made, which attaches them 
to propositions in this way; a proposition can be held 
to be a priori if it can be shown that there is in fact 
an a priori method of determining its truth value. Thus 
a proposition could be described as a priori, even if no 
one actually used that method of acquiring knowledge of it.
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Similarly, a proposition, could be described as a posteriori 
if it could actually be known a posteriori. It is 
conventional to suppose that, where both a priori and 
a posteriori justifications are available, a priority 
is dominant, since a priori processes produce knowledge 
which is infallible in a way that a posteriori ones do not.
The psychologistic approach is one which, I believe, 
offers in addition to the advantages listed above an 
enrichment of the concepts of a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge, and a way of securing the distinction against 
the criticisms of it raised earlier.
The Four-Colour Theorem emerges as a proposition 
that can be known by a complex process involving both 
a priori and a posteriori means. It cannot therefore be 
described as an a priori proposition, but, equally, not 
as a purely a posteriori one.
In the concluding section I shall reexamine the 
significance of accepting this proposition as a mathematical 
theorem and describe how the epistemological theory I have 
adopted helps to answer the charges of mathematical 
empiricism, made by Tymoczko*s critics.
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SECTION III
Conclusions
1. Reassessment of the Philosophical Significance of 
the Four-Colour Theorem 
(a) Summary of the original interest in the theorem 
and its proof.
Ifhen the proof of the 4 CT was first published in 
197b, it aroused the interest of at least two philosophers. 
One was Thomas Tymoczko, whose mathematical capability 
enabled him to work from the definitive statement of the 
proof by Appel, Haken and Koch ( 'Every Planar Map is 
Pour-Colorable Illinois Journal of Mathematics XXI, 8, 
September 1977). The other was myself, who chanced upon 
a report of the proof by Appel and Haken ( 'The Solution of 
the Pour-Color Map Problem') in the Scientific American - 
CXXXVII, 8, (October 1977). My reaction to the paper was 
substantially the same as that of Tymoczko. The unsurveyable 
length of a critical lemma with proof raised immediate 
questions of an epistemological nature. Firstly, how is 
this proof known - a priori or a posteriori? Secondly, if, 
as seems to be the case, a posteriori, is it really a proof? 
The answer to this second question appeared to be supplied 
by the fact that this proof had been accepted as such in 
mathematical circles; acceptance by other mathematicians 
being the decisive criterion. It is not the job of the 
philosopher to prescribe standards of proof, but to examine 
the consequences of a modification of the concept. The 
affirmative answer to question two therefore loads directly
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to a further one. Does this proof involve any 
significant alteration to the criteria for being a proof?
As soon as this emerged for consideration more detailed, 
deeply philosophical queries did so, too. I took it as 
given that mathematical truths were necessary ones. Was 
not this an example of such a necessary truth knowable 
only a posteriori? Or perhaps was it not the distinction 
between a posteriori and a priori knowledge that was 
threatened ?
In response to Tymoczko *s paper (’I^. Phil. UCtVI, 2, (f j 
February 1979) a variety of arguments were produced, all 
with the aim of refuting the suggestion that the proof 
presented any interesting divergence from traditional ones.
The methods of refutation were as follows:-
1. It was denied that the proof was unsurveyable. The 
claim was that in fact it had been surveyed - by a computer.
]^fy reply to this was that it was hopelessly anthropomorphic 
to endow any unconscious machine with the capability to 
survey a proof. Not only the concept of surveyability, 
but also that of proving essentially involves conscious 
awareness of what is being undertaken. A radar scanner 
does not survey a piece of terrain; its human operators 
do so using it. Similarly, a computer neither proves nor 
surveys a theorem, nor even adds two numbers together; it 
is a device used by human beings to perform these tasks.
There is certainly much present discussion of the 
topic of artificial intelligence, and many intimations 
that the possibility of creating self-conscious computers
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is a real one. It is a possibility that cannot be ruled 
out a priori; but it is interesting that most of the 
controversy surrounding this subject centres its attention 
on behavioural criteria for the attribution of machine 
consciousness; that is, if a machine exhibited such and 
such forms of behaviour, we might be inclined to say that 
it was conscious. I can imagine circumstances where this 
might seem a plausible explanation of the machine *s 
observed output. However, since philosophical behaviourism 
fails as an adequate theory of mind, it would require 
evidence of a very different sort and considerably more 
understanding of the relation between brain activity and 
human consciousness before any such attributions were 
feasible. The proof of the 4 CT is unsurveyable,
2. The claim was made that the proof was not a posteriori, 
because it could 'in principle' be known a priori. It is 
a matter of empirical fact that men can live for little more 
than a century. There is no logical impossibility about a 
race of men, either acquiring phenomenally increased 
cognitive powers, or living for milennia. Such a race of 
'supermen * could gain a priori knowledge of the 4 CT. The 
appeal to such "in principle" extensions of human powers 
I rejected for a number of reasons. I challenged the 
suggestion that such augmented human beings presented a 
genuine logical possibility. That they are 'imaginable" 
cannot be denied, but as is often the case, the imagination 
only supplies a partial specification of what it is 
imagining. It is at least arguable that certain genetic
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structures are essential properties of humanity and that 
such a vastly altered being would require different 
structures. It would therefore be necessarily non-human.
My conviction that a truly viable explanatory account of 
knowledge can only be realized when constructed in terms 
of human psychological processes (i.e. a naturalistic 
epistemology) leads me to the view that consideration of 
such hypothetical and possibly infinite extrapolations of 
human capacities, must be dismissed as irrelevant. Thirdly,
I think Erwin's 'correlation argument' (Op. Cit., p.l8Ô) 
provides excellent grounds for dismissing 'knowable in 
principle ' as a requirement for a priori knowledge since 
it demonstrates that any proposition whatever could in 
principle be known a priori.
8. Another argument produced against the view that the 
4 CT was in any way innovative was to the effect that if 
the use of computers for this proof entailed that it contained 
empirical elements, then the same could be said for almost 
all mathematical theorems, for the use of computational 
aids, calculators, logarithm tables, abacci, etc., was 
commonplace in mathematics. The difference with the 4 CT 
was 'quant^ative, not qualitative'. Here again it isl\
important to distinguish clearly between what is possible 
"in fact" and what "in principle", since it is on this 
distinction that a qualitative difference rests, and I 
believe there is a qualitative difference. The values 
appearing in logarithm tables could in fact be calculated 
by an individual. The mathematical operations performed
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on calculators or abaci could all be done by human 
beings, either in the head or with pen and paper; the 
use of such tools makes no substantial difference, the 
point is that human beings could calculate the values or 
derive the theorems independently of mechanical aids.
Each value and each computation is a mathematical theorem, 
and could in fact be known a priori, even if it usually 
is known a posteriori. The 4 CT is also a theorem, but 
it is one that cannot in fact be known a priori. It must, 
due to its inordinate length, be known at least partly 
a posteriori. Thus it differs epistemologically from other 
theorems, and this difference cannot be described as merely 
quantative. This is not to say that other theorems cannot 
share this characteristic; at least one other possibility 
has been cited. Nor must the likelihood of borderline 
cases be overlooked. These would be proofs of sufficient 
length for a difficulty to arise over their surveyability 
or lack of it. Here, I suggest empirical evidence would 
have a relevant part to play in deciding the case.
4. The fourth and probably most far-reaching assault on 
the idea that the 4 CT as a proof, is unique in the 
empirical nature of its structure, has as its source the 
recognition of human fallibility. Tymoczko 's critics ' 
claim is that the 4 CT, because of its a posteriori element, 
is not certain in the sense in which logically necessary 
truths are certain, but only probably true. The assertion 
that all a posteriori truths are only probable and therefore 
uncertain is a familiar confusion. There just is no lack
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of* certainty surrounding the truth of many a posteriori 
propositions. Just as Wittgenstein claims that the fact 
that "we know that water boils and does not freeze under 
such and such circumstances" and that "we know that up to 
now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances," is 
a fact "fused into the foundations of our language-game" 
(Wittgenstein, 1979, para. 55^) cannot it be equally said 
that the correctness of appropriately checked calculations 
is "fused into the foundations of our language game?"
However, the objection continues with the claim that 
in the case of the 4CT its lack of surveyability makes its 
truth slightly loss probable, since undetected, or 
undetectable errors may occur in the program, the operation, 
or the hardware, of the machine, but the difference between 
this situation and that of any theorem with a traditional 
proof executed totally 'by head * is merely one of degree.
Human beings, so the argument runs, are physical machines, 
and as such are not immune from error. Anyone can make 
mistakes, slips in calculation, overlook gaps in inferential 
chains, misread symbols, etc. Thus they think any proof at 
all may also contain undetected errors. This in itself 
seems unreasonable. Is it really the case that a proof, 
however short or simple, and exhaustively checked, might still 
contain an error? Perhaps some far-reaching conceptual 
revision might overthrow it in the future, but is it a 
genuine possibility that there might be an error in 
calculation concealed in a demonstration of, for example,
561 + 672 = 1233? Nevertheless, they believe that "the
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ever present possibility of error" introduces empirical 
elements into all of mathematics. It is not particularly 
easy to see what is being asserted here. The underlying 
feeling seems to be a result of a confusion of two rather 
obscure lines of thought, and the conclusion, that 
mathematics is an empirical activity, a product of that 
confusion, I shall try to untangle them.
Firstly, it is agreed that the 4 CT is.known 
a posteriori. The move is then made to the assertion that 
its conclusion is only probable. This requires the 
assumptions that no necessary truths can be known a 
posteriori, and that all a posteriori truths are merely 
probable. Both these assumptions have been challenged.
It is the unsurveyability of the 4 CT which is responsible 
for its a posteriority, and its unsurveyability entails 
that it might contain mistakes. Since other proofs might 
also contain mistakes, the conclusions of them are 
similarly only probable.
The second thread in this argument is that proofs are 
accepted when they have been checked by a community of 
mathematicians, and the outcome is always the same. Thus 
the acceptance of a proof depends on an experimental 
procedure, that of checking a proof. The more cases of 
checking which result in the same conclusion that are 
accumulated, the more likely it is that the conclusion is 
true. Therefore all proofs have empirical elements. I have 
maintained throughout this thesis that this argument is 
muddled. It involves confusing the concepts of knowledge,
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certainty, conviction and truth, with the effect that 
a priori/a posteriori distinction appears to collapse.
Since it was at this point that the current interest in 
computer proofs waned it seemed important to take up the 
argument,
(b) Proof, Proving and Proof Acceptance
To argue from the empirical fact that human beings 
are fallible to the conclusion that all mathematical proofs 
could contain undetected errors, is not feasible. How 
could an error be concealed in the proof of 2 + 1 = 3?
There is a proof of 2 + 1 = 3 »  it is a consequence of
Peôpo's axioms. It is not, however, a result of understanding 
this proof that we are certain that 2 + 1 = 3 .  Most people 
have never heard of Pe^no. Certainty that 2 + 1 = 3  arises 
from learning to calculate and it is hard to see what 
could count as making a mistake here.
That 3 is what we get when we add 1 to 2 is part of
what we mean by 'adding one *, but it is no less a consequence 
of a formal system, and as such, is a theorem provable within 
that system. All elementary arithmetical prepositions are 
of this order. The possibility of having made a mistake 
just does not arise. Not all mathematical proofs therefore 
are less than certain in the way suggested. Of the ones 
which because of their complexity could conceal mistakes 
it is important to be clear about two things.
In the first place, the possibility of an error of 
reasoning does not make the conclusion only probable. The 
conclusion is either a valid consequence of the system, or
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it is not. If we have reasoned correctly then it is a valid 
consequence. If we have not it still may he a theorem; we 
just need to correct the reasoning.
What is a matter of probability is not the truth of 
the conclusion, but that we have carried out a valid 
deduction. That we have done so is open to empirical tests. 
We repeat the deduction, submit it to the scrutiny of others 
and form the belief that the reasoning has been done 
accurately. From our own conviction and that of other 
members of the mathematical community, both as to the lack 
of error in calculation and from the fact that no conceptual 
paradoxes emerge, we become convinced that what we have is 
a proof.
The second point, which follows directly, is that what 
we know a posteriori, as a result of the checking procedures 
is that the form of the a priori reasoning process is sound; 
that no mistakes have been made and that we are convinced 
of the truth of the theorem. The confusion between the 
result of the process of proving, and the result of the 
process of becoming convinced that the proof is right, 
derives at least in part from an epistemological theory 
which regards propositions as the primary bearers of a 
priority and a posteriority. If, as I believe is right, 
it is 'ways of knowing ', or psychological processes that 
are a priori or a posteriori it is easy to see that, in 
the case of simple mathematical theorems purely a priori 
processes can generate both knowledge of their truth and 
acceptance of a formulation of the inferential structure
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which constitutes this process, as a proof. This formulation 
is the objective justification for the conclusion. The 
theorem can then be described as an a priori proposition. 
When the a priori process, required to deduce the theorem, 
is a very long and/or complex one an additional procedure 
may be necessary. This a posteriori process involves 
repetition of the a priori process, by one or several human 
beings, in order to become convinced that it is error free. 
It is here that the psychologistic interpretation of the 
distinction helps to display the difference in the two 
cases, because of its capacity to provide both a subjective 
and an objective criterion of a priori knowledge.
In both cases, the simple and the complex, there is 
an a priori method by which the truth value of the 
conclusion is determined. It consists of the process 
of inference required to deduce it formalized in some, 
acceptable language. For simple mathematical truths this 
inferential process suffices in a particular instance to 
convince the mathematician that the theorem is proved.
In complex cases the process of accepting the theorem as 
proved has a further dimension; it includes evidence 
gathered a posteriori, that the inferential structure 
is sound. The length and complexity of the process of 
"becoming convinced" will vary from individual to individual 
and from proof to proof; it will consist of two elements, 
the a priori deduction, plus the a posteriori checking 
procedures. The theorem itself, however, can still be 
described as a priori, in the derivative sense, because
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the inferential process which leads to the conclusion 
"that *p*" fulfils the conditions of a priority. The 
double-stranded process which loads to the subjective 
conclusion "that I am convinced that the proof of 'p * is 
correct" does not.
Not all or even most proofs therefore are accepted 
on purely a priori grounds, but that doesn't mean that 
the theorems as such lack a priori justifications - these 
are supplied by the form of the inferential procedure needed 
to know them to be true. The justification for the 
conclusion that "the proof is sound" is one which combines 
this process with one of checking and rechecking it for 
error.
I suggested the metaphor of a double-helix structure 
to describe this two-stranded process by which some proofs 
become accepted. It is a mistake to suppose, however, that 
because empirical evidence that the reasoning is correct, 
is required for some proofs to be accepted, that mathematics 
is "infected with empirical elements". That "proposition p" 
has been accepted as a proof within the body of mathematics" 
is not a mathematical proposition. The knowledge of the 
mathematical proposition, "proposition p" itself, is 
a priori knowledge, because of the kind of process which 
produced it.
Once the distinction has been drawn between the 
statement of a theorem, and the statement "that it is a 
theorem" it is easier to see how the 4 CT does in fact differ 
from traditional ones.
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Certainly empirical procedures, hand-checking and 
computer re-runs were needed to make sure no errors in 
calculation had occurred and certainly the unsurveyable 
length of the proof added to the probability that such 
errors might have occurred; but these differences are 
only of a quantitive nature. The qualitative difference 
between the 4 CT and traditional proof is that there is 
no complete a priori procedure to check. The unsurveyable 
computer run forms an essential part of the process itself; 
the process which generates knowledge of the mathematical 
proposition "all normal maps are four-colourable."
The additional support for its acceptance provided 
by re-runs on other computers, hand-checking of sections 
of the print-out, general evidence as to the reliability 
of the machine's hardware and so forth, like that adduced 
in support of numerous traditional theorems, generates i
Iconviction that the work is good. It does not form part i
of the proof. The Pour-Colour Theorem, however, also 
introduces empirical considerations into the proof procedure 
itself. Traditional proofs do not.
Since, as I have already made clear, it is a matter 
for mathematicians to decide what is a proof and what is 
not, the fact that the Pour-Colour Theorem is accepted as a 
proof must have consequences relating to the concept of and 
criteria for being a proof. The distinguishing feature of 
the 4 CT is its unsurveyability, Surveyability is a 
feature which has been held to be an essential charac­
teristic of proofs, most notably by Wittgenstein.
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"A mathematical proof must be perspicuous," Only 
a structure whose reproduction is an easy task is called 
a 'proof It must be possible to decide with certainty 
whether we really have the same proof twice over, or not", 
(197Ü, III (i)).
Crispin Wright (1980, p.ll3) comments on the last 
sentence of the above that:
"It is plain that the possibility referred to here 
is meant to be a practical possibility; nothing is 
acceptable as a proof of which we could not in practice 
be quite sure whether it had been correctly reproduced,"
Wright goes on to argue that this concept of practical 
reproducibility which for Wittgenstein is an essential 
feature of proof, is nevertheless not presented unambiguously 
in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Usually 
Wittgenstein appears to equate practical reproducibility 
with a physical capacity to write it out. "Proof must be 
capable of being reproduced by mere copying" (iV, 4l).
"It must be easy to write dotvn exactly this proof again"
(ill, 1).
If it were in fact the case that all that is intended 
by the demand for reproducibility is that it could in 
practice be copied out, there seems little reason to assert 
that the 4 CT is unreproducible and consequently 
unsurveyable. A repetition of the mechanical process 
of obtaining a print-out of the computer run would provide 
a reproduction of the proof. The argument for the 4 CT as 
a significantly different kind of proof would begin to
83.
collapse. However, in(ill,83) it appears that it is more 
than just the symbols that must be reproducible.
"A proof shows us what OUGHT to come out - And since 
every reproduction of the proof must demonstrate the same 
thing, while on the one hand it must reproduce the result 
automatically, on the other hand it must also reproduce the 
compulsion to get it...."
"Proof must be surveyable: this aims at drawing our
attention to the difference between the concepts of 
"repeating a proof", and "repeating an experiment". To 
repeat a proof means, not to reproduce the conditions under 
which a particular result was once obtained, but to repeat 
every step and the result. And although this shows that 
proof is something that must be capable of being reproduced 
in toto automatically, still every such reproduction must 
contain the force of proof which compels acceptance of the 
result."
This seems to suggest that what is important is for us 
not only to be able to recognise that strings of symbols 
have been correctly duplicated, but also to follow the 
procedure step by step inexorably reaching an understanding 
that the conclusion must be the result of the procedure.
Thus there appear to be two possible interpretations of 
practical reproducibility and the class of surveyable proofs 
will differ depending on which interpretation is adopted. 
Clearly, the second one is a stronger demand and there may 
be many proofs which, though long and complex, nevertheless 
can be checked for accurate duplication of the patterns of
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symbols, but which, on the other hand cannot be grasped 
in such a way as to understand how the result is produced 
by the procedure. Equally clearly,
"If a structure of inferences is too complex or 
lengthy even to be physically reproduced, then naturally 
there can be no convincing check of every step in it and 
if its physically reproducible structure is nevertheless 
too lengthy to be convincingly checked as a chain of 
inferences, then obviously it cannot serve as a paradigm of 
how a certain result cannot but be achieved by correctly 
following through a certain process." (Wright, I980)
Now even if it can be argued that the 4 CT is 
surveyable in the first sense, it cannot be the case that 
it is in the second. Wright suggests though that a third 
sense of surveyability could be postulated. In this third 
sense a proof, which consists in a repetition of a simple 
technique, and which is too lengthy to be checked step by 
step, can be recognized as a proof, by just " 'seeing* where 
these repetitions will lead us". (p.122)
This is exactly the situation which arises with regard 
to the 4 CT. The program is developed to apply an 
identical procedure to a very large number of cases, and 
the justification of the proof, as such, rests in the 
belief that the program is effective in providing for each 
case the required result.
"Now, this is prec3.sely one of the ideas on which 
Wittgenstein here wishes to put pressure. He seems to want 
to deny that in such cases a cogent but physically
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unreproducible proof exists." (Wright, I980, p.122). It 
does seem plausible that at least part of Wittgenstein*s 
purpose in insisting upon the criterion of surveyability 
for proofs was to exclude the possibility that structures 
like the 4 CT shoilld be held to be proofs. For Wittgenstein 
a genuine proof must be surveyable in all three senses.
Having some idea of what was intended by the expression 
'surveyableit still remains to try to grasp the under­
lying motivation for the demand that this be a 
feature of proofs.
One way to view the matter would be to regard the 
surveyability criterion as a consequence of an extreme 
anti-realist position.
"For on this standpoint concepts in general may be 
regarded as applying only in conditions when we may in 
practice recognize their application.... The notions then 
of 'correct proof * and of 'same proof ' may be fully 
intelligibly applied only in cases where we can in practice 
assess the correctness of their application". (p.123)
Of course, the difficulty with a work of unsurveyable length 
would be that we would not be able to make such an assessment 
Wright chooses the familiar example of determining whether 
some huge number is prime or not. In such circumstances, 
where the demonstration of primacy has ceased to be 
surveyable, can we ^ nuinely say that the predicate "prime" 
genuinely applies or not. The point is that understanding 
is a recognitional capacity. It is the ability to recognize 
in practice the circumstances under which a statement could
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be used to assert something true. Where we have no grasp 
on these circumstances, where, as in this example, we cannot 
recognize that a computation has been correctly carried out, 
we have no real understanding of the concept ' p r i m e H o w e v e r  
is it really necessary to conclude that Wittgenstein's anti­
realist view of proof is really a product of such an extreme 
general anti-realist position? Wright believes rather that 
Wittgenstein's conception of proof derives from specific 
concerns about the nature of proof and of necessity. One 
of these has been mentioned already. This is the view 
that it is our actual practice which determines what is 
to count as a correct application of a term. Signs do not 
interpret themselves. It is up to us to make the 
interpretation.
"Thus, if we cannot agree whether some tortuous 
calculation shows a particular number to be prime, there 
can be no fact of the matter, furnished by the concepts 
themselves, of which we are merely incapable of practical 
recognition. Without our ratification of them, there are 
no such facts." (p.129)
In the first place, therefore, it is a matter which 
is decided by our practice whether a concept applies in 
a circumstance or not, and if there is no determining procedure 
that can actually be carried out, it is just unintelligible 
to suggest that there is a determinate answer to the question 
of the validity of that application.
Further remarks put a rather different slant on the 
matter. Wittgenstein comments that causality has no role
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to play in proof, and that proof is not an experiment* It 
is not that on a particular occasion a particular result 
was caused to occur or even that it does so on several 
occasions. To be a proof there must be a relationship 
between the assumptions, the procedure and the result, 
such that the result has to occur if the procedure is 
correctly applied.
"Proof must be capable of being taken in" really means 
nothing but: a proof is not an experiment. We do not accept
the result of a proof because it results once, or because 
it often results. But we see in the proof the reason for 
saying that this must be the result." (ill, 39 RFM.)
What Wittgenstein is rejecting is the idea that our 
previous understanding of the concepts forces us to accept 
that a particular outcome must occur. By using concepts in 
such a way as to make a result part of the criteria for 
the correct application of the procedure, the relationships 
are created rather than discovered. This according to Wright 
is a consequence of Wittgenstein's general view of the role 
of proof being one of modifying concepts.
"Can I say: the proof induces us to make a certain
decision, namely that of accepting a particular concept 
formation? Do not look on a proof as a procedure which 
compels you but as one which guides you. And what it guides 
is your conception of a particular situation." (ill 30 RFM) 
and again:
"One would like to say: the proof changes the grammar
our language, changes our concepts. It makes new connections
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and it creates the concept of these connections." (ill 3l)
I do not wish to attempt an explanation or defence of 
this particularly difficult doctrine of Wittgenstein's.
It appears to run counter to all accepted ideas of what 
proof should do. That is, it is the usual belief that 
understanding a proof involves recognising at each stop 
that it must follow from the previous and proceeding in 
this way, inexorably to the conclusion. If the conclusion 
is accepted as a theorem because of the sense (in Frege 's 
terminology) it has, and because of the relation between 
this sense and the previous steps in the proof, how can 
accepting it change that sense? Only, in that, by being 
recognized as proved, something is added to the sense of 
the expression of the conclusion.
Despite the difficulties involved in this view, it is 
nevertheless clear that for Wittgenstein the 4 CT would not 
count as a proof at all, and the reason it would not is its 
uns urv eyability.
The traditional conception of proof as a demonstration 
of a proposition by a purely a priori deduction is what is 
challenged by the acceptance of the 4 CT as a proof. Accepting 
the proof of the 4 CT and other unsurveyably long computer 
proofs requires that the traditional conception is modified 
to accommodate them. In a very real Wittgensteinian sense 
we do not discover that the 4 CT is proved, but in accepting 
it, determine that it is. But in making this determination 
wo have to relinquish the belief that the class of theorems 
is a subset of the class of a priori propositions, and also
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the belief that all known necessary truths are knotm a priori. 
It is in order to make clear the extent of the modification 
to the traditional notion of proof, that I have reverted 
to using the classical terminology and speak of a priori 
propositions rather than a priori 'ways of knowing The 
psychologistic analysis of knowledge that I have supported 
throughout this thesis, however, lends itself to translation 
into this Kantian terminology because it offers a clarifica­
tion of Kant *s a priori/a posteriori distinction rather than 
a rejection of it. Kant's "special sources of knowledge, 
namely a faculty of a priori knowledge»" (I{ant, ed. Kemp 
Smith, 19331 p.44) is explicated as a particular type of 
mental process. Frege *s "Ultimate ground upon which rests 
the justification for holding it ][% judgment] to be true", 
(Frege, trans. Austin, 1959, p.3e) differs from one judgment 
to another, depending on whether an appeal to particular 
facts forms an indispensable part of its demonstration.
The idea that the psychologistic view explicates is that 
of a demonstration. According to it, what a demonstration 
consists in is a description of the steps required to 
achieve a determination of the truth value of the 
proposition. The only steps that could be relevant 
are those belonging to an inferential process. It is for 
this reason that even Frege, with his consistently vehement 
anti-psychologism, can be seen as locating his ground for 
the a priori/a posteriori distinction in differences in 
types of mental processes. The 4 CT, since it is accepted 
as a proof, modifies the concept of proof because the
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inferential process which constitutes its justification 
relies on an appeal to some particular facts, facts 
concerning the outcome of the computer run. The justifica­
tions of "traditional" proofs make no such appeal. They 
consist of the inferences made from logical truths taken 
as premisses to the conclusion and it is the structure of 
that procedure that warrants the truth value of the 
conclusion, not a set of observation statements relating 
to results achieved on individual occasions. A demonstration 
that a theorem is proved if a computer produces a particular 
set of results cannot constitute an a priori justification.
A Fregean a priori justification can only be achieved if 
the result can be derived by inference from the axioms of 
the system. Observing, and it can only be by observation 
that a result has occurred when the print-out is too long 
to check, provides evidence that the theorem is a truth, 
but this evidence can only form part of a proof if the 
meaning of "proof" is extended to allow for sets of 
evidential reports on the outcome of computer operations 
being admissible steps in a proof-procedure.
A psychologistic analysis of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction is thus not committed to the belief that 
mathematics is an empirical science. It is, further, an 
analysis which allows the distinction to be retained with 
a general naturalized epistemology despite any apparent 
difficulties of doing so.
There is a final point which must be made concerning 
the extent to which acceptance of the proof of the 4 CT
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modifies the concept of proof. I have throughout this 
thesis made the realist assumption that if the k CT is true, 
then like all other mathematical truths it is necessarily 
so. In acquiring, therefore, a posteriori knowledge of 
the truth of the 4 CT, knowledge of a necessary truth is 
gained by a posteriori means.
I have also maintained that one of the differences 
between a priori and a posteriori processes is that only 
a priori processes can give knowledge of the necessity of 
a proposition. Thus, although many propositions are 
knowable by either a priori or a posteriori means, only 
where the process is an a priori one can the knower be said 
to have knowledge that the proposition is true and 
necessarily so. The man who devotes his life to measuring 
the angles of triangles may well come to the conclusion 
that their sum is always l80°, but unlike the man who deduces 
this from Euclid 's postulates, cannot know that this must be 
the case, without making further assumptions that proposi­
tions of this type are always necessary.
If this Kantian thesis, that knowledge of modality 
is gained a priori, is maintained and I cannot see that it 
should be discarded, we are forced to the conclusion that 
whilst we have knowledge that the 4 CT is true, we cannot 
know that it is necessary. Given the structure of the 
proof of the lemma this is not surprising. Its proof 
relies on the result of the computer operation which scans 
thousands of individual configurations and pronounces on 
the reducibility or otherwise of each one. The affirmative
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answer is each case convinces us that the lemma is 
proved, but what we cannot know, because of the lack 
of surveyability, is that such a result must occur.
In admitting this proof into the body of mathematics 
as a proof, a break with tradition occurs not only by 
countenancing proof by a posteriori means, but also 
in recognizing a conjecture as proved where knowledge of 
its necessary truth is not available.
It is this consequence of computer proof which in 
my view constitutes the greatest modification to the 
traditional conception of proof, and one which merits serious 
consideration, increasingly so as the passage of time 
since 1977 has shown extraordinarily rapid development 
in computer technology.
(2 ) Computer Proof and the Future
Philosophical discussion of the proof of the Four- 
Colour Theorem is still going on eight years after its 
first publication. References to it, and to Tymoczko*s 
article, occur frequently when the subject of the 
epistemological implications of computer proof are raised . 
Davis and Hersh in "The Mathematical Experience" (1980) 
devote a chapter entitled "Why should I believe a computer?" 
to the topic. They do not offer any conclusions, but 
expound the differences in the kind of objection to this 
proof, made by, on the one hand, mathematicians and on the 
other, philosophers. The mathematicians' objection is 
a matter of taste "whether we get out of such a proof the 
insight, pleasure, satisfaction, or whatever it is we feel
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a good proof should give".
The philosopher's objection is quite different. It 
seems to him that there is a degradation in the degree of 
certainty which violates the nature of mathematics, as he 
understands it," (p.305)
What is demonstrated by these remarks is that the 
Four-Colour Theorem has a crucial role to play within 
the philosophy of mathematics. Mathematicians may find 
many proofs anaesthetic, for a variety of reasons. The 
philosophical objection is a deeper one which goes to the 
heart of epistemology. It is not the fact that this 
particular conjecture has been proved that is important. 
Although it is an interesting one with an easy appeal to 
the lay population, it cannot be said to abound with 
obvious consequences, and applications within mathematics.
It cannot be regarded as a potentially powerful tool with 
which to attack a host of outstanding mathematical problems. 
What the acceptance of this proof does do is to create 
a precedent, %ere one such proof is found acceptable 
others may follow. Even if the Four-Colour Theorem could be 
regarded as an anomaly, its acceptance an abberation on the 
part of the mathematical community, and I have argued that 
the extent to which it embodies a modification in the 
concept of proof prevents it being so regarded, the fact 
remains that it is unlikely to remain unique for long.
Acceptance of this method of proof taken together 
with technological developments and increased interest
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in the field of computer science creates a situation 
which is certain to produce more "computer solutions" 
to intractable mathematical problems,
Tymoczko interprets the acceptance of this proof 
in Kuhnian terms, as a "paradigm shift" in mathematics,
(1977» p,8l). The point he is making by this analogy 
is that the Four-Colour Theorem does not merely present 
evidence of a technological revolution in mathematics, 
but more importantly, a conceptual one.
That further computer proofs will follow is not 
just speculation. Frequent reports in the national press 
are concerned with the use of computers in the search for 
larger prime numbers. The "Guardian" (24 November 1983) 
includes an article by K, Devlin on the discovery at 
the University of California of a new largest known prime 
number 2*21701-1 (the symbol * indicates "to the power 
of") using a CDC-CYBER—174 computer, Ifhether the demonstration 
of the primacy of this number is unsurveyable is not made clear 
in the report, but whether this is the case or not the general 
position is unaffected. The role of computers in mathematics 
is an increasing one. In the near future or even at present 
it is likely that the single criterion of surveyability will 
cease to be the distinguishing feature of a posteriori computer 
proofs,
Technological advances have moved in two directions; 
the speed at which machines operate has increased, as has 
the memory capacity of the machines, and also the logical 
and manipulative capabilities have been developed so that
the type of programs that can be written have changed.
The effects of these augmented powers being 
accessible to mathematicians and the use of them approved 
as standard practice could be that tho idea of proof 
as an a priori deduction from a set of axioms, becomes 
increasingly only one kind of proof amongst others.
In such circumstances, predictions are not easy to 
make, but it is at least clear that tho greater the speed 
at which a machine can operate the more likelihood there 
is of proofs of unsurveyable length being produced. The 
viability of any program is partially a function of the 
amount of expensive computer time it uses. Problems with 
structural similarities to the Four-Colour Theorem in 
that the examination of large numbers of similar cases 
are involved, are obvious choices for solution by computer, 
The faster the computer, the more problems that are open 
to solution.
Developments of artificial intelligence can have 
different effects. The combination of powerful internal 
logic systems and sophisticated programming techniques 
increases the possibility of achieving short surveyable 
proofs, where previous ones were unsurveyable. An analogy 
can be drawn between computer programs and formal proofs. 
Short, efficient ones are more elegant and desirable timn 
rambling convoluted ones.
Thus the drive towards brevity and efficiency could 
reduce the number of unsurveyable proofs, but produce 
instead others which for another reason raise serious
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philosophical problems. Researchers in artificial 
intelligence have produced programs which are "self- 
developing" and "self-correcting," These not only 
eliminate errors in the program listings, but also far 
from just analysing data in accordance with a given 
method, produce new methods themselves for achieving 
a solution. Some of these solutions can only be 
validated and checked by another computer. There would 
seem to be a genuine possibility that a mathematical 
proof achieved by such means could be accepted, once 
computer proof becomes commonplace. The similarity between 
this kind of proof and a traditional a priori deduction 
would be very remote indeed.
Could a situation arise where a computer proof is 
not only unsurveyable because of its length, but also 
unsurveyable in Wittgenstein *s deeper sense of 
unsurveyability, where it cannot be grasped how the result 
is produced by the procedure; in other words, a proof, 
validated by computers, which cannot be understood?
The question is an important one, for any answer 
depends heavily on the view taken on another difficult 
philosophical issue.
Whether or not a piece of mathematics could be 
true, but "incomprehensible" to human beings, given 
a limited genetic structure, is an ontological question.
It depends on the extent to which ascriptions of realism 
can be made. On one view it is not even intelligible 
to suggest that there is a truth which lies beyond human
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compréhension. The idea that there is a true physical 
theory which is there, whether or not human beings could 
understand it, is arguably not a coherent one. It could 
not be discovered if beyond comprehension, and if provided 
by divine interference, could explain nothing. By analogy 
the idea of mathematical theory provided by advanced 
computers, but not comprehensible to mathematicians, requires 
similar realistic assumptions, which are not easily seen to 
be justifiable.
Unlimited acceptance of "proof by computer" involves 
philosophical problems, both epistemological and metaphysical, 
which deserve serious and detailed consideration.
Al.
APPENDIX A
Details of the method of proof of the Pour-ColourTheorem
based on: The Solution of the Four-Color Map Problem
Appel K, and Haken V., Scientific American,
pp. 108-121, 1977.
(1 ) The idea of "neighbouring countries'*
The Four Colour Theorem states that four colours only, 
are needed to colour a planar map so that no two "neighbouring 
countries" are the same colour.
(a) The map must consist of contiguous countries.
(b) A country must be adjacent to another along a line.
If countries meeting at a single point were regarded 
as neighbouring, then a map formed like a pie chart 
would require a different colour for each wedge in
Fig. 1 
This would require 
six colours.
the map.
i. e
(c) Countries must be constituted from a single connected 
region, otherwise clearly more than four colours will 
be needed.
Fig. 2 
This map, with country 
E in two parts, requires 
five colours.
i.e.
A .
( ) Three colours do not suffice
Each country is adjacent to 
the other three so four 
colours are needed.
{3 ) The definition of a normal map
(a) A map is normal, as defined by Alfred Bray Kerape in 1879,
if no country in it completely surrounds another country
or countries, i.e. Eig. 4.
This map is not normal as 
A surrounds B, C, D
and if no more than three countries meet at any point. 
Kempe proved that if the Four-Colour Theorem was 
provable for normal maps it would be true for all maps. 
He also showed that if there was a map which required 
five colours, then there was a normal map which required 
five colours. To prove the Four-Colour conjecture, it
f Iwas necessary to show that a normal five-cromatic map r 
was not possible.
(b) A minimal normal five-c^omatic map is the normal five-
c^omatic map with the fewest possible countries. If the 
assumption of the existence of such a map leads to a 
contradiction the theorem is proved.
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(c) Kempe showed that every normal map has at least one
country with five or fewer neighbours. There are no 
normal maps on a plane where every country has six 
or more neighbours.
(4) The notion of a reducible configuration
(a) A configuration consists of a country and its neighbours.
Thus, from (3) every normal map must contain one of 
these four configurations.
(i) a country with two neighbours;
(ii) a country with three neighbours;
(iii) a country with four neighbours;
(iv) a country with five neighbours.
These configurations, therefore, form an "unavoidable" 
set.
(b) A configuration is reducible if it can be shoim by
examining it and the way in which chains of countries 
can be aligned, that it cannot possibly occur in a 
minimal five-cromatic map. Kempe showed that all 
unavoidable Configurations except (iv) a country with 
five neighbours, were reducible; i.e. he proved that 
if a minimal five-cromatic map contains a country with 
two, three or four neighbours, then there is a five- 
cromatic map with a reduced number of countries. This 
contradicts the assumption of a minimal five-cromatic 
map.
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(c) The proof consists of finding an unavoidable set of 
reducible configurations. This set contains of 1,500 
complex figures. In the century which followed the 
introduction of the idea of reducibility by Kempe, 
methods were developed for testing configurations 
for reducibility. Size of configuration was of major 
importance; for large configurations, the methods 
involved so much detailed examination that the use 
of computers became essential.
Heinrich ileesch, working at the University of Hanover 
formalised Kempe *s method of proving reducibility and 
showed that in principle it could be used on a computer. 
His student, Karl Durre, wrote the first program designed 
to prove reducibility.
(5 ) Dual Graphs
Heesch introduced the idea of describing configurations 
in terras of dual graphs. Each map can be translated into a 
dual form in this way :-
Mark the capital in each country in the map and whenever 
two countries are neighbours, join their capitals by a road 
across their common border. Remove everything except the 
capitals (vertices) and roads (edges). These vertices and 
edges constitute a dual graph of the original map.
Pis. ^
( a )  O r i g i n a l  m a p (b) Dual graph superimposedon map
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When a map is normal, the faces on the graph are triangles 
and the graph is called a triangulation of the plane. The 
number of edges meeting at a vertex is called the degree of 
the vertex and equals the number of neighbours of the country 
represented by that vertex. A circuit is a path of edges, 
starting and ending at the same vertex without crossing 
itself; it divides a graph into two parts, interior and 
exterior.
A configuration is part of a triangulation consisting 
of a set of vertices plus all the edges joining them. The 
ring of a configuration comprises the boundary circuit formed 
by all vertices adjacent to the configuration and the edges 
joining them. Thus the ring in the graph corresponds to the 
ring of countries that surround the configuration on the 
original map. Configurations are described by ring size,
A six-ring configuration is one which is bounded by exactly 
six countries.
(6) Discharging procedures
(a) A method of discovering unavoidable configurations was 
invented by Heesch. It is analogous to moving charge 
in an electrical network. This "discharging" method 
became, in a more sophisticated form, a crucial element 
in the proof of the theorem.
Kempe showed that a triangulation of a minimal five- 
cromatic map cannot contain any vertices with fewer than 
five edges meeting at it. The authors use the word 
"triangulation" to mean, therefore, a triangulation with 
no vertices of degree less than five.
a 6 .
(b) (i) The charge number of a vertex of degree K is 6-K.
(ii) All vertices of degree greater than 6 are therefore 
assigned negative charge.
(iii) Only vertices of degree 5 have positive charge.
From Kempe *s work it can be shoifn that the sum of the 
charge numbers for any triangulation is exactly 12. It 
is important that this charge sum is always positive.
If the charge numbers in such a triangulation are moved 
about; holding their sum constant, some vertices may lose 
all charge, i.e. degree 5 vertices, whilst some negatively 
charged vertices may become positively charged. This 
situation is described as "discharging" and "over­
charging" and the effect obtained depends on the dis­
charging procedure chosen.
Given a specified discharging procedure on an arbitrary 
graph, it is possible to list all configurations that 
after discharging have vertices of positive charge; 
i.e. positive charge can only occur within this finite 
set. Since total charge is positive, there must always be 
some vertices which have positive charge. Therefore, 
since all possible cases of positive charge are 
included in the list of configurations, every triangulation 
must contain at least one of these configurations.
The purpose, for the proof of the k CT, of discharging 
positive vertices is to find a procedure describing 
exactly how to move charge in such a way as to ensure 
that every vertex of positive charge in the resulting 
configuration must either belong to a reducible
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configuration or be adjacent to one. If the configurations
are reducible, since they must be part of an avoidable
set, the Four-Colour Theorem is proved.
(7) Even with improvements in discharging procedures and high
speed computers the difficulties were enormous. It was
believed that large configurations with ring size 18 would
be part of any unavoidable set of reducible configurations.
To test configurations of this size would require over 100
hours of computer time, and more storage than was available
on any computer at that time.
Also it was not known how many reducible configurations
would be needed. It was important to discover whether a small
enough set of manageably small configurations would suffice to
form an unavoidable set. Many months more were•spent on work,
modifying discharging procedures, making experimental test
programs, and on writing a formal proof that a finite
unavoidable set of geographically good configurations existed.
The expression "geographically good" was used to describe
configurations which did not contain the first two of three
obstacles to reducibility discovered by Heesch,
Heesch *s Reduction Obstacles
Figure 6
V has four neighbours on the ring of the configuration W has three non-consecutive neighbours on the ring
a 8
(-J) X  a n d  y a r e  j o i n e d  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  a n d  t o  t h e  r i n g  b u t  h a v e  
o n l y  o n e  o t h e r  n e i g h b o u r  i n  t h e  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
These arrangements of vertices seem to occur only in 
configurations that cannot be proved reducible., Appel,
Haken and Koch could use the obstacles to identify potential 
problem areas in their proof. Heavy solid lines join vertices 
in each configuration. Thin lines connect configuration 
vertices to ring vertices, and form the boundary circuit.
Work on the problem continued from 1970 until 1975. By 
then it was believed that an unavoidable set of configurations 
could be found which was obstacle free and likely to be 
reducible. A program for testing reducibility was written 
in assembler language for the IBM 3bO at the University 
of Illinois, but it underwent repeated modification and was 
finally abandoned at the end of the year: the work of Edward
P. Moore of Wisconsin University showed that a ring size of 
at least 12 was going to be necessary, possibly even l4.
In 1970 a new discharging procedure was used. First, 
an approximation was achieved through a preliminary run of 
the discharging procedure. Each possible case in which a vertex 
was forced to be positive was considered, and the neighbourhood
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examined to find an obstacle-free configuration. If none 
were found the area was called critical. This meant that 
the procedure had to be modified to avoid this problem. If 
an obstacle-free configuration was found, it was not 
necessarily reducible. New programs were needed to search 
the area for one that was also reducible. By June of that 
year the construction of an unavoidable set of reducible 
configurations was complete. 1200 hours of computer time 
had been used, on three computers.
The final proof involved the proof of the reducibility 
of 1,482 configurations. The discharging procedure could be 
checked for accuracy in about two months by hand, but the 
reducibility computations would be "virtually impossible" 
to check in this way, even using a team of mathematicians.
It is this part of the whole proof, the proof that there 
is a set of unavoidable reducible configurations of which 
every minimal five cromatic map must contain at least one 
that constitutes the critical lemma. The proof of this 
lemma is unsurveyable.
Bl.
APPENDIX B
Alternative Logic as a Solution to Vagueness
The first view to be considered is that of Frege, and 
Russell. To the extent which vagueness prevents natural 
language attaining the precision of an ideal language, as 
mirrored in first-order predicate and prepositional logic, 
it is defective, and where it is defective it is beyond the 
scope of logic. Whenever a sentence on the Frege/Russell view 
fails to express a proposition, i.e. whenever it cannot be 
said to be either true or false, it is necessarily beyond 
the scope of a system of propositional calculus. Sentences 
can fail to express propositions, and therefore lack truth- 
value for other reasons than vagueness. "Socrates is a prime 
number" could be held to be truth-valueless rather than just 
false because of the inappropriateness of the predication.
The truth or falsity of the statement just does not arise.
To claim, however, as Russell would, that lack of truth-value 
is equivalent to meaninglessness, in view of the extent to 
which vague predicates occur in perfectly significant ordinary 
conversations, would be to discard most of normal discourse as 
incoherent. To quote from Russell's 1923 article, he announces 
eloquently; "All traditional logic habitually assumes that 
precise symbols are being employed. It is therefore not 
applicable to this terrestrial life, but only to an imagined 
celestial existence.... Logic takes us nearer to heaven than 
most other studies."
This is a view which would be more appealing if the 
so-called defects in natural language formed a small class
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of statements which could either be easily ignored or re­
modelled to eliminate the supposed flaws, but as Max Black 
(1937) comments, these defects pervade the whole of 
empirical science. No experimental result has the rigour 
of a mathematical deduction; it is only approximate. There 
is a gap between the theory and its applications. These are, 
if they are to have any empirical content, dependent on 
observation. Observational predicates are essentially vague 
or "tolerant" due to the nature of our observational faculties. 
To argue from the recognition of this gap between the precision 
of the theory and the vagueness of the empirical experiments, 
that logic and mathematics are inapplicable to experimental 
science, would seem both destructive and absurd, Frege and 
Russell are not alone, however; Duhem (1906) makes the claim 
that :
"Toute, loi physique est une loi approchée; par 
consequent, pour le strict logician elle ne peut etre ni 
vraie, ni fausse," And Max Black (1937) also quotes Einstein's 
remark that; "Insofern sich die Satze der Mathematick auf 
die Wirklichkeit beziehen sind sie nicht sicher, und insofern 
sie sicher sind, beziehen Zie sich nicht auf die Wirklichkeit."
It is easy to recognize that the result of applying 
Euclidean geometry (for example) to empirical situations is 
that the conclusions reached are only approximate. Nothing 
in the world can be described as a point without extension or 
a line with length but not breadth. Geometry is applicable to 
the world in so far as we are aware of the nature and extent 
of the approximations involved. There is no direct analogy
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to the relationship of formal logic to natural language.
Here it is only in some cases that the use of a predicate 
gives an argument an only approximately true conclusion, and 
the problem lies in recognizing exactly where the approximations 
occur, and whether they are sufficient to invalidate the 
conclusion. Nevertheless, the rejection of all vague sentences 
from the scope of logic calls for the removal of too much that 
would be normally considered its province, to be taken seriously. 
If formal logic is regarded as inapplicable to arguments 
expressed in natural languages, then as Stephen Weiss (l97^) 
points out, it cannot provide criteria for evaluating such 
arguments. It would be a convenient solution to the paradoxes 
which result from the vagueness of our terms to claim that 
since the arguments yielding the paradoxes are beyond the 
scope of logic, they cannot lead to contradictions within it, 
but also an inadequate one. Some arguments formulated in 
natural languages are clearly sound and some clearly unsound, 
but this solution fails to distinguish between them.
Quine (1970» p.8l) not only dismisses vagueness as the 
worst possible reason for altering logic; he goes further and 
claims that it is not even possible to do so. All attempts 
to, for instance, redefine negation, result in either giving 
a different name to the same truth-functional connective, or 
else in defining a different connective. In this case, Quine 
maintains, we have no ground for calling it negation; we are 
just not talking about the same thing. He says in "Philosophy 
of Logic"; "Here evidently, is the deviant logician's 
predicament; when he tries to deny the doctrine he only
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changes the subject." All changes, he regards as either 
trivially notational, or else talking about something else.
Even should it be possible to present a coherent challenge 
to the classical system, Quine regards it as anaesthetic and 
contravening what he calls "the maxim of minimum mutilation" 
to tamper with such a "paragon of clarity, elegance, efficiency". 
Ilis answer to the questions raised by vague predicates is that j
language should, and can, be made precise, to the extent it !imatters for the purposes of each individual context. He is, j
I think, on both counts guilty of over-simplification. In ;
the first place he regards all vagueness to be of the i
superficial context-dependent variety, which we have sho-vm I
via the Sorites paradoxes not to be the case, and he also j
believes that where the truth-value of sentence hinges on the ;
vagueness of its terras, these terms should be replaced by 
others to render the truth-value determinate. To do this 
would be effectively to destroy the purpose of many expressions ■
rather than to preserve it, j
If it is not deemed to be possible to idealise languages j
Isufficiently to dispense with vagueness as a problem, the other |
alternative is to make some alteration to our standard logic. I
Since this requires to some degree complicating the classical !
jsystem, or else the adoption of a different, more complicated i
one, the factors which are in tension here are simplicity as ;Iopposed to scope. j
I intend to opt for scope, and will now consider some j
of the suggested ways of designing a logic suitable for |I
dealing with vague sentences. ;
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Tiie first suggestion I shall look at is that of Max 
Black (1937) who defines the notion of a consistency profile 
for a vague term. This definition involves three basic notions; 
(1) language; (2) a situation in which a language user is 
applying a term or symbol L to an object x; and (3) the 
consistency of application of L to x. Situations arise 
where a decision has to be made whether to apply L or r\j L 
to X. This is characterized as a discrimination of x 
with respect to 1, or a DxL. For any number of these DxL, 
some will result in a decision to apply L and some ^  L, 
Allowing "m" to stand for those resulting in L and "n" to 
stand for those resulting in rsj L, he defines the consistency 
of application of L to x as the limit to which the ratio 
“ tends as the number of observers and DxL approach infinity. 
Since this is a function of x and L, it can be expressed 
as C (L, x ), A consistency profile is obtained by plotting 
this function on a graph against a series of terms (x), the 
curve which is derived being a description of the vagueness of 
the terra L, He develops the idea further so that L (x, C) 
can be taken to mean "L applies to x with consistency C" 
and the consistency with which r\J L applies to x is 
so that the Principle of Excluded Middle is replaced by the 
operation which permits tho transformation of L (x, C) into
L  (x è  )"•
There are obvious difficulties with view, although 
Hempel (l939)> despite some technical alterations, considers 
it to be adequate. The most fundamental of these is to actually 
obtain a value for C. The practical difficulties involved in
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collecting sufficient DxL in order to discern the limit
to which the ratio — is tending seem enormous and evenn
if this were easy, it would still be possible to ask the 
question whether any two situations involving a "discrimination 
of X with respect to L", are sufficiently similar to provide 
judgements relevant to the classes m or n. If an individual 
observer applies L to x on one occasion and L to x
on another occasion, we are not bound to conclude that the 
difference lies in the fact that x is a borderline case 
of L. Other background conditions may have altered radically 
even if we are not aware of the change (the observer's mental 
faculties might have broken do^m), but to add to the definition 
a clause to the effect that the background conditions must be 
the same in all relevant respects only leaves us with the 
impossible task of deciding what is to be considered relevant.
More recently there have been several attempts to provide 
an adequate semantics for a logic of vagueness, which fall 
into two conflicting classes. On the one hand there are 
those systems favouring what is described as "the super-truth" 
view, and on the other there are systems operating with 
infinitely many truth-values.
David H. Sanford (l9?6) argues in favour of a system of 
infinite-valued semantics, and against the proposals of 
writers such as Dummett (l975), Fine (l975) and Kamp (1975) 
that vague sentences can be dealt with by counting them as 
true only if they are true for all ways of making them 
completely precise.
There is agreement amongst this group of writers over
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the retention of the Law of Excluded Middle, and the rejection 
of the principle of bivalence. The L,X*M* states that every 
disjunction of the form (P or not P) is true, whilst the 
principle of bivalence says that every statement is either 
true or false. Whilst it is possible to maintain the Law 
of Excluded Middle, and not the principle of bivalence, the 
converse does not hold.
Since the problem with vague sentences is the indeterminacy 
of truth-value in borderline cases, it might be thought 
preferable to adopt a three-valued system, which assigns the 
values true, false, or indefinite to sentences, but it is 
easily seen that this does not solve any problems. It is 
no simpler to determine whether a man with perhaps five hundred 
and one hairs on his head is bald or on the borderline between 
bald and not bald, than to determine whether he is bald or not 
bald. If it is of no help to use three values, it seems 
natural next to suppose that a continuum of values might 
provide the answer. Unfortunately, it is not that straight­
forward, Supposing the system operated with an infinite number 
of values, ranging between 0 for definitely false and 1 for 
definitely true, the others corresponding to all the points on 
a continuum; there can be no reason for assigning one of those 
infinitely many values in favour of another. In the case of 
a colour on the borderline between green and blue, there are 
no criteria to determine whether the statement "that is green" 
should be given the value .6072 as opposed to .59341,
Replacing the principle of bivalence by that of trivalence 
or multi-valence affords no solution, according to Sanford,
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because the common component of these principles is a 
conjunct, which he calls the principle of valence, which 
asserts that every sentence must have a truth-value. If 
this is denied he sees no reason for not using a multi-valued 
system, since it will then never be necessary to assign a 
particular intermediate value to a statement. It would, 
however, be a system in which some of the logical connectives 
are not defined truth-functionally.
Sanford admits that his definitions are less elegant 
and more unfamiliar than those of Fine and Kamp, but despite 
these disadvantages rejects their two-valued systems in favour 
of his own.
The super-truth theory is concerned, as I have said, with 
making vague predicates more precise, "For every vague 
statement, there is a certain range of acceptable ways of 
making it definite, that is, of associating determinate truth- 
conditions with it." (Dummett, 1975). Dummett considers a 
method of making vague statements definite to be acceptable if 
it preserves the truth-value of the statement for all cases 
where it was previously either definitely true or definitely 
false.
It is unclear whether Dummett regards this as a necessary 
and sufficient condition of "acceptability". Although 
preserving the truth-value in previously clear-cut cases may 
constitute a necessary condition for "acceptably precisifying" 
a vague predicate, it would hardly seem to be a sufficient 
condition. There must be numerous instances where two totally 
different predicates are definitely true and definitely false
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of the same objects, yet no—one would suggest that 
substituting one for another was an acceptable way of 
making the former more precise,
I would agree with Sanford in preferring a multi­
valued approach, not just on the basis of the arguments he 
produces, but also because I would doubt the feasibility of 
finding in all cases a method of making a vague expression 
precise. The difficulty with many vague terms is that 
there are no criteria for providing them with sharp 
boundaries and even if there were, the purpose or function 
of the expression would be radically altered by doing so.
The theory which in recent years has been the subject of 
a good deal of research by logicians and mathematicians is 
"fuzzy set theory". It was originally developed by L,A,
Zadeh (19^5) to provide a means of manipulating vague or 
inexact concepts via operations similar to those of standard 
set theory. Although it is not possible to be sure how 
successfully this theory deals with the problem of vagueness, 
it does appear to have considerable potential and be well 
worth detailed study.
Fuzzy sets are conceived as subsets of some well- 
defined set which themselves have ill—defined or "fuzzy" 
boundaries. In this way they resemble the "doubtful fringe" 
or "penumbral area" which forms part of the extension of 
a vague term. If a term is defined on the basis of the clear 
cases for its application the individual applications of the 
term or expression can be regarded as forming a set. In so 
far as there is indeterminacy over some applications of the
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term to some objects, there is indeterminacy over the 
membership of these applications to the set so defined.
Fuzzy set theory allows for these cases of doubtful set 
membership by defining a membership function for a fuzzy 
sub-set of a set which provides a grade or degree of
membership for any potential element of that set. The value
of the function is defined within the closed interval (O — l) 
so that degree of membership assigned to any doubtful element 
can take any value between 0, which definitely excludes that 
element from membership of the set, and 1 which definitely 
includes that element. Thus, if x is a set representing 
the extension of the terra "red", "x" can be regarded as 
a member of x if it is a particular application of the 
term. Should "x" be a borderline or doubtful application 
of "red", and A, a fuzzy subset of x, then the degree of 
membership of "x" in A can be expressed as the function
the value of which ranges from 0 to 1.
The usual set-theoretic operations complementation, 
union and intersection, for example, can be defined 
analogously for fuzzy-sets, also the relations of containment 
and equality. For any two ordinary sets A and B, A is
contained in B if every member of A is also a member of
B, Similarly for any two fuzzy sets A and B, if every 
member of A belongs to B to at least the same extent as 
it belongs to A, then A can be said to be contained in B. 
The union of two fuzzy sets A and B, whose membership 
functions f A ~ and f 6 C is a fuzzy set C,
where C = AUB, the membership function of which can be
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defined as
■ f o  C o c ' O  =  M a x  U f a  C-'o c ' O ^  iç, ‘ x T ' e  D C
This is the smallest set which contains both A and B, 
the set of the elements of at least one of A and B.
This corresponds to logical disjunction, whereas the 
intersection of sets corresponding to conjunction is 
defined as a fuzzy set C, where C = A AB, and for which
f  o  C  " o c O  =  M i n  C  f  A  C ' j c O , f  e> . " xJ' &  o c
or the largest set contained in both A and B, the set 
of all the elements which belong both to A and B, Under 
these definitions De Morgan *s laws and the laws of distribution 
hold as do those of associativity and transitivity. It would,
I think, be unprofitable to devote more space to expounding 
the technicalities of this theory which are available in 
Zadeh's papers and related works, but it can be seen that 
the fundamental idea offers a more intuitively acceptable 
representation of our way of using inexact concepts. We do 
use some concepts, because they are not precisely defined, 
not despite their lack of definition, and a logical system 
developed especially to reflect tliis seems more appropriate 
than one which demands the idealization of language in order 
to formalize the inferences made in that language.
One of the most important features of this system is 
that the result of a long chain of slightly unreliable 
deductions is very unreliable indeed. In this respect the 
theory seems to approximate closely to our normal expectations
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We would not be likely to envisage that the conclusion of 
an argument couched in vague terms would be definitely true 
or false, as it would be on the super-truth theory. It is 
much more likely that the conclusion would have only the 
same degree of validity as the premisses,
J.A, Goguen in "The Logic of Inexact Concepts" (1988-69) 
presents a solution to the Sorites paradoxes using fuzzy-sets, 
and then proceeds to develop the theory at length. He 
justifies the use of fuzzy sets on grounds of the utility of 
this form of representing concepts not only for philosophical
(1)purposes, but also for those of technology, although research 
in these areas is still in its infancy. Despite his warning 
that "one must not expect too much of fuzzy sets and logic" 
Goguen (1968/69) does believe that the theory "is rich enough 
in operations and properties to be of genuine use in 
constructing models for a wide variety of situations" (p.337)» 
and further, that the mathematical properties of the abstract 
mathematical objects turn out to be the properties we 
consider reasonable for inexact concepts. I would agree 
with Goguen and Sanford that although it has not been shown 
that this is the best or only approach to the problem of 
constructing a logical system capable of representing 
adequately the essential vagueness of ordinary language, it 
does appear to have sufficient scope to merit detailed 
investigation.
(1) Bellman, Kalaba and Zadeh - Abstraction and PatternClassification (I966)
Cl.
APPENDIX G
Formal Details of Kessler *s Reconstruction of Millian 
Arithmetic
based on Frege, Mill and the Foundations of Arithmetic 
(Journal of Philosophy, LXXVII, (2) I98O, pp.70-73)
The calculus of individuals is used to formalize the 
conception of numbers as types of structural relations.
Familiarity with the axioms of this system is assumed 
as are the notions of atomicity, disjointness and 
nominalistic sum (denoted by the symbol *+
The definition offered of a numeral (n) is that it 
denotes that numerical relation which holds between an 
aggregate x and a property p just in case x has n 
p-parts.
(1) Axiomatization of the calculus of individuals
( D O V y )  Coc. <  . Z) O C < Z  ) )
(:)cD Cy) Caw) ( 3 ( qi-om Cw)6 ot-om Cz) & % y
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(2) The number 0
The number 0 is that numerical relation which holds 
of an aggregate x and an individuating property p just 
in case x contains no p-parts.
(^ ) O  pj iff (<Jü) C w  <  OC P uj3
If the predicate letter p refers to any property at 
all, it refers to the property p. This is adopted as a 
convention.
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(3) The number 1
The number 1 is that numerical relation which an 
aggregate bears to a property p, just in case x contains 
exactly one p-part.
(b) ' i( f^ X 6 Py fi 6* oc 6 Pz..3 Z = y ) )
(4) A successor
The definition of a successor is a more complicated 
matter,
The intuitive description of a successor on this theory 
is this: an aggregate x bears the numerical relation m*
to a property p just in case removing exactly one p-part 
from X leaves an aggregate that bears the relation m to p. 
Thus, any aggregate that bears m* to p contains one more 
p-part than any aggregate that bears ra to p .
(<=) m 'Co&.pJiFf  y - * Z  t m  <:y ,  p }  ^  I 6 Z ,  p ) )
This initial definition fails because of the "problem 
of fusion", which is explained in this way (p.?l),
"Suppose that a and b are gold spheres. Let y be an 
aggregate consisting of a plus half of b. Let z be the 
aggregate consisting of that part of b" not contained in y .
Then we have l(y, being a gold sphere) and O (z, being a 
gold sphere). z contains no goId-sphere parts and the only 
such part of y is a. By (c), we would have that 0 (y + z , 
being a gold sphere.) However, since y + z contains both 
a and b, we should have that z , (y + z, being a gold sphere). 
The problem is that a part of y and a part of z, neither of 
which is a gold sphere, have "fused" in y + z to yield a new 
goId-sphere-part. "
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A restriction on the bound variables y and z in
(c) offers a solution.
(d) (i)Cw)Cwz. Puo *3' *\/*a><c.z.)
A further restriction on the bound variables of (c)
is necessary to eliminate another difficulty (p.72), "Suppose
that Willow and Bree are cats. Consider an aggregate y 
that consists of both Willow and Bree, and an aggregate z 
that consists of just Willow, Then, 2 (y, being a cat)
and 1 (2, being a cat), By (c) we can derive 2* (y + 
being a cat). But this is incorrect. Z* (y + z, being
a cat) is true iff there are parts w and t of y + z 
such that 2, (w, being a cat) and 1 (t, being a cat) where
w and t have no cat-parts in common. The parts w and t 
must be disjoint with respect to their cat-parts.
Thus :
(d) (ii) (juL))CuuZ.ij+%. 6 w  ^
which is a nominalistic analogue of set-theoretic disjointness. 
No p-part of y + z is a p-part of both y + z.
Aggregates y and z which satisfy both d(i) and d(ii) 
with respect to a property p can be described as p-disjoint 
(yp/z) giving us
(®) y p/z iff PuJ O* CwJZ. U .V» U> Z.Z.)
&  C w Z y  • (f,' L O ' C Z ) )
The successor relation can now be defined in two stages.
(fa) o'coc, pj iff 1 C3C,
( f b )  m '  (  3C, p i  i f f  C 3 y ) ( 3 z ) C o c  = u + 2  m C y . p i
S  iCz., p%)
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(fb) holds when ra 0, It is also possible to define
(g) 2  p D  iff
3 c 30. pi iff a' cx-.p)
It is now possible to express the facts that (i)
0 is a natural number; (ii) any number generated from
a natural number by an application of the successor relation 
is a natural number, and (iii) these are the only natural 
numbers. If Nn = the property of being a natural number, then
(h) Nn fm i  i f f  C F iC F Coi & CniC F Cni =• PC n 'i ' . :^  F c m i )
Finally, truth—conditions for identities of pure number 
theory must be provided.
On this view "m = n" is true just in case 'm * and *n * 
refer to the same numerical relation. The task of giving 
truth conditions for identities of pure number theory, therefore, 
becomes that of giving truth-conditions for identities of 
numerical relations.
(i) C m  Cx.pJ) =  n C x ,
is clearly necessary but insufficient to establish the 
identity of numerical relations m and n. Co-extensional 
predicates need not refer to the same relation, A stronger 
condition must be formulated, to make sure that *m^ and *n* 
denote the same numerical relation.
If it can be established that, for any individuating 
property p, the property of having n, p-parts is identical 
with the property of having m p-parts, it will be clear 
m and n are identical.
This is precisely what is established when it is shown 
that an equivalence of the above form (i) is valid in any
C5.
model of the calculus of individuals and the definitions 
(a)-(h). If (i) is true in every such model then both 
m (x, p) and n, (x,p) are provably equivalent to:
( j) C B o C i ' ) " ‘ •• • &  oc,r<& Poe, & &  Pior Q Cy)CPy & q
^  • v' =
for some x . This means that m and n apply to an
aggregate x (with respect for the property p) in virtue 
of the same aspect of that aggregate *s structure. This is 
the characteristic of having a particular number of p-parts 
If * k stands for truth in every model of the calculus 
of individuals and with definitions (a)-(h) we have
(k) *m = n* is true iff \r C p3 C m  S
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